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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
1. At present, relations between the European Union (EU) and Vietnam are 
governed by the Co-operation Agreement on Economic and Trade of 1995 and 
the EU-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement 1980. 
In the near future, a new Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Partnership and Cooperation (PAC) is supposed to enter into force between 
both parties. But this does not seem to be the last step on the relations between 
Vietnam and the EU. As the PAC expressly states, it should facilitate the launch 
and conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 
The commitments to be assumed by the parties in that future FTA would 
go beyond those established in prior agreements. The EU’s Global Europe 
Strategy states that FTAs shall be comprehensive and ambitious in coverage 
and “they should tackle non tariff barriers through regulatory convergence”. 
One of the areas repeatedly mentioned in the Strategy where regulatory 
convergence is needed are intellectual property rights (IPR).  
The objective of this Report is to analyse the probable content of a 
Chapter on IPR in a hypothetical FTA between the EU and Vietnam, the 
implications that such Chapter may entail for the IPR system of the Asian 
country, the probable socio-economic impact that it may have, and the 
cooperation mechanisms that may help Vietnam on the implementation of this 
Chapter. The Report is divided in four chapters having in mind the items of its 
Terms of Reference. 
 
2. Chapter I explains the reasons that justify the inclusion of an IPR Chapter 
in a hypothetical FTA between the EU and Vietnam, and the international IPR 
regulatory framework in which such treaty will be integrated.  
As stated in the Europe 2020 Strategy, research and innovations are 
basic components of the EU’s economic growth. IPR protection both within the 
boundaries of the EU and in third countries where European firms make 
business is essential in this strategy.  
Despite the problems that presently exist in Vietnam to ensure an 
effective IPR protection and enforcement, the Asian country also grant a great 
relevance to this issue. The reason is that its political aim is to become a 
“knowledge-base market economy of the 21st century”. The Party believes that 
encouraging creation and innovation, and IPR protection serve the national 
development. In addition to this, Vietnam authorities are aware of the benefits 
that the increase of the level of IPR protection has for the attraction of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), international transfer of technology and the promotion 
of local innovators and researchers. 
Having this in mind, it is no surprise that the PAC reaffirms the great 
importance that both parties attach to IPR protection (Art. 20). In this sense, 
there should not be any problem to include an IPR Chapter in a hypothetical 
EU-Vietnam FTA. Divergences may actually appear on the negotiation of the 
content of that Chapter: while the objective of the EU in its FTAs is to provide a 
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level of IPR protection similar to that of the EU legislation, this might be 
detrimental for Vietnam having in mind its level of economic development. In 
any case, an agreement is always possible as far as the EU has affirmed the need 
to take into account the level of development of the countries concerned. 
The inclusion of an IPR Chapter in FTAs in one of the means used by the 
EU to increase the level of protection of IPR provided for in the existing 
international regulatory framework composed by TRIPS and other multilateral 
treaties. The EU has concluded several FTAs including IPR provisions. The most 
relevant ones are those concluded with Korea (EU-Korea FTA); Colombia and 
Peru (EU-CP TA); Central America (EU-CA AA) and the CARIFORUM States 
(EU-CARIFORUM EPA). Special attention is paid to these treaties during the 
Report.  
Vietnam is also party to several FTAs included those with US, Japan or 
Switzerland. 
IPR provisions in FTAs include so called TRIPS-plus – extend the 
protection provided for in TRIPS, or TRIPS-extra provisions – oblige the parties 
to grant protection to categories of IPR which are not mentioned in TRIPS. 
These provisions do not derogate but simply supplement the provisions 
established in those treaties. In particular, the National Treatment and Most 
Favoured Nation principles are still applicable with a few exceptions.  
 
3. Chapter II is the main one of the Report and has two objectives. The first 
is to determine the hypothetical content of an IPR Chapter by identifying 
common IPR provisions that exists in previous FTAs concluded by the EU. The 
second is to assess the implications that the adoption of a Chapter with that 
content may have on Vietnam’s IPR legislation.  
The chapter is divided in four sections: a) objectives, general obligations 
and principles; b) substantive protection; c) enforcement; d) technology 
transfer. Of particular relevant are the first three. 
The content of provisions in FTAs related to “objectives”, “nature and 
scope of the obligations” and “general principles” is very important. The reason 
is that they provide some flexibility to the Parties when implementing the 
obligations of the IPR Chapter into national legislation in order to adapt them to 
their specific needs. The comparison among the FTAs concluded by the EU 
show that their objectives are not exclusively to “ensure an effective protection 
and enforcement of IPR”. The FTAs also refers to other objectives which are 
more relevant of developing countries such as “the promotion of the 
international transfer of technology”. Furthermore, all the FTAs make reference 
to the Doha Declaration on Public Health and the objectives and principles of 
TRIPS (arts. 7 and 8). It is important to note that these principles slightly vary 
from one FTA to another depending on the particular circumstances of each 
EU’s partner. This is particularly important for Vietnam: its authorities would 
have some scope to negotiate the inclusion of principles which are relevant for 
the country and which should guide the implementation of the FTA in national 
law.  
In relation to the substantive provisions they concern all categories of 
IPR. In general, the level of protection established in those provisions already 
exists in Vietnamese IPR legislation. There are just a few exceptions. First, in 
the field of copyright, Vietnam would need to ratify the WCT and WPPT and to 
increase the term of protection of copyright and related rights to 70 and 50 
years. Second, in the field of geographical indications (GIs) – an area of great 
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relevance for the EU and for Vietnam as well, it is presumed that a hypothetical 
FTA would include an obligation on mutual recognition, and an obligation to 
increase the protection of GIs in Vietnam probably including provisions on the 
conflict with previously registered trademarks. Third, in the field of trademarks, 
Vietnam would need to make efforts to streamline registration procedures and 
to ensure that decisions are adequately reasoned. FTAs also include provisions 
on the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge which would 
be of great interest for a biodiversity-rich country such as Vietnam. 
As previously mentioned, provisions on enforcement are the most 
demanding in the FTAs. Vietnam has been pointed out by the EU (and the US) 
as one of the source countries of counterfeit and pirate products. The measures 
which have been taken to tackle this problem are acknowledged, but they are 
still considered insufficient. The implementation of the obligations in this field 
would need Vietnam to modify part of its IPR legislation – e.g. ensure that 
enforcement actions and penalties have deterrent effect on infringers; adapt the 
list of entitled applicants to include licensees, provide the possibility to ask for 
provisional measures before the commencement of the procedure, or regulate 
the right of information. More important than that, it will need Vietnam to 
make a great effort in providing the means to ensure the effective enforcement – 
e.g. investments in new equipment and facilities, new personnel and the 
training of that personnel. In order to fulfil these obligations, Vietnam might 
would benefit from cooperation mechanisms provided for in the FTAs. 
 
4. Chapter III focuses on the implications that the inclusion in a 
hypothetical FTA between EU and Vietnam of provisions similar to those in the 
existing EU’s FTAs may have on the economy and society of the Asian country. 
For that purpose, attention is paid to general studies on the impact of the 
increase of the level of IPR protection in developing countries and to a few 
studies concerning Vietnam. 
According to these studies, the strengthening of IPR protection may have 
three inter-related benefits: increase of FDI; promotion of international 
technology transfer; and encouragement of innovative and research activities by 
local firms. The studies coincide that developing countries do not enjoy these 
benefits the same way. It depends on its level of development and its particular 
circumstances – e.g. the consistency of their research and development (R&D) 
structure. Furthermore, developing countries may only enjoy the benefits of an 
increase of IPR protection in the long term.  
Besides the benefits, the increase of IPR protection may also have costs. 
The most important ones are those deriving from the implementation of the 
provisions on IPR enforcement in so far as they may imply huge investments in 
facilities, equipments and human resources. Other probable costs are those 
related to the obstacles which might be created to access to medicines, the 
development of the agricultural sector, equitable benefit-sharing of the 
exploitation of traditional knowledge and genetic resources, and access to 
knowledge.  
It is sustained that to maximise the benefits and to reduce the costs of the 
increase of the level of IPR protection, each developing country must adapt its 
IPR system to its level of development and its particular circumstances. 
Furthermore, IPR reforms must be accompanied with other measures in IPR-
related fields such as R&D. 
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In the case of Vietnam, it seems that the increase on IPR protection have 
not had the desired impact on economic development so far due. Some of the 
reasons pointed out by scholars and national authorities are: the enforcement of 
IPR is still weak; public awareness about IPR is not appropriate; and the IPR 
creation is weak due to the lack of enough scientists and engineers, the low 
degree of investment in R&D – 0.5 of the country’s GDP, and the existence of 
deficiencies in the R&D structure. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the existing IPR legislation in Vietnam 
suggests that some parts are not in accordance to the level of development of the 
country. That is the case, for instance, of the regulation of plant variety rights 
where Vietnam is bound to apply the very restrictive regime of UPOV 1991. It is 
sustained by some scholars that such a regime might have a negative impact on 
the development of the agricultural sector. Fortunately, that is not the situation 
as a whole. Other aspects of the IPR legislation seem to be more suitable to the 
particular circumstances of Vietnam – for instance, the regulation of the 
international exhaustion of rights seems to be adequate to promote the access to 
medicines.  
In general, the adoption of an FTA with an IPR Chapter similar to those 
of other FTAs concluded by the EU will neither increase nor reduce these costs. 
However, there is one important exception: enforcement. Compliance with 
obligations in this field might require Vietnam a big investment in human and 
financial resources: building new facilities, purchasing new equipments, hiring 
new personnel, training new and old personnel, etc...  
In any case, despite the low impact of the increase of IPR protection in 
Vietnam and the implied costs, official documents show the commitment of 
national authorities to keep the same attitude towards IPR protection to attain 
some strategic objectives of the country. These objectives include the attraction 
of FDI from enterprises in very IPR-sensitive sectors such as IT, telecom and 
bio-tech; or the development of a strong R&D market.  
In order to attain these objectives, Vietnam authorities are recommended 
to: a) negotiate an IPR chapter which provides for a level of protection that is 
the most adequate to its level of development and its particular circumstances; 
b) as a complement to the first, negotiate the inclusion in the IPR Chapter of 
general principles which should allow its authorities some flexibility when 
implementing the obligations in the FTA to its national legislation; c) 
accompany the IPR reforms, with measures in other fields so that its national 
industry can take full profit of IPR; d) finally, if needed, Vietnam should make 
use of the cooperation mechanisms provided for in the FTAs and ask the EU for 
technical assistance to facilitate the achievement of these objectives. 
 
5. Chapter IV analyses the cooperation mechanisms provided for in the 
EU’s FTAs, with the purpose of establishing whether their inclusion in a 
hypothetical FTA with Vietnam will add something to the bilateral cooperation 
schemes that already exist.  
These mechanisms are of great aid for helping developing countries to 
comply with the obligations assumed in the treaties. They focus in three areas: 
the effective protection and enforcement of IPR, the promotion of international 
transfer of technology and the consolidation of a viable R&D system in 
developing countries.  
As confirmed by the professionals interviewed for this Report, technical 
assistance is of great relevance for Vietnam in order to tackle the two main 
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problems for the effective protection and enforcement of IPR in the country: the 
lack of human and financial resources to fight against counterfeiting and piracy, 
and the lack of public awareness of the importance of IPR protection. According 
to the existing EU’s FTAs, Vietnam would benefit from exchange of information, 
capacity building and enhancement of institutional cooperation between IP 
offices. These cooperation mechanisms go much beyond those established in the 
PAC. In any case, many of the professionals interviewed for this report agree 
that such technical assistance needs to be tailored to the particular 
circumstances of Vietnam; training programs do not have to follow the “one size 
fits all” approach – the flexibilities of TRIPS need to be explained as well; 
technical assistance needs to be provided to all IPR-related national agencies 
and business associations; finally, access to IT devices or of databases managed 
by international organisations is also required.  
Cooperation mechanisms also aim to promote technology transfer to 
EU’s partners. The reason is that the more technology-advance is a country, the 
more it can benefit from an IPR system and the more it can absorb IPR-related 
imports. So the promotion of technology transfer is for the benefits of all the 
parties involved. For this purpose EU’s FTAs provide for a variety of 
cooperation mechanisms: exchange of views and information on practices 
affecting technology transfer both domestically and internationally; EU’s 
incentives to its institutions and firms to promote and to facilitate the transfer 
of technology to the other Party in such a way that allows the establishment of a 
viable technological platform; academic, professional and business exchange 
programs. 
Finally, as previously mentioned, it is acknowledged that for IPR 
strengthening to have an impact on the economy of a country it must be 
accompanied by measures to consolidate its R&D structures. The EU-
CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-CP TA include specific cooperation mechanisms 
conceived for helping their partners to improve their R&D systems. They 
include the exchange of information about publicly-funded R&D projects; the 
participation of entities and experts on their respective systems of science and 
technology (S&T); and capacity building programs.  
Many of these latest mechanisms are already mentioned in the PAC. 
These mechanisms might be highly beneficial for Vietnam having in mind the 
reported situation of R&D in the country – very low investment in the field, few 
level of R&D activity in the private sector, lack of cooperation between public 
R&D organisations and private enterprises, lack of IPR awareness among 
researchers. These mechanisms may help Vietnamese authorities to attain its 
objective of raising Vietnam’s science and technological capacity to the level of 
regional leaders established in the country’s current five-year plan on science 
and technology.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1. At present, relations between the European Union (EU) and Vietnam are 
governed by the Co-operation Agreement on Economic and Trade of 19951 and 
the EU-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement 19802. Thanks to these agreements, the 
relations between Vietnam and the EU have expanded and developed, yet the 
relationship still stands at a level lower than what can be allowed by the 
potential and advantages of both sides3.  
In order to deepen in their relations, both parties have negotiated a new 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation (PAC)4. 
The PAC provides the basis for a more effective engagement by the EU and its 
Member States with Vietnam in the development, trade, economic and justice 
domains. At the moment of drafting this Report, such Agreement was about to 
enter into force. 
However, this is not the last step on the relations Vietnam-EU. As the 
PCA expressly states, it should facilitate the launch and conclusion of a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) in accordance with the EU’s objective of creating a 
coherent economic and political framework for relations between the EU and 
ASEAN countries5.  
 
2. Further deepening in the economic-trade relations between Vietnam and 
the EU seems to be of common interest for both parties.  
On the one half, according to the Vietnam’s Master Plan for the relations 
with the European Union (the Master Plan)6, “the development of a 
comprehensive co-operation relationship with the EU and with each of its 
Member States on the basis of equality and mutual benefit is of strategic 
importance to the cause of national industrialisation and modernisation”7.  
On the other half, in the Global Europe Strategy8 of 2006, the European 
Commission stated that opening markets abroad was an important source of 
productivity gains, growth and job creation. ASEAN was identified as one of the 
regional block which whom negotiations of a FTA should be launched based on 
market potential (economic size and growth) and the level of protection against 
                                               
1 OJ L 136, 7 June 1996. 
2 OJ L 144, 10 June 1980. 
3 Master Plan for Relations Between Vietnam and the European Union towards 2010 and 
Orientations towards 2015 (promulgated together with Decision no. 143/2005QD-TTg dated 14 
june 2005 by the Prime Minister), p. 1. 
4 Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, of the other half (Doc. COM(2010) 
699 final). 
5 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Council Decision, p. 2. 
6 Master Plan, p. 1. 
7 Master Plan, p. 1.  
8 “Global Europe – Competing in the World”, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf  
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EU’s export interests (tariffs and non tariff interests)9. Having negotiations with 
ASEAN as a block failed, the EU decided to launch negotiations with each one of 
its members10. It is in this context that negotiations with Vietnam would be 
started.  
 
3. According to the Global Europe Strategy, the commitments to be 
assumed by the parties to a future FTA between the EU and Vietnam would go 
much further than those established in prior agreements, including the PAC not 
yet in force. The Global Europe Strategy states that FTAs shall build on WTO 
and other international rules to go further and faster in promoting openness 
and integration. They shall be comprehensive and ambitious in coverage and 
“they should tackle non tariff barriers through regulatory convergence wherever 
possible and contain strong trade facilitation provisions”11.  
One of the areas repeatedly mentioned in the Strategy where regulatory 
convergence is needed are intellectual property rights (IPR): “FTAs should 
include stronger provisions for IPR...”12.  
The objective of this report is to analyse the possible content of a Chapter 
on IPR in a hypothetical FTA between the EU and Vietnam and the business 
and legal implications that such chapter may entail for Vietnam. For that 
purpose, the report will be divided in four chapters.  
 Chapter I explains the reasons that justify the inclusion of a chapter on 
IPR in FTAs.  
Chapter II identifies common provisions in IPR chapters in FTAs recently 
concluded by the EU and explains the implications that it may have for Vietnam 
IPR system if similar provisions are included in a hypothetical FTA between 
both parties. 
Chapter III focuses on the socio-economic implications that such 
provisions may have for Vietnam taking into account studies of the impact of 
the increase of the level IPR protection in developing countries.  
Finally, Chapter IV deals with the cooperation mechanisms provided in 
the EU’s FTAs and the way they may help Vietnam to implement the obligations 
in an IPR Chapter of the hypothetical FTA with the EU.  
                                               
9 Communication “A single market for Intellectual Property Rigths. Boosting Creativity and 
Innovation to Provide Economic Growth, High Quality Jobs and First Class Products and 
Services” (Doc. COM (2011) 287 final) (hereinafter, the Communication), p. 11. 
10 At present, negotiations have been started with Singapore and Malaysa, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/vietnam/ 
11 The Communication, p. 11. 
12 The Communication, p. 11. 
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CHAPTER I 
JUSTIFICATION OF AN IPR CHAPTER IN A 
HYPOTHETICAL FTA BETWEEN THE EU AND VIETNAM 
 
 
I. EU’S AND VIETNAM’S APPROACHES OF IPR  
 
1. The EU is one of the strongest promoters of IPR protection in the world. 
The main reason for this is that research and innovation are basic components 
of its economic growth strategy. In March 2000, the European Council adopted 
the so-called Lisbon Strategy with the aim of becoming the “most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world in year 2010”13. Such 
objective was renewed in the Europe 2020 Strategy where it is stated that 
“knowledge and innovation are drivers of our future growth”. IPR are essential 
in this strategy in so far as it ensures firms and individuals commercial returns 
for their intellectual creations and provide incentives to invest in future research 
and inventive activities14.  
Other reasons why the EU promotes a high level of protection of IPR are 
that counterfeited and pirated products threaten the health and safety of EU 
citizens and that trafficking with these products have become a source of 
funding for criminal and terrorist organisation15. 
In view of these concerns, it is no surprise the Commission’s assessment 
that “in the knowledge-based economy more than ever, IPR enforcement 
remains a key objective, which is vital for the competitiveness of European 
industry and for EU's growth and jobs as well as for the safety of its citizens”16. 
 But the EU’s objective of promoting a high level of IPR protection is not 
limited to its territory. The EU enjoys a comparative advantage in research and 
innovation activities in particular vis-à-vis emerging economies. Globalisation 
provides Europe with immense opportunities to export and trade in its IP-
intensive products, services and know-how to third countries17. However, EU 
companies cannot take full profit of these opportunities unless their IPR are 
adequately protected when trading in foreign countries. Furthermore, the EU is 
aware that the importation of counterfeited and pirated goods must be tackled 
in the source countries.  
These explain why the EU is an active promoter of the effective protection 
and enforcement of IPR in international fora and why one of the objectives of 
the FTAs concluded with third countries is to include IPR provisions which offer 
“as far as possible identical levels of protection to that existing in the EU”18.  
 
                                               
13 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-
r1.en0.htm 
14 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/  
15 Strategy for the enforcement of IPR in third countries (IPR Enforcement Strategy), p. 7 (OJ 
129, 26 May 2005). 
16 Commission Staff Working Document “IPR Enforcement Report 2009”, p. 3. 
17 The Communication, p. 19. 
18 The Communication, p. 20. 
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2. While its circumstances are not the same than those of the EU, Vietnam 
is also a promoter of IPR protection. The main reason is that the Asian country 
also aims at becoming a knowledge-base market economy of the 21st century. 
For this purpose the Vietnam’s Strategy for socio-economic development 2001-
2010 identifies demands for strong development of scientific and technological 
market associated with protection of IPR19. The Party and the State believe that 
encouraging and promoting creation and innovation, and IPR protection serve 
the national development20. Academics also sustain that IPR protection is a 
critical requirement for any country to develop technologically based industrial 
and promote invention and innovation21.  
In addition to this, it is sustained that a high level of IPR protection helps 
developing countries such as Vietnam to attract foreign direct investment (FDI); 
the international transfer of technology and know-how via networking and 
collaboration with domestic firms22; and the promotion of innovative and 
research activities by local firms and individuals.  
Finally, while there is no official assertion about it, Vietnam authorities 
would certainly agree with the EU’s views that a high level of IPR protection and 
enforcement also help to ensure the health and safety of its citizens and to cut 
the source of financing of criminal organisations. 
Despite these objectives, it is certainly true that Vietnam shall still 
overcome many problems that presently exist in the country to ensure an 
effective protection and enforcement of IPR. In fact, according to the World 
Economic Forum, Vietnam is ranked 127 of 142 countries with regard to 
effectiveness in IPR protection23. Those problems will be explained throughout 
this Report. 
 
3. Taking into account the position of EU and Vietnam about the protection 
of IPR, it should not be any problem for any of the parties to accept the 
inclusion of a Chapter in the field in a hypothetical FTA.  
In fact, in Art. 20 PAC, the parties already “reaffirm the great importance 
they attach to IPR protection and the full implementation of international 
commitments on IPR with a view to ensuring adequate and effective protection 
of such rights in accordance with the relevant international 
standards/agreements, including effective means of enforcement”. 
 
4. The difficulties may certainly show up when negotiating the content of 
that Chapter.  
As it will be explained in chapter III, while IPR protection may have a 
strong positive impact on investment and innovation, academics have 
underlined that it may also have counterproductive effects in developing 
countries: monopolisation of markets by foreign firms, higher prices of IPR-
related products, public health, access to knowledge, food security, 
                                               
19 The same is also valid for the Vietnam Strategy for socio-economic development 2011-2020, 
available at 
http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/Modules/News_English/News_Detail_E.aspx?CN_ID=396692&C
O_ID=30113 
20 NOIP, Intellectual Property Activities – Annual Report 2010, p. 5. 
21 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s Intellectual Property Landscape from a Regional Perspective”, 
International Area Studies Review, vol 14, num. 1, March 2011., p. 97. 
22 This is broadly explained in Chapter III.  
23 Information available at http://gcr.weforum.org/gcr2011/ 
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environment, labour rights, technology transfer, biodiversity management24. At 
the same time, ensuring the effective enforcement of IPR implies the investment 
of a lot of resources (such as human, material, financial or informational) to 
create the necessary administrative and judicial framework. 
Academics sustain that IP protection should be tailored to the domestic 
level of development of each country25. The overarching aim to promote societal 
progress of a country demands a level of IP protection which takes all relevant 
interests into account and balances between them26.  
Vietnamese authorities should pay attention to these concerns in the 
hypothetical negotiations with the EU of a FTA. When negotiating the content of 
the IPR Chapter, Vietnam should try to negotiate levels of protections of the 
different categories of IPR which are adapted to its particular situation, 
provisions which provide certain flexibility for its implementation in national 
law or exceptions to the exclusivity rights. 
 
5. At first sight, this approach might be seen as completely opposite to that 
of the EU since, as previously mentioned, its first objective is to include 
provisions which offer “as far as possible identical levels of IPR protection to 
that existing in the EU”. However, the EU has also stated in the Global Europe 
Strategy that when negotiating FTAs, it is important to “take into account the 
development needs of our partners”27.  
In particular, the recent Commission Communication A single market 
for Intellectual Property Rigths (the Communication)28 states that “[i]n 
negotiating FTAs, the IPR clauses should as far as possible offer identical levels 
of IPR protection to that existing in the EU while taking into account the level 
of development of the countries concerned”. Furthermore, the Communication 
also states that “the right balance also need to be struck between protection of 
IPR in third countries and access to knowledge”29.  
 
6. To conclude it can be affirmed that it is of the interest of both parties to 
include an IPR Chapter in a hypothetical FTA between EU and Vietnam. While 
some disagreements may appear on the content of such Chapter – level of 
protection, flexibilities on the implementation of its obligations, exceptions to 
the exclusivity rights… -, the declared approach of the EU to the negotiation of 
bilateral agreements with its partner suggests that such disagreements might be 
easy to solve. 
 
 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL IPR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN 
WHICH THE HYPOTHETICAL FTA BETWEEN VIETNAM AND 
THE EU WILL BE INTEGRATED 
 
                                               
24 J. Kuanpoth, “TRIPS-plus Rules under Free Trade Agreements: An Asian Perspective”, in: C. 
Heath / A. Kamperman Sanders, Intellectual Property and Free Trade Agreements, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 27. 
25 A. Kur / H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, “Enough is enough – the notion of binding ceilings in 
international intellectual property protection”, MPI Research Paper Series No. 09-01, p. 29. 
26 H. Grosse Russe-Khan, “The concept of sustainable development in International IP Law – 
New Approaches from EU Economic Partnership Agreements”, ICTSD, September 2010. 
27 Global Europe Strategy, p. 19.  
28 The Communication, p. 20.  
29 The Communication, p. 20. 
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1. The existing international IPR regulatory framework and the 
EU’s actions to increase the level of protection 
 
7. As it is widely known, the basic instrument on international IPR 
protection is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). Having been adopted in the framework of the World Trade 
Organisations (WTO)30, all the Members – including the EU and Vietnam – 
must comply with its provisions31.  
Broadly speaking TRIPS obliges the parties to provide a minimum level 
of protection to different categories of IPR – copyright, trade marks, industrial 
designs, patents, lay-out designs of integrated circuits, geographical indications 
and undisclosed information – and to established measures to ensure their 
effective enforcement. Furthermore, art. 64 TRIPS enables its members to refer 
to the WTO Dispute Settlement System in case of controversies on the 
compliance of its provisions.     
 
8. Besides TRIPS, there are many other treaties related to the different 
categories of IPR adopted in the framework of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO). The basic ones are the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of literary and artistic works of 1886 and the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of industrial property of 1883. Both the EU and Vietnam are parties 
to these treaties – in fact, TRIPS obliges WTO Members to comply with them.  
However, while the EU or its Members States have ratified all the other 
treaties administered by WIPO, that is not the case of Vietnam32 and of many 
other developing and developed countries.  
 
9. Having in mind the relevance the IPR have for its economic growth, it is 
easy to understand that the EU considers that the level of protection provided 
by TRIPS is not enough. Furthermore, it is sustained that the agreement is not 
adequate implemented in many countries. The EU provides for a higher level of 
IPR protection within its territory and fights for the strengthening of IPR 
protection in third countries. This is completely legal from the point of view of 
TRIPS in so far as art. 1.1 states that WTO members “may, but shall not be 
obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by 
this Agreement”.  
 
                                               
30 TRIPS is included in Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing WTO. 
31 Inadequate protection of IPR constituted one of the biggest obstacles to Vietnam’s accession 
to the WTO and has remained a source of external pressure. Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s ...”, 
p. 74. It should be recalled that at the time TRIPS was enacted and Vietnam submitted in 
application for WTO Membership (1995), IPR system in Vietnam functioned mainly on the basis 
of “under-law” documents (WTO, Vietnam Review of Legislation before TRIPS Council, Doc. 
10-4595 of 7 September 2010, p. 2). So the efforts made by Vietnam to adapt its IPR systems to 
TRIPS must certainly be appreciated. 
32 Vietnam is party to the following treaties in the field of IPR: TRIPS (1st January 2007), WIPO 
Convention (January 1975), Paris Convention (January 1975), PCT (December 1992), Madrid 
Agreement (February 1973), Madrid Protocol (April 2006), Berne Convention (July 2004), 
Phonograms Convention (April 2005), UPOV Convention (November 2006), Rome Convention 
(March 2007). Treaties which have not been ratified yet by Vietnam are: WCT, WPPT, Patent 
Law Treaty, Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks 2006, Trademark Law Treaty 1994, 
Budapest Treaty, Hague Agreement, Nice Agreement, Locarno Agreement, Strasbourg 
Agreement and Vienna Agreement. The text and information of all these treaties is available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ 
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10. The EU fights for the strengthening of IPR protection in third countries 
by implementing two categories of actions: multilateral and bilateral.33 
 
a) The main multilateral action implemented by the EU is its 
participation in the negotiations in international fora such as the TRIPS Council 
and in the different Committees of WIPO. 
Furthermore, the EU has been involved in the negotiation of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Act (ACTA). Due to the frustration with the progress on 
monitoring and norm-setting on IPR enforcement in multitateral fora, the 
major industrialized countries started the negotiation of this treaty in 200734. 
The final text was adopted in October 2010. Its purpose is to have a new 
plurilateral treaty improving global standards for the enforcement of IPR, to 
more effectively combat trade in counterfeit and pirated goods35. 
 
b) Bilateral action. Following the example of the US Special 301 
Report36, the European Union in running, since the adoption of the Strategy for 
the enforcement of IPR in third countries (IPR Enforcement Strategy) in 2005, 
an Evaluation of the IPR Enforcement in Third Countries (the Evaluation 
Report). The result of this evaluation is a list of countries/regions on which the 
EU must focus its efforts on promoting IPR protection and enforcement.  
The EU is adopting two complementary actions with the countries 
included in the list. On the one half, it conducts "political dialogues" on IP 
issues (usually involving European industry), and/or runs technical co-
operation programmes intended to help enhance the IPR system with 
authorities of those countries. On the other half, if the adequate circumstances 
exist, the EU launches negotiations for bilateral trade agreements with certain 
of these countries.  
Vietnam was listed in Category 337 in the Evaluation Report in 2006: 
“Countries/regions with high levels of production, transit and/or consumption 
of IPR infringing goods, with which the EU may soon enter into a deeper trade 
relation, which would include higher focus on IPR enforcement”38. 
                                               
33 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/  
34 In the WTO Council for TRIPS, Brazil, India and China have consistently blocked the 
inclusion of enforcement as a permanent agenda item. At the WIPO, enforcement issues are 
relegated to a purely advisory committee. 
35 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/anti-
counterfeiting/  
36 The Special 301 is an annual review process led by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
of intellectual property protection and market access practices in foreign countries. Those 
countries which do not provide "adequate and effective" protection of IPR or "fair and equitable 
market access to United States person that rely upon IPR" are included in a Watch List or a 
Priority Watch List. In the 2011 Special 301 Report, Vietnam is included in the Watch List – 
meaning a country having "serious intellectual property rights deficiencies" – along with 
Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Italy, Jamaica, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, 
Philippines, Romania, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
Available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2841 
37 Along with Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Malaysia. In 2009, that list was updated: Vietnam is still included along with Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, India, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Russia and United States. 
38 In particular, the Evaluation Report stated that “Although [the ASEAN] countries have made 
substantial progress in recent years in legislative terms, the production and trade of infringing 
goods is generalised, enforcement actions are insufficient and penalties against infringers are 
mostly non-deterrent. The expected opening of markets between the EU and ASEAN will have to 
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11. As it has just been mentioned, negotiation of bilateral trade agreements is 
one of the actions taken by the EU to increase the protection of IPR in third 
countries. Such agreements do not only refer to IPR, but to all trade-related 
aspects. It is usually the case that in exchange for the increasing of the 
protection of IPR, the EU makes concessions in other areas of trade such as 
preferential access to the EU market for certain products or services. 
The EU has negotiated more than 40 of these agreements. Depending on 
the third country, those agreements have taken the form of Economic and 
Partnership Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Association 
Agreements, Trade Development and Cooperation Agreements, Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements or Free Trade Agreements.  
The relevance of IPR provisions in those agreements have grown as a 
consequence of the mandates of strengthening IPR protection included in the 
Global Europe Strategy, the IPR Enforcement Strategy and subsequent 
Commission communications. The number of IPR provisions in the most recent 
FTAs is high in comparison with other fields of law:  
a) 25 (Arts. 139 – 164) in the Economic Partnership Agreement with 
the CARIFORUM States39 (EU-CARIFORUM EPA); 
b) 69 (arts. 10.1 – 10.69) in the Free trade Agreement with the 
Republic of Korea40 (EU-Korea FTA); 
c) 48 (arts. 195 -257) in the Trade Agreement with Colombia and 
Peru41 (EU-CP TA); 
d) 63 (arts. 228 – 276) in the EU-Central America42 Association 
Agreement43 (EU-CA AA). 
At present, the EU is negotiating FTAs with Canada, India, Malaysia, 
Mercosur all of which include IPR chapters with numerous provisions. 
The IPR provisions in these FTAs are TRIPS-plus or TRIPS-extra. The 
first are provisions that provide broader and more extensive standards of 
protection of the categories of IPR established in TRIPS, stronger enforcement 
mechanisms, weakening of the “flexibilities” and “special and differential 
treatment” granted to developing and least developed countries in the 
Agreement. The second are provisions that provide for protection of subject 
matters which are not mentioned in TRIPS – e. g. protection of test data of 
pharmaceutical or agrochemical products. 
 
12. The EU is not alone in the use of FTAs to increase the level of protection 
of IPR. The US has concluded more than 30 FTA agreements with their partners 
and other countries such as Japan, Korea and China are starting to do the same, 
although the content of the IPR Chapter in the case of this latter country varies. 
                                                                                                                                         
be accompanied by an increased respect and protection of intellectual property assets”. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/february/tradoc_145795.pdf  
39 OJ L 289, 31 October 2008. CARIFORUM is composed of the 14 members of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) - Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, and Dominican Republic. 
40 OJ L 127, 14 May 2011. 
41 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf  
42 Central America includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Honduras and 
Nicaragua. 
43 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=689  
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Negotiation of FTAs including IPR provisions is not new for Vietnam 
either. At present, Vietnam is party to the Bilateral Agreement between the US 
and Vietnam on trade relations of 2000 (US-Vietnam BTA), the Agreement 
between Japan and Vietnam for an Economic Partnership of 2008 (Japan-
Vietnam EP), and is in the process of negotiating a FTA with Chile.  
In addition to this, as a member of ASEAN, Vietnam is party to 
Agreements of ASEAN establishing Free Trade Areas with Australia-New 
Zealand, China, India, Korea and Japan although not all of them include IPR in 
their scope of application44.  
Finally, in the specific field of IPR, Vietnam has signed a bilateral 
agreement with the Swiss Federal Council on the Protection of Intellectual 
Property and on Co-operation in the Field of Intellectual Property 1999 and is 
party to the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property 
Cooperation of 1995. 
While some of these agreements exclusively provide for cooperation in 
the field of IPR, others – US-Vietnam BTA, Switzerland-Vietnam Agreement – 
provide for TRIPS-plus and TRIPS-extra provisions similar or even more 
demanding than those included in the FTAs concluded by the EU.  
These treaties are self executing in Vietnam. They are usually invoked 
before the courts and they take them into account on their judgements45. 
Furthermore, in case of conflict between a treaty provision and a national 
provision, the first prevails46. 
As it will be seen in chapter II, the impact of a hypothetical FTA with the 
EU in Vietnam IPR system is reduced by the fact that Vietnam has already 
implemented some TRIPS-plus/-extra obligations in the framework of these 
FTAs. 
 
 
2. The supplementary character of IPR provisions in FTAs: TRIPS 
plus/extra provisions, MFN and NT clauses 
 
13. From what has been already said, it is clear that the purpose of IPR 
Chapters in FTAs is to supplement the protection provided by TRIPS. It shall be 
recalled that this Agreement provides for a minimum standard of protection47, 
so WTO members are free to increase such level of protection with TRIPS-plus/-
extra provisions in the FTAs they negotiate48.  
To reinforce this supplementary character, EU’s FTAs include so-called 
“non-derogation clauses”. The aim of these clauses is to make clear that the 
objective of its IPR provisions is to complement and specify the rights and 
                                               
44 That’s the case of the FTAs with Korea, India or China. 
45 So practitioners believe that the more precise the treaty, the better. However, the lack of 
flexibility for the implementation of the treaty in national law may also have negative effects. 
46 Art. 5 Intellectual Property Law 2005 (IPL). The same solution is provided in art. 759.2 Civil 
Code (CC). 
47 Art. 1.1: Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but 
shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement, 
48 For the same reason, parties to FTAs are free to provide a more extensive protection that is 
required in the FTA in their national legislation. This is expressly mentioned in Art. 139.5 EU-
CARIFORUM EPA. 
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obligations of the Parties under TRIPS49. These “non-derogation clauses” are 
particularly important when interpreting FTAs: a) in case of a conflict between 
the provisions in the FTA and in TRIPS, the first must be interpreted in a way 
that does not contradict or is detrimental to the provisions of the latter; b) it 
cannot be interpreted that the provisions of the FTA derogates those of TRIPS 
or any other international agreement. FTA provisions “complement” those of 
these agreements and, in certain cases, specify the rights and obligations of the 
parties under these agreements. 
 
14. Generally speaking, the effect of the proliferation of FTAs which IPR 
chapters is the “ratchet up” of international standards in the field50.  
This “ratchet up” effect is emphasized by the fact that due to the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment (NT) principles in Arts. 3 and 
4 TRIPS51, parties to these FTAs must grant the higher level of IPR protection 
provided in them not only to nationals of the other party to the FTA but to 
nationals of any other WTO member. Contrary to GATT and GATS, exemptions 
to these principles very limited52.  
None the less, a precision needs to be made: MFN and NT principles are 
only applicable to TRIPS-plus provisions, that is: to provisions in FTAs that 
increase the level of protection of categories of IPR included in TRIPS – e.g. 
provisions that obliges the parties to increase the term of protection of copyright 
to 70 years. However, these clauses are not applicable to TRIPS-extra provisions 
– e.g, test data exclusivity, plant variety rights….- because they do not refer to 
categories of IPR covered by TRIPS 53. As a consequence, an obligation for WTO 
FTA parties to apply these provisions to national of other WTO members does 
not exist. 
 
                                               
49 Arts.196.2 EU-CP TA, 229 EU-CA AA, 10.2.1 EU-Korea FTA. The scope of this clause is 
extended in the EU-CP TA and the EU-CA AA to “other multilateral agreements” and “other 
international treaties in the field of IPR”. The fact that a non-derogation clause is not included 
in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA should not be an obstacle to reach the same result as a 
consequence of the general rules on the interpretation of international treaties provided by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. 
50 M. Handler / B. Mercurio, “Intellectual Property”, in: S. Lester / B. Mercurio (eds.), Bilateral 
and Regional Trade Agreements, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 308-341, esp. 309. 
51 “With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members” 
52 “Exempted from this obligation are any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity accorded by 
a Member: (a) deriving from international agreements on judicial assistance or law enforcement 
of a general nature and not particularly confined to the protection of intellectual property; (b) 
granted in accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) or the Rome 
Convention authorizing that the treatment accorded be a function not of national treatment but 
of the treatment accorded in another country; (c) in respect of the rights of performers, 
producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations not provided under this Agreement; 
(d) deriving from international agreements related to the protection of intellectual property 
which entered into force prior to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, provided that such 
agreements are notified to the Council for TRIPS and do not constitute an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other Members”. 
53 X. Seuba Hernandez, “Health Protection in the European and Andean Association 
Agreement”, HAI Europe/AIS Latinoamerica & Caribe Publication, 2008, pp. 20-22. 
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15. Finally, it is worth mentioning that some EU’s FTAs include provisions 
with NT and MFN principles54. These clauses can also be found in some of the 
FTAs concluded by Vietnam55. 
The objective of the first category of provisions is to make clear that 
national treatment of the nationals of the other party is not subject to any 
conditions and that the only applicable exceptions are those provided for in arts 
3 and 5 TRIPS.  
Thanks to the second, nationals of either Party can benefit from the 
advantages, favours, privileges or immunities granted by other Parties of the 
FTA to national of third countries, subject to the exceptions provided for in 
arts. 4-5 TRIPS. 
The lack of NT clauses in the EU-Korea FTA and the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA do not have any consequence due to the existence of the same clause in 
TRIPS. The lack of MFN clauses in these FTAs means that the Parties to these 
agreements are not oblige to accord national of the other Party the advantages 
granted to national of third parties. However, once implemented in national 
legislation, nationals from the other Parties will benefit from those advantages 
thanks to the NT clause. 
 
                                               
54 Arts. 198-199 EU-CP TA and 230 EU-CA AA. 
55 National Treatment is provided in Art. 3 US-Vietnam FTA and Art. 4 ASEAN-AU-NZ FTA. In 
the Swiss-Vietnam FTA and Japan-Vietnam EPA there are provisions on NT and MFN. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONTENT OF THE IPR CHAPTER OF A HYPOTHETICAL 
FTA BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE EU – IMPLICATIONS 
FOR VIETNAM IPR SYSTEM 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The first chapter has focused on the justification of the inclusion of an 
IPR Chapter in a hypothetical FTA with the EU and on the international 
regulatory framework in which the negotiation of such an agreement will take 
place.  
Having explained both aspects, this second chapter has two objectives:  
a) To determine the hypothetical content of such Chapter by 
identifying common IPR provisions that exist in previous FTAs concluded by 
the EU. It is presumed that it will be the objective of the EU to negotiate the 
inclusion of similar provisions in a future FTA with Vietnam. 
b)  To determine the implications that the adoption of a Chapter with 
that content may have on Vietnam’s IPR system. 
 
2. For the first objective, particular attention will be placed on the following 
FTAs: EU-CARIFORUM EPA, EU-Korea FTA, EU-CP TA, EU-CA AA. The 
reason to concentrate exclusively in these agreements is that they are the most 
recent ones and that they have been adopted after the publication of the IPR 
Enforcement Strategy. An extra reason is that, apart from the EU-Korea FTA, 
they have been concluded by developing countries like Vietnam. 
Broadly speaking it can be affirmed that the IPR Chapters have a similar 
structure and they deal with the same list of issues. However, the content of the 
provisions differ from one agreement to another although divergences are less 
notorious in provisions dealing with enforcement. 
Attention will also be paid to ACTA. While it has not been adopted yet – 
the EU is in the process of doing so – it is assumed that the ACTA standards will 
become a de facto multilateral norm that third countries would be asked to 
meet, either formally through joining ACTA, or as part of bilateral agreements56. 
Therefore, it is not unrealistic to think that in future FTAs, provisions on IPR 
enforcement would ask for ratification of ACTA or would be modelled in 
accordance with its provisions. 
 
3. For the second objective, a comparison will be made between the 
common IPR provisions identified in the FTAs and the provisions in Vietnam’s 
IPR laws in the same field. In particular, attention will be paid to the following 
instruments: 
                                               
56 DG for External Policies, Policy Department, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA). An Assessment, 2011, p. 9 – 11. 
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a) in general: arts. 736 – 759 of the Civil Code (CC)57 and the 
Intellectual Property Law (IPL)58. 
c) in the field of industrial property rights: Decree 103/2006 
detailing and guiding the implementation of the Intellectual Property Law 
regarding Industrial Property (D. 103/2006)59 and Circular 01/2007 guiding the 
implementation of Decree 103/2006 (C 1/2007) 60. 
d) in the field of copyright and related rights: Decree 100/2006 
detailing and guiding the implementation of a number of articles of the Civil 
Code and the Intellectual Property Law regarding copyright and related rights 
(D. 100/2006)61. 
e) in the field of plant varieties: Decree 104/2006 detailing and 
guiding the implementation of the Intellectual Property Law regarding rights to 
plant varieties (D. 104/2006)62. 
f) in the field of enforcement: the Criminal Code (Crim C.); the Civil 
Procedure Code 2004 (CPC)63; the Customs Law64; Decree 105/2006 detailing 
and guiding the implementation of the Intellectual Property Law on the 
protection of intellectual property rights and on the State management of 
intellectual property65 (D. 105/2006), Decree 97/2010 on sanctioning of 
administrative violations of industrial property (D. 97/201o); Law on 
Information Technology (ITL)66.  
f) in the field of technology transfer: Law on Technology Transfer 
(TTL)67. 
These regulations have been gradually revised and updated in response to 
commitments assumed by Vietnam in international multilateral and bilateral 
agreements and the considerable pressure of Vietnam’s main trade partners68. 
For the purpose of a better understanding of these regulations and its 
application in practice, attention will also be paid to the few studies on Vietnam 
IPR System that exist in English69 and the opinion of practitioners and officials 
which have been interviewed for this Report.  
                                               
57 No. 33/2005/QH11 of 14 June 2005. 
58 No. 50/2005/QH11 of 29 November 2005, revised by the Law Amending and Supplementing 
a number of articles of the Law on Intellectual Property (No 36/2009/QH12) established by the 
Order No. 12/2009/L-CTN of June 29, 2009. 
59 Decree No. 103/2006/ND-CP of September 22, 2006, detailing and guiding the 
implementation of the Intellectual Property Law regarding Industrial Property (amended and 
supplemented by Decree No. 122/2010/ND-CP of 31 December 2010). 
60 Circular No. 01/2007/TT-BKHCN of February 14,2007, guiding the implementation of the 
Government's Decree No. 103/2006/ND-CP (amended and supplemented by Circular No. 
13/2010/TT-BKHCN of 30 July 2010 and Circular No. 18/2011/TT-BKHCN of 22 July 2011).. 
61 Decree No. 100/2006/ND-CP of September 21,2006, detailing and guiding the 
implementation of a number of articles of the Civil Code and the Intellectual Property Law 
regarding copyright and related rights. 
62 Decree No. 104/2006/ND-CP of September 22,2006, detailing and guiding the 
implementation of the Intellectual Property Law regarding rights to plant varieties. 
63 No. 24/2004/QH11 of June 15, 2004. 
64 Arts. 57 – 59. 
65 Decree No. 105/2006/ND-CP of September 22,2006, detailing and guiding the 
implementation of the Intellectual Property Law on the protection of intellectual property rights 
and on the State management of intellectual property, amended by Decree 119/2010/ND-CP of 
31 December 2010. 
66 No. 67-2006-QH11. In particular arts. 16 to 20. 
67 No. 80/2006/QH11. 
68 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 74. 
69 In particular, Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 74. 
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While the existing legislation in Vietnam constitutes a significant step 
forward in the protection of IPR, in the opinion of academics, practitioners and 
representatives of the business sector certain deficiencies remain and certain 
aspects of the regulation do not comply with TRIPS70.  
 
4.  To facilitate the reading of this chapter, it has been divided into four 
sections: a) objectives, general obligations and principles; b) substantive 
protection; c) enforcement; d) technology transfer. Furthermore, each section is 
divided in two subsections: one where common features of IPR provisions in 
FTAs are identified and another where the implication of that particular 
commons feature may have in Vietnam’s IPR System. 
 
 
II.  OBJECTIVES, GENERAL OBLIGATIONS AND PRINCIPLES 
 
1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
5. It is common to all EU’s FTA to open the IPR Chapter with a section on 
“objectives”, “nature and scope of the obligations” and “general principles”. It is 
also usual to find among these opening provisions a reference to the exhaustion 
of rights. 
 
6. Objectives71. Surprisingly, the objectives of the chapters on IPR in the 
FTAs are partly different, something that can be explained by the different level 
of economic development of each EU’s partner. 
On the one half, the objectives in the EU-Korea FTA are: a) to achieve 
and adequate and effective level of protection and enforcement of IPR; b) to 
facilitate the production and commercialisation of innovative and creative 
products in the Parties. 
On the other half, the other three FTA provide for a) the achievement of 
an adequate and effective level of protection and enforcement of IPR; b) and the 
promotion and encouragement of technology transfer between both parties. The 
EU-CA AA and the EU-CARIFORUM EPA go even further. The first provides for 
a third objective consisting on the promotion of technical and financial 
cooperation in the area of IPR. In the EU-CARIFORUM EPA provisions on IPR 
are included in a chapter on “Innovation and intellectual property”. This implies 
that objectives are higher in number in so far as they encompass both areas. 
 
7. General obligations72. In order to attain the abovementioned 
objectives, the FTAs oblige the Parties to implement the IPR chapters of the 
FTA, the TRIPS and international IPR treaties to which they are parties.  
                                               
70 WTO, Vietnam Review …, at 14. Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 77. During the 
interviews carried out for the drafting of this Report, practitioners also mention deficiencies in 
particular in relation to registration procedures and enforcement. These opinions are not share 
by M. P. Nguyen, M. P. Nguyen, “Impact of the IP System on Economic Growth – Vietnam”, in: 
WIPO, IP in Asian Countries: Studies on Infrastructure and Economic Impact, 2009, p. 115. 
According to Eurocham’s 2011 White Book (Trade/Investment Issues and Recommendations), 
one of the five core issues for 2011 was “protecting and enforcing more efficiently IPR” (p. 6). 
71 Arts. 195 EU-CP TA, 228 EU-CA AA, 10.1 EU-Korea FTA, 132 EU-CARIFORUM EPA. 
72 Arts. 196 EU-CP TA, 229 EU-CA AA, 10.2 EU-Korea FTA, 139 EU-CARIFORUM EPA. 
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When establishing the objective of strengthening IPR protection, FTAs 
provides a definition of IPR that covers categories which are not included in 
TRIPS. While definitions are very similar and they all cover plant variety rights, 
minor changes do exist73. 
Only the EU-CARIFORUM EPA includes a “national conformity clause” 
– “parties shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing 
the provisions of this Section within their own legal system and practice”. A 
similar provision is not found in the other FTAs, but it should be recalled that a 
“national conformity clause” can be found in Arts. 1.1 and 41.5 TRIPS74. 
 
8. General principles75. All the FTAs include a recognition of the 
importance of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health for the interpretation and implementation of the rights and obligations 
deriving from the FTA’s IPR provisions76. Furthermore, they also include a 
reference to the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration and the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement77. 
The EU-CP TA and the EU-CARIFORUM EPA refer to the power of the 
Parties to adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition or to 
prevent the abuse of IPR by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology. This is taken from Art. 8 TRIPS, thus, the fact that similar 
provisions are not included in the other two treaties should not have any 
consequence78. 
Due to the fact that the parties to the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, the EU-CP 
TA and the EU-CA AA are developing countries, these treaties include other 
principles which should provide some flexibility on the implementation of the 
IPR Chapters in their national legislation. For instance, when the objectives of 
the IPR provisions are listed, in the EU-CA AA it is said that the ensuring of IPR 
protection should be attained “taking into account the economical situation and 
the social or cultural need of each Party”. In the EU-CP TA, such objective shall 
                                               
73 For instance, the definition of IPR in art. 196.5 EU-CP TA includes trade names “in so far as 
these are protected as exclusive property rights in the domestic law concerned’; in art. 139.3 EU-
CARIFORUM EPA, “patents for bio-technological inventions” and “protection of data bases” 
(presumably including the sui generis right in non-original data bases); and in art. 229.2.c) EU-
CA AA “geographical indications, including designations of origin”. 
74 Although it is not a common characteristic of the FTAs, it is worth mentioning that some of 
them provide for different deadlines for the implementation of the IPR Chapter: for instance, 
CARIFORUM states are required to comply with its obligations before 1st January 2014 or even 
later for least developed countries; Korea has until 2013 to comply with certain provisions on 
copyright (art. 10.14 EU-Korea FTA). 
75 Art. 197 EU-CP TA. In the rest of the FTAs, those “general principles” are disseminated in 
different provisions of a section entitled “Objectives and principles”, “General Provisions” or 
“Principles”. 
76 While in EU-CP TA and EU-CA AA the Declaration should guide the implementation of 
provisions related to all categories of IPR, in EU-CARIFORUM EPA and EU-Korea FTA its 
application is limited to patents. 
77 While in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA the parties “agree to take the necessary steps to accept the 
Protocol”, in the other treaties the parties “shall contribute to the implementation and respect”. 
It can be argued that the obligation for CARIFORUM states is stronger that for the rest of EU’s 
partners. However, it is difficult to sustain that the terms “shall contribute to the 
implementation and respect” do not imply that countries are bound to ratify it.  
78 With one exception: while art 8 TRIPS states that such measures “shall be consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement”, this condition is not included in EU-CARIFORUM EPA and EU-
CP TA. 
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“contribute to transfer and dissemination of technology and favour social and 
economic welfare and the balance between the rights of the holders and the 
public interest” – this is taken from Art. 7 TRIPS. Finally, in the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA it is said, that “an adequate and effective enforcement of IPR 
should take account of the development needs of the CARIFORUM states”.  
 
9. Exhaustion of rights79. It is common to all the treaties to provide a 
rule on this issue similar to the one established in art. 6 TRIPS: the Parties shall 
be free to establish their own regime for the exhaustion of IPR. Although the 
EU-CARIFORUM EPA does not say anything about it, due to art. 6 TRIPS the 
regime is exactly the same. Therefore, parties to FTAs can choose among the 
national, regional or international exhaustion of rights. 
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
10. Up to now, the FTAs concluded by Vietnam refer to one and exclusive 
objective: to provide an “adequate an effective protection and enforcement of 
IPR”. The ASEAN-AU-NZ FTA is the only one that makes references to other 
objective: the effective and adequate creation, utilisation of IPR.  
Besides this, these treaties include certain general principles to guide its 
implementation and interpretation80. However, they are not as comprehensive 
as those provided by EU’s FTAs. 
  
11. The content of provisions in FTAs related to “objectives”, “nature and 
scope of the obligations” and “general principles” are useful for at least two 
important reasons: a) in case of discrepancies on the meaning of the treaty 
provisions, these objectives and general principles should give interpretation 
criteria; b) the should provide some flexibility to the Parties when implementing 
the obligations of the IPR Chapter into national legislation in order to adapt 
them to their specific needs81. 
As it will be further explained in chapter III, while the strengthening of 
IPR protection certainly has benefits for developing countries, a level of IPR 
protection that is not in accordance with the socio-economic situation of a 
country can be counterproductive. For that reason, the more flexibility for the 
implementation of IPR provisions in FTAs the better for developing countries 
like Vietnam. 
                                               
79 Arts. 200 EU-CP TA, 232 EU-CA AA, 10.4 EU-Korea FTA. The EU-CARIFORUM EPA does 
not include a provision on this issue. 
80 The US-Vietnam BTA states that “the parties recognise the underlying public policy objectives 
of national systems for the protection of IPR, including developmental and technological 
objectives, and ensure that measures to protect and enforce IPR do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade (art. 1). The ASEAN-AU-NZ FTA makes reference to the need of 
“taking into account the different levels of economic development and capacity and differences 
in national legal systems and the need to maintain an appropriate balance between the rights 
IPR owners and the legitimate interests of users” (art. 1). The ASEAN Agreement on IP states 
that Member States shall respect “the adoption of measures necessary for the protection of 
public health and nutrition and the promotion of the public interests in sectors of vital 
importance to the Member State’s socio economic and technological development, which are 
consistent with their international obligations”. 
81 X. Seuba Hernandez, “Health Protection...”, p. 14-15. 
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Having this in mind, Vietnam should pay great attention on the drafting 
of these provisions. The inclusion of objectives and general principles similar to 
those of the EU-CP TA, the EU-CA AA or the EU-CARIFORUM EPA would be 
highly beneficial.  
In fact, Vietnam may ask for the inclusion not only of principles which 
are of relevance for developing countries in general but for principles which are 
important to its particular socio-economic circumstances. Just as an example, 
the EU-CP TA refers to general principles which are of particular relevance for 
Peru and Colombia – access to medicines (art. 197.1) the importance of 
promoting the implementation of Resolution WHA 61.21 Global Strategy and 
Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property82 (art. 
197.4) – and the EU-CA AA is the only one that includes the promotion of 
technical and financial cooperation in the area of IPR as an objective as such. 
Vietnam should also decide whether to include or not an obligation to 
ratify the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration and the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement. It should be 
recalled that the applicability of this Decision is viewed with scepticism by 
developing countries, academics and NGOs83. In the Review of Vietnamese 
Legislation before the TRIPS Council (the WTO Review), the Vietnamese 
representative said that Vietnam was studying the possibility to ratify it. At the 
moment of drafting this Report, that ratification had not taken place84. 
 
12. In order to reflect these principles when implementing the IPR 
provisions, Vietnam should make use of measures such as those in art. 7 IPL85, 
exceptions and limitations to the exclusivity rights, and the exhaustion of rights. 
In relation to this latter issue, FTAs concluded by Vietnam do not include 
any specific obligation. According to art. 125.2 b) IPL, Vietnam has adopted the 
principle of international exhaustion of rights. Even more, rights are exhausted 
when the products are put on the market not only under the consent on the 
right holder but also in the framework of a compulsory license86. Scholars 
                                               
82 Adopted by the World Health Organisation, available at 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf 
83 X. Seuba Hernandez, “Health Protection...”, p. 32 
84 “Viet Nam supports the work of developing intellectual property policy and strategy for public 
health ... Viet Nam is now studying the possibility of implementing the relevant procedures for 
ratifying the Protocol on Amending the TRIPS Agreement regarding Article 31bis...” (WTO, 
Vietnam Review…, at 29). Status of ratification is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm 
85 Art. 7.2 IPL states “the exercise of IPR must neither be prejudicial to the State’s interests, 
public interests, legitimate rights and interests of other organisations and individuals, nor 
violate other relevant provisions of law” 
Art. 7.3: “where the achievement of defense, security, people’s life-related objectives and other 
interests of the State and society specified in this Law should be guaranteed, the State may 
prohibit or restrict the exercise of IPR by the right holder or compel the licensing by the holders 
of one or several of their rights to other organisations or individuals with appropriate terms” 
The EU expressed its concerns about this provisions in WTO, Vietnam Review…, p. 8-9. 
Vietnam explained that both provisions are compatible with TRIPS. Article 7(3) stipulates 
clearly that the exercise of the State's authority shall be "subject to appropriate conditions", and 
Article 7(3) also specifies clearly that the State only has power to interfere in such circumstances 
that are "stipulated in this Law". 
86 IPR holders shall not have the right to prevent others from performing the following acts: 
“circulating, importing, exploiting utilities of products having been lawfully put on the market, 
including overseas markets, except for products put on the overseas markets not by the mark 
owners or their licensees”.  
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sustain that this is the best option for enabling parallel importation, because it 
allows the control of the cost of pharmaceutical products and facilitates access 
to medicines. However, it could also become a deterrent to pharmaceutical 
investment in countries that have adopted the doctrine and provoke 
manufacturers to move towards a single global price for their products which 
would most likely be set at a price that the market can bear in the wealthier 
countries87.  
 
 
III. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS ON IPR PROTECTION 
 
13. It is common to the four FTAs to include provisions on the different IPR 
categories included in TRIPS. Furthermore, the treaties include provisions on 
plant varieties and genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore. 
 
A. Patents 
 
1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
14. Patents are governed by arts. 27 to 34 TRIPS. Provisions in FTAs 
concerning patent are not numerous. They do not deviate much from what is 
established in arts. 27-34 TRIPS88. However, they do provide for some TRIPS-
plus/-extra obligations. Besides the provisions on plant varieties – which will be 
analysed in the following section, they include obligations related to the 
compliance of some international agreements and to the protection of test data 
and the extension of the term of protection of patents for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural products. 
 
15. International treaties89. The EU’s FTAs include a common list of 
treaties in the field of patents which the EU’s partners shall comply with, 
accede, or make efforts to accede. A common obligation to “comply with” or 
“accede to” the Budapest Treaty90 and the PCT91 exists in all the FTA. However 
the obligations in relation to the Patent Law Treaty are different from one treaty 
to another92.  
                                                                                                                                         
Furthermore, art. 21 D. 103/2006 states: “products lawfully put on the market…includes 
products already put on overseas market by owners, licensees, including licensees under 
compulsory licensing decisions, or persons with the right to prior use of IPR objects”. 
87 X. Seuba Hernandez, “Health Protection..”, p. 27-29. 
88 It should be recalled, that the section on patents was one of the most difficult to negotiate (D. 
Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement – Drafting History and Analysis, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 
1998, p. 147). 
89 Arts. 230 EU-CP TA, 147 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 258 EU-CA AA, 10.33 EU-Korea FTA 
90 An obligation to “comply with” the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the 
Deposit of Microorganisms is established in EU-CP TA (but only for arts. 2 to 9) and EU-CA AA. 
In EU-CARIFORUM EPA, the obligation to “comply with” only exists for the EU. CARIFORUM 
states’ commitment is to “accede to” that Treaty. Korea is a party to it so the absence of the 
obligation in the FTA does not have any consequence. 
91 In the EU-CARIFORUM EPA the EU shall comply with it and the CARIFORUM states accede 
to it. The Treaty is not mentioned in the other FTAs probably because all EU’s partners are party 
to it. 
92 In relation to the Patent Law Treaty, the EU is oblige to “comply with” it in the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA, and to “make all reasonable effort to comply with” it in EU-CP TA, EU-CA 
AA and EU-Korea FTA (in the latter only in relation to arts. 1 to 16). EU’s partners are bound to 
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16. Patent term extension. There are not common provisions on this 
issue. The EU-CP TA and the EU-Korea FTA93 provide for the extension of the 
duration of the term of patent protection up to five years in order to compensate 
the pharmaceutical patentees for any reasonable delay caused by the national 
drug regulatory authorities in examining an application for registration or from 
a patent office in assessing the application for a patent. However, while the 
provision in the EU-Korea FTA is compulsory, in the EU-CP TA it is optional for 
the Parties to adopt these measures94. In the case of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
and the EU-CA AA no obligation on patent term extension is established. 
 
17. Protection of test data. Again, there are no common provisions in the 
EU’s FTAs concerning the protection of data related to safety and efficacy 
submitted to national authorities for approval of the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products.  
In the EU-CP TA and the EU-Korea FTA95, an exclusivity period of 5 
years for pharmaceutical products and 10 years for chemical agricultural 
products is granted to the first applicant of marketing authorisation. However, 
there are several differences between both treaties. Just to mention two of them: 
a) in the EU-CP TA it is established that, in the absence of specific legislation, 
protection of the exclusivity right on data tests in Peru shall be granted against 
disclosure and the practices that are contrary to honest commercial practices, in 
accordance with art. 39.2 TRIPS; b) while in the EU-Korea FTA the only 
exception to the exclusivity right is the use by a person who can prove the 
“explicit consent of the marketing authorisation holder”, in the EU-CP TA the 
parties have the option to include additional exceptions for reasons of public 
interest, situations of national emergency or extreme urgency. 
The EU-CA AA and the EU-CARIFORUM EPA do not include similar 
provisions. The exclusive obligation of EU’s partners in these treaties is to 
protect test data by the rules on unfair competition in accordance with Art. 
10bis PUC (art. 39.2 TRIPS). Protection against unfair competition does not 
imply granting periods of exclusivity96 
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
18. Patents are governed by arts. 750-753 CC and art. 50-62 IPL. These 
provisions are further developed in D. 103/2006. It is sustained that these 
provisions are TRIPS-compliant. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
“make all reasonable efforts to accede” to the PLT except for Korea who must “make all 
reasonable efforts to comply with” and the CARIFORUM states which “shall endeavour to 
accede to” the Treaty. It should be noted that this latter obligation in weaker that the one 
assumed by the rest of EU’s partners. 
93 Arts. 230.3 and 4 EU-CP TA, 10.35 EU-Korea FTA 
94 The EU-Korea FTA states that the parties shall provide, at the request of the patent owner, for 
the extension of the duration of the rights up to five years. The EU-CP TA exclusively obliges 
parties to “make its best efforts to process … applications expeditiously with a view to avoid 
unreasonable delays” and states that parties “may… make available a mechanism to compensate 
the patent owner”. 
95 Arts. 231 EU-CP TA, 10.36 and 10.37 EU-Korea FTA. 
96 X. Seuba Hernandez, “Health Protection...”, p. 35. 
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19. Vietnam is party to the PCT97 so a hypothetical FTA with the EU may 
include either a provision obliging Vietnam to “comply with” this treaty or 
nothing might be mentioned.  
In relation to the Budapest Treaty, Vietnam has already assumed the 
obligation to “make best endeavours to adhere” to it in the Swiss-Vietnam 
Agreement98. Since all the EU’s FTAs contain an obligation to comply with or to 
accede to it, it is presumed that EU will also ask Vietnam to accede to it. As a 
consequence certain adaptation of Vietnam’s domestic legislation will be needed 
to comply with the treaty.  
Vietnam is not a party to the PLT. It is presumed that EU will ask 
Vietnam to “make all reasonable efforts to accede” to it99. 
  
20. The regulation of patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products is particularly sensitive in so far as the higher the level of 
protection granted the higher the price of these products and the tougher for 
manufacturers of generic to access the market. As explained in chapter III, this 
may constitute a serious obstacle to access to essential medicines for citizens of 
developing countries. 
As previously mentioned, there are not common provisions in EU’s FTAs 
concerning patent term extension and protection of test data. In any case, 
Vietnam already provides for protection of these data as business secrets during 
the 5 years following the date of granting of the authorisation for marketing 
against public disclosure, use for unfair commercial purposes, and use for 
applying for a license of marketing the products. Exceptions are provided for 
disclosure of test data in order to protect the public and its use for non-
commercial purposes100. 
Vietnam legislation does not include provisions on the extension of the 
term of protection. However, it should be recalled that only the EU-Korea FTA 
provides for this. 
Having all these elements in mind, it can be affirmed that a hypothetical 
FTA with the EU will not obstacle the mechanisms that presently exist in 
Vietnam legislation to facilitate access to medicines or to promote any other 
public interest involving patent protection – e.g. the promotion of research in 
the agricultural sector. 
                                               
97 Specific provisions to comply with obligations under these treaties are established in D. 
103/2006 (art. 12) 
98 Another treaty that is mentioned in Vietnam’s FTAs is the Strasbourg Agreement on the 
international patent classification system: Art. 2 Japan-Vietnam EPA obliges the parties to use 
it. The EU’s FTAs does not include any obligation in relation to this treaty. 
99 It should be recalled that PLT aims at harmonising formal requirements for applying, 
obtaining and maintaining patents (e.i. required data, application form and content, simplifying 
possible requirements, and, strengthening applicant’s position so as to avoid application 
rejection due to formal reasons). Vietnam would be required to adapt its domestic legislation on 
registration (art. 102, to the requirements established in the Treaty. 
100 Art. 128.1 IPL, art. 125.3 and art. 3 Decree 120/2005/ND-CP of 30 September, 2005 
providing administrative violation handling in competition. The Health Ministry and the 
Agriculture and Rural Development Ministry assume the prime responsibility in guiding the 
keeping of confidentiality of test data (art. 20 D. 103/2006). These measures were adopted 
following the conclusion of the US-Vietnam FTA where an obligation to protect test data is 
established. The US has recently stated that Vietnam should “clarify its system for protecting 
against unfair commercial use, as well as unauthorized disclosure, of undisclosed test and other 
data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical products” (US Special 301 
Report, pp. 41-42). 
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B. Plant Varieties 
 
1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
21. The only reference to plant varieties in TRIPS is found in Art. 27.3, where 
an obligation to protect this subject matter by patents, by a sui generis right or 
by both is established. 
Having specific legislation in this field101, one of the purposes of the EU in 
its bilateral negotiations is to increase the protection of plant varieties in the 
territory of their partners. For that purpose, the EU has tried to impose their 
accession to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants of 1991 (UPOV). This convention is considered an effective sui generis 
system in the sense of art. 27.3 by the EU – and the US as well. However, the EU 
has only attained its purpose in the EU-Korea FTA (art. 10.39)102. This is the 
only treaty where a TRIPS-extra obligation is established. 
With the exception of the EU-Korea FTA, the FTAs make an explicit 
reference to the so-called “farmer’s privilege” or the exception to the exclusive 
right of plant breeders “to allow farmers to save, use and exchange protected 
farm-saved seed or propagating material”103. In the EU-CP TA a reference is 
made to Art. 15.2 UPOV that contains the exception but in a more restricted 
way104. In particular it does not authorise farmers to exchange seeds with other 
farmers for propagating purposes, but merely authorises them to save and use 
seeds for propagating purposes on their own holdings within certain limits and 
subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder. 
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
22. Plant variety rights are relevant for developing countries with a 
strong agricultural sector and great biodiversity. However, some of them look 
with scepticism to IPR protection on the belief that plant variety right would 
enable multinational corporations to monopolise the market of new plant 
varieties that are derived from original plants through biotechnological 
processes.  
                                               
101 Regulation 2100/94 on Community Plant Variety Right. 
102 While in EU-CA AA there is not a reference to the Convention, in the other two treaties the 
parties obliged themselves to “consider acceding” (art. 149 EU-CARIFORUM EPA) or to 
“cooperate to promote and ensure the protection of plant varieties based on the” UPOV 
Convention 1991 (art. 232 EU-CP TA). In the EU-CA AA, Art. 259.1 only refers to the “obligation 
to protect plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any 
combination thereof”. It is worth mentioning that Colombia is party to UPOV 1978 and Peru to 
UPOV 1991. In relation to the EU-CA AA, only Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua are parties to 
the Convention. In relation to the EU-CARIFORUM EPA just Dominican Republic and Trinidad 
and Tobago have acceded to the Convention so far. 
103 Art. 149.1 EU-CARIFORUM EPA and 259.3 EU-CA AA. This exception allows farmers who 
have purchased a seed of a protected variety to save seeds from the resulting harvest for planting 
in the subsequent season as well as to exchange those seeds with other farmers without risk of 
being sued by the IPR holder.  
104 Art. 232. 
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Vietnam has adopted a different approach. The country is party to UPOV 
1991 since 2006105 and there is extensive domestic legislation to ensure an 
effective protection of plant varieties106. Furthermore, pursuant to Art. 7.2.c) 
US-Vietnam BTA, Vietnam is obliged to protect under patent law plenty of 
categories of plant varieties which are excluded from protection under the 
UPOV107. 
It should also be recalled that on May 2011 Vietnam’s authorities signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the EU Community Plant Variety 
Office with the aim of strengthening the co-operation in this important sector 
for the development of Vietnam108. 
Having these elements into account, Vietnam seems to be in a position to 
assume obligations in this field similar to those established in the strictest EU’s 
FTA. In fact, it is considered that the legislative efforts undertaken in Vietnam 
have provided the country with what might be considered in the western world a 
“modern” innovation system109. 
Once Vietnam is party to UPOV 1991, there is no possibility to opt for the 
more flexible regulation of “farmer’s privilege” provided for in the EU-CA AA 
and the EU-CARIFORUM EPA110. This is considered as detrimental for certain 
authors who understand that the existing legal framework results in “excessive 
levels of legal restrictions on access to fundamental agricultural research inputs, 
including plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. A key issue revolves 
around the question of whether they will ultimately encourage agricultural 
research for the benefits of the majority of the Vietnamese farmers and 
consumers”111. 
Furthermore, it is sustained that the obligation in the US-Vietnam BTA 
“impedes the adoption of patent-related measures to safeguard nutrition and 
food security” even when these measures can be justified in the objectives of art. 
8.1 TRIPS112. 
 
 
C. Trademarks 
 
                                               
105 The US-Vietnam BTA and the Japan-Vietnam EPA both provide for the ratification of UPOV. 
106 Arts. 750-753 CC, arts. 157-197 IPL, and D. 104/2006. The Agricultural and Rural 
Development Ministry and the Plant Variety Protection Office are the entities in charge of the 
administration of this right. 
107 “The exclusion [from patentability] for plant varieties is limited to those plant varieties that 
satisfy the definition provided in Article 1(vi) of the UPOV Convention (1991). The exclusions for 
plant and animal varieties shall not apply to plant or animal inventions that could encompass 
more than one variety. Viet Nam must also provide patent protection on all forms of plants and 
animals that are not varieties, as well as on inventions that encompasses more than one variety.” 
108 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vietnam/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110519_en.h
tm  
109 C. Chiarolla, Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection of Crop Biodiversity under 
International Law (Ph. D), Centre for Commercial Law Studies, School of Law, Queen Mary 
University of London, December 2009. 
110 It is sustained that seed exchange among farmers – something that is allowed under the EU-
CA AA and the EU-CARIFORUM EPA but not in UPOV 1991 – is important for purpose of food 
security and crop and variety rotation, something that is considered a wise practice for many 
reasons, disease avoidance being one of them (E. Bonadio, “IP Provisions on the EU-Central 
America Association Agreement and development issues”, JIPLP, 2011, vol 6, num. 1., p. 19.) 
111 C. Chiarolla, Intellectual Property …, p. 239. 
112 C. Chiarolla, Intellectual Property …, p. 239. 
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1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
23. Trademark regime in TRIPS is to be found in arts. 15 – 21. The 
FTAs concluded by the EU complement this regime with provisions on 
international agreements, registration procedure, well-known trademarks and 
exceptions to the rights. 
 
24. International Agreements113. There are not common 
provisions concerning the international agreements on trademarks. All the 
FTAs refer to the Madrid Protocol114, but an obligation to accede only exist for 
the EU and Colombia and in a 10-year term.  
In relation to the Trademark Law Treaties 1994 and 2006, the FTAs 
contain obligations to “make all reasonable efforts to comply with” it – for 
Parties which are already party to the treaty, “make all reasonable efforts to 
adhere” to it or “endeavour to accede”. Some FTAs do not even mention one of 
both treaties.   
 Finally, an obligation to “use the classification established in the Nice 
Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services” 
is only established in the EU-CP TA115. 
 
25. Registration procedures116. Arts. 62 (in general) and 15 (for 
trademarks) TRIPS contain specific provisions on procedures for registration of 
IPR.  
In particular, art. 15.5 states that members may provide for opposition 
procedures. This is turned into an obligation in EU’s FTAs.  
In addition, it is established that registration procedures shall provide for 
a system where the refusal to register a trademark shall be duly reasoned and 
communicated in writing to the applicant who will have the opportunity to 
contest such refusal and to appeal a final refusal before court.  
The EU-Korea FTA, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-CP TA also 
include an obligation for the parties to establish a public available electronic 
data base of applications and registrations. 
 
26. Well-known trademarks. All the treaties but the EU-Korea 
FTA include provisions on well-known trademarks to complement art. 16.2 
TRIPS. However, the content of the provisions is very different so it cannot be 
said that there are common provisions in relation to this issue117. 
  
                                               
113 Arts. 202 EU-CP TA, 238 EU-CA AA, 10.16 EU-Korea FTA, 144.E 
114 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of 
Marks 
115 Art. 204.1 EU-CP TA. 
116 Arts. 204.2 EU-CP TA, 144.A EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 239 EU-CA AA, 10.15 EU-Korea FTA. 
117 First, art. 205 EU-CP TA states an obligation to cooperate with the purpose of making 
protection of well-known trademarks effective pursuant to art. 6bis PUC and 16.2 and 3 TRIPS. 
Second, in art. 240 EU-CA AA, the obligation to apply Art. 6bis PUC to the protection of 
trademarks extends to well-known trademarks, including unregistered ones. Third, art. 144.B 
EU-CARIFORUM EPA recalls the obligation to apply the concept of well-known trademarks to 
service marks and the parties are asked to endeavour to apply the WIPO Joint Recommendation 
concerning provisions on the protection of well-know trademarks. 
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27. Exceptions to the right conferred by a trademark118. All the EU’s 
FTAs include provisions that complement art. 17 TRIPS in relation to the 
adoption of exceptions to the trademark right. All the FTAs but the EU-CA AA 
oblige the parties to adopt a limited exception to the rights conferred by a 
trademark to allow the fair use of  descriptive terms by third parties without the 
need of obtaining the consent of the right holder.  
 The EU-CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-CP TA119 explicitly state that the 
use of geographical indications (GIs) identical or similar to previous trademarks 
is covered by the exception. 
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
28. Trademark protection is governed in Vietnam by arts. 750-753 CC, 
arts. 72 – 75 IPL apart from the provisions that apply in general to industrial 
property rights. 
 
29. Vietnam is party to the Madrid Agreement and the Protocol and it 
has established specific provisions to implement the obligations under these 
treaties in D. 103/2006 (art. 12). 
Vietnam is not a party to the TLT 1994 and 2006. However, the only 
obligation to EU’s partners is to “make all reasonable efforts to adhere”. 
Vietnam has already assumed this commitment in the Swiss-Vietnam 
Agreement. The adoption of the TLT may entail the need to adapt the rules on 
registration of trademarks (arts. 105, D. 103/2006).  
Finally, in relation to the Nice Agreement, Vietnam is not a party to it and 
the EU’s FTAs do not include a general obligation to ratify it. In any case, 
Vietnam has assumed an obligation to use the classification system of the Nice 
Agreement in the US-Vietnam FTA, the Japan-Vietnam EPA and the ASEAN-
AU-NZ FTA. 
 
30. In general terms, it can be affirmed that Vietnam legislation is 
consistent with the common provisions related to the trademark registration 
procedures established in EU’s FTA.  
Art. 112 IPL provides for the faculty of third parties to express opinions to 
the registration authority on the grant or refusal of trademark applications. It is 
assumed that such opinions may end up with the refusal of the registration, thus 
it can be affirmed that the provision comply with the EU’s FTAs obligation to 
provide opposition procedures. In any case, Vietnam should make sure that 
such procedures are adversarial in accordance with art. 62 TRIPS120. 
                                               
118 Arts. 206 EU-CP TA, 241 EU-CA AA, 144 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.17 EU-Korea FTA. 
119 The EU-CP TA makes the use of the exception stricter because it only allows the use of “its 
own name and address, or descriptive terms concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended 
purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of the goods or the rendering of the 
services or other characteristics of the goods or services”. In addition, the EU-CP TA include the 
obligation to establish an addition exception to allow persons “to use the trademark where it is 
necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or 
spare parts, provided that it is used in accordance with honest practices in industrial and 
commercial matters”. 
120 According to the website Helpline Law, “Vietnam does not provide for an official opposition 
procedure. However, the owner of a trademark who discovers that his mark has been 
appropriated or a mark confusingly similar has been accepted for registration, can file an 
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 Art. 110 IPL states that registration applications shall be published, once 
accepted, in the Official Gazette of IP. However, it shall be note that three EU’s 
FTAs provide for the availability of those documents in a public electronic data 
bases. Vietnam has already assumed a similar obligation in the ASEAN-AU-NZ 
FTA. Despite the fact that it is not established in law, the Gazette in published in 
the NOIP web site thus it can be affirmed that Vietnam already complies with 
this obligation. 
 While it can be affirmed that Vietnam’s legislation is consistent with the 
rest of obligations states in EU’s FTAs and TRIPS concerning registration 
procedures, practitioners have denounced the existence of certain problems in 
practice. 
 First, the IPL states that marks shall be granted 6 months from the date 
of publication of the application (art. 119 IPL), however firms often have to wait 
more than a year to receive a certificate. During that period, the interests of 
rightholders are not protected. Eurocham has denounced that this does not 
seem to be in conformity with the obligation in art. 66.2 TRIPS to grant IPR 
within a reasonable period of time so as to avoid unwarranted curtailment of the 
period of protection121. Eurocham recommends the revision of the IPR 
legislation by giving specific regulation processing requests from trademark 
applicants being protected against arrogating and violating the IPR under 
consideration122. 
 Second, Eurocham states that in opposition and cancellation 
proceedings, NOIP continues to issue very questionable decisions on whether 
one trademark infringes another and that it does not sufficiently consider 
evidence that a trademark application has been filed in bad faith123. While this 
constitutes a deterrent for foreign companies to invest in Vietnam it can also be 
an infringement of the obligation to adequately reason decisions provided in the 
FTAs and Art. 41.2 TRIPS124.  
 
31. In relation with the protection of well-known trademarks, the regulation 
in art. 75 IPL and 6.2 D. 103/2006 seem to be enough to meet the obligation in 
the FTAs. 
 
32. Finally, in relation to the exceptions, art. 125.2 g) IPL states that 
the trademark holder cannot prevent the use in an honest manner of “people’s 
names, descriptive marks of type, quality, quantity, utility, value, geographical 
origin and other properties of goods and services”. Having in mind the relevance 
that the EU grants to the coexistence of GIs with previously protected 
trademarks, the provision seems to be in conformity with EU’s FTAs. 
 
 
D. Industrial designs 
                                                                                                                                         
unofficial opposition. The submission to the NOIP must provide the reasons why opposition is 
sought, together with evidence to support the position”. Available at 
http://www.helplinelaw.com/article/vietnam/391 
121 Eurocham, White Book, p. 43. 
122 Eurocham, White Book, p. 43. 
123 Eurocham, IPR Position Paper 2009, p. 1-2. 
124 It is recommended that NOIP should issue more reasoned opinions on “confusing similarity” 
in trademark opposition and cancellation proceedings. Such decisions should reflect in detail all 
relevant facts and circumstances so that the parties can understand the reasoning underlying 
the decision (Eurocham, IPR Position Paper, p. 2). 
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33. EU’s FTAs include several provisions on industrial designs to 
supplement the regulation established in arts. 25-26 TRIPS. The provisions 
relates to international agreement in the field, requirements, scope and term of 
protection, exceptions to the right of exclusivity and the relation to copyright. 
 
34. International agreements. It is common to all the FTAs 
except the EU-Korea FTA, to oblige the parties to “make all reasonable 
efforts”125 or to “endeavour”126 to accede to the Geneva Act 1999 of the Hague 
Agreement127. 
 
35. Requirements for protection128. The FTAs contain provisions 
on the requirements an industrial design must meet in order to be protected. 
Three provisions are shared by all of them; a) the exclusion from protection of 
designs dictated essentially by technical or functional consideration – while this 
exclusion is optional in art. 25.1 TRIPS, it is made compulsory in the FTAs; b) 
the protection shall be provided by registration; c) “a design shall not subsist in 
a design which is contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of 
morality”129. 
The FTAs establish other requirements that industrial designs must 
meet, but they are not uniform: one of them required the design to be new, 
other original, other new or original; at the same time, three of them require the 
design to have individual character but the EU-CP TA doesn’t130.  
 
36. Scope of protection. It is common to all the FTAs but the EU-
CA AA to extent the category of acts covered by the “ius prohibendi” provided in 
art. 26 TRIPS. This provision grants the owner of a protected industrial design 
the right to prevent third parties from “making, selling or importing” articles 
bearing or embodying the design when such acts are undertaken for commercial 
purposes. The FTAs extend the ius prohibendi to acts of offering, stocking or 
using131. In addition to this, in all the FTAs but the EU-CP TA the ius prohibendi 
can be exercised not only when such acts are undertaken for commercial 
purposes – as established in art. 26.1 TRIPS – but also when they “unduly 
prejudice the normal exploitation of the design or are not compatible with fair 
trade practice”. 
 
37. Term of protection. There is not a common provision in this issue. 
While the EU-CP TA and the EU-CA AA provide for a minimum term of 10 years 
– likewise art. 26.3 TRIPS, the EU-Korea FTA increases that minimum to 15 
years and the EU-CARIFORUM EPA states that the term of protection shall 
amount to at least 5 years with the faculty to renew it up to 25132. 
                                               
125 Arts. 224 EU-CP TA, 251 EU-CA AA.  
126 Art. 146 EU-CARIFORUM EPA. 
127 Hague Agreement concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs. 
128 Arts. 228.2 EU-CP TA, art. 146.C.2 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 253 EU-CA AA, 10.31 EU-Korea 
FTA. 
129 Arts. 228 EU-CP TA, 146.C EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 253 EU-CA AA, 10.31 EU-Korea FTA. 
This is copied from art. 8 D. 98/71 on designs. 
130 Arts. 225 EU-CP TA, 146.B EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 252 EU-CA AA, 10.27 EU-Korea FTA. 
131 Arts. 226 EU-CP TA, 146.D EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.28 EU-Korea FTA. The extension of 
protection is based on Art. 19.1 R. 6/2002. 
132 Arts. 227 EU-CP TA, 255 EU-CA AA, 10.30 EU-Korea FTA, 146.E EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
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38. Exceptions. All the treaties reproduce the faculty opened to the 
States in art. 26.1 TRIPS to adopt limited exceptions to the exclusivity right 
“provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the normal 
exploitation of protected industrial designs and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the owner of the protected design, taking account of 
the legitimate interests of third parties”133. 
 
39. Relation to copyright. Finally, it is also common to all the FTA 
to include a provision that makes clear that the subject matter of protection of a 
design right can also be protected by copyright from the date on which the 
design was created or fixed in any form134. 
 
40. Other provisions. The FTAs include other provisions in relation 
to industrial designs but it cannot be affirmed either that they are present in all 
the FTAs or that they share common features. The issues covered by those 
provisions are: protection of unregistered designs; protection of textile designs 
and grounds for refusal of registration.  
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
41. Protection of industrial designs is governed in Vietnam by arts. 750-753 
CC and arts. 63 – 67 IPL apart from the provisions that apply in general to 
industrial property rights. 
 
42. Vietnam is not a party to the Hague Agreement. However, EU’s 
partners are only oblige to “make all reasonable efforts” to accede to the 
Agreement. In any case, this is an obligation that Vietnam has already assumed 
in the framework of the Swiss-Vietnam Agreement. If ratified, Vietnam would 
have to adapt its domestic legislation on registration requirements and 
procedure (art. 103 IPL and D. 103/2006). 
 
43. In Vietnam, protection of industrial designs is granted by 
registration as far as the following requirements for protection are met: novelty, 
creativity and susceptibility of industrial application135. According to Art. 66 
IPL, creativity exists when the design “cannot be easily created by a person with 
average knowledge in the art”. According to Art. 67 IPL, susceptibility of 
industrial application means that the design “can be used as a model for mass 
manufacture of products with appearance embodying such industrial design by 
industrial or handicraft methods”. It is doubtful whether this is consistently 
with the FTA where these conditions are not required. Furthermore, they are 
strange to EU Design Law. 
Besides this, nothing is mentioned about the exclusion from protection of 
designs which are contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality. 
On the contrary, similar to the FTAs art. 64 IPL excludes for protection 
                                               
133 Arts. 228 EU-CP TA, 146.C EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 253 EU-CA AA, 10.31 EU-Korea FTA 
134 Arts. 229 EU-CP TA, 146.F EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 257 EU-CA AA, 10.32 EU-Korea FTA 
135 Art. 63. 
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appearance of a product which is dictated by the technical features of the 
product136. 
 
44. In relation to the term of protection, at present it is established in 
5 years after the filing date137 and may be renewed for two consecutive terms of 
5 years. It should be recalled that the minimum terms established in the FTAs 
are 10 (EU-CP TA and the EU-CA AA), 15 (EU-Korea FTA) and 5 years with the 
possibility to renew up to 25 (EU-CARIFORUM EPA). It is difficult to assess 
whether Vietnam’s regulation would be acceptable for the EU. 
 
45. Finally, in relation with the scope of protection, art. 124.2 IPL and 
art. 20 D. 103/2006 grant the owner of the industrial design the right to prevent 
third parties from manufacturing, importing, circulating (selling and displaying 
for sale), advertising, offering and stocking for circulation products embodying 
an industrial design. While exporting is not mentioned in the list, in practice 
cases concerning this activity will be considered as infringement if that activity 
is supported by manufacturing, importing, circulating (selling and displaying 
for sale), advertising, offering and stocking for circulation products…. 
Therefore, Vietnamese regulation in this point is in conformity with EU’s FTAs. 
However art. 125.2.a) states that design owners shall not have the right to 
prevent others from “using designs… in service of their personal needs or for 
non-commercial purposes…”. It should be recalled that the treaties oblige to 
extent the protection to acts which “unduly prejudice the normal exploitation of 
the design or are not compatible with fair trade practice”. 
 
 
E. Geographical indications 
 
1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
46. While geographical indications (GIs) are a category of IP relatively 
new to most developing countries, it has a long tradition in Europe. GIs is one of 
the main priorities of the EU in international negotiations. It is a crucial aspect 
of its agricultural policy of sustaining the rural European economy. 
Despite this relevance, the EU was not able to negotiate a level protection 
in TRIPS that fulfilled its expectations. Because of that, the EU is seeking to 
strengthen the protection of GIs provided in Arts. 22-24 TRIPS both in 
multilateral negotiations138 and in its bilateral agreements139, including the 
FTAs.   
                                               
136 This exclusion was established in the US-Vietnam FTA (Art. 10). 
137 Art. 93.4 IPL. 
138 Art. 23.4 TRIPS includes a mandate to undertake negotiations in the Council for TRIPS 
“concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of 
geographical indications for wines eligible for protection in those Members participating in the 
system”. “The Council for TRIPS shall keep under review the application of the provisions of this 
Section; the first such review shall take place within two years of the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement”. In addition, Art. 24.1 states: “Members agree to enter into negotiations aimed at 
increasing the protection of individual geographical indications under Article 23”. Such 
negotiations are also listed in the Doha Agenda.  
139 The EU has adopted several specific agreements on GIs with countries such as Mexico, 
Australia, South Africa, Switzerland or even the US. 
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The provisions in the FTAs aim to strengthen the protection of GIs by 
three different means: providing for mutual recognition of GIs; increasing the 
scope of protection; and facilitating cooperation among competent authorities 
in the field. 
 
47. Mutual recognition. The EU-CP TA and the EU-Korea FTA provide 
for the mutual recognition and protection of each Party’s GIs. For that purpose a 
list of GIs of each Party are included in an Annex to the FTAs. An examination 
of a summary of the specifications of the GIs in the list, and an objection 
procedure have been carried out before the ratification of the treaty140. 
Mutual recognition is also provided in the EU-CA AA141. However the list 
of GIs to be mutually recognised still needs to be completed by the Central 
American countries, through an opposition and examination procedures, and 
adopted by the Association Council. Art. 353.5 states that the Treaty will not 
enter into force with a country that has not provided such list.  
The three treaties also provide for a procedure to add new GIs to the list 
of the Annex which will be automatically recognised by the other party142. 
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA does not provide a similar obligation. The 
reason seems to be that the CARIFORUM States do not have a system of 
protection of GIs. Therefore, the obligation assumed by the parties is to 
establish such a system and the submission of a list of prospective GIs 
originating in the CARIFORUM states within six months from the entry into 
force of the Agreement. The parties further agree to commence negotiations 
aimed at an agreement on the protection of GIs no later than 1 January 2014. 
Presumably such an agreement would establish a mutual recognition 
obligation143. 
 
48. Increased protection. Broadly speaking the provisions of the 
FTAs provide for an extension of the protection provided for an extension of the 
protection granted to wines and spirits in TRIPS to GIs for agricultural 
products. GIs holders can prohibit: a) the use of any means in the designation or 
presentation of a good that indicates or suggest that the good in question 
originates in a geographical area other than the true place of origin in a manner 
which mislead the public as to the geographical origin of the good; b) any other 
use which constitutes an act of unfair competition; c) or the use of a GI identify 
a good for a like good not originating in the place indicated by the GI in 
question, even where the true origin of the good is indicated or the GI is used in 
translation or transcription or accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, 
“style”, “imitation” or the like144. Protection in the EU-CP TA goes even 
beyond145. 
Furthermore, while TRIPS conditions the refusal or invalidation of the 
registration of a trademark that conflicts with a previously registered GI to the 
fact that it “misleads the public as to the true place of origin”, such requirement 
is deleted in the treaties146.   
                                               
140 Arts. 209 EU-CP TA, 10.24-10.25 EU-Korea FTA. 
141  Art. 245. 
142 Arts. 209 EU-CP TA, 247 EU-CA AA, 10.24 – 10.25 EU-Korea FTA. 
143 Art. 145.A. 
144 Arts. 246 EU-CA AA, 145.B EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.21 EU-Korea FTA. 
145 Art. 210. 
146 Arts. 211 EU-CP TA, 145.D EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 248 EU-CA AA, 10.23 EU-Korea FTA. 
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Another common requirement is to subject the protection of the GIs to 
the protection in their country of origin147. This makes the optional provision of 
Art. 24.9 TRIPS, mandatory. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the EU-CP TA enables the parties to 
extent that protection, in accordance to the law of each Party, to non-
agricultural products148. Since the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-CA AA 
refers to GIs in general, the extension of protection to non-agricultural products 
seems to be included in the general obligation. In the EU-Korea FTA, the 
protection is expressly limited to agricultural products.   
 
49. Cooperation mechanisms. All the FTAs provide for specific 
cooperation mechanisms for GIs149. In the case of the EU-Korea FTA, a specific 
Working Group on GIs is created. In the other FTAs competences are given to 
cooperation bodies150 created in the framework of the agreement to follow up 
the implementation of the GI-related provisions, to exchange information in 
this field and to monitor the addition of new products to the list of protected 
GIs. 
 
50. Other provisions. The FTAs include more provisions on GIs. 
However, it is difficult to identify other common features. For instance, all the 
treaties include provisions on exceptions to GIs – homonymous GIs, customary 
names, person’s names, plant variety, conflicts with previously protected 
trademarks, however the number and the content of these provisions vary151. 
These exceptions supplement those listed in arts. 23 and 24 TRIPS.  
It is also worth mentioning that the EU-Korea FTA and the EU-CA AA 
establish a list of requirement that the system of protection of GIs established by 
each Party must meet152. Similar provisions are not included in the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-CP TA. 
Finally, the EU-CP TA and the EU-CA AA include a provision with the 
following content: a GI protected under each of these agreements “cannot, in 
that Party, be deemed to have become generic, as long as it is protected as a GI 
in the Party of origin”153. A similar provision is not found in the other two 
treaties. 
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
51. Regulation of GIs in Vietnam is established in arts. 750-753 CC, arts. 79-
83 IPL and provisions applicable to industrial property rights in general. 
Being a country where agriculture plays a very relevant role on the 
sustainability of national economy, Vietnam is very concerned about protection 
of GIs. It is sustained that they can serve not only as a tool for product 
                                               
147 Art. 207 EU-CP TA, 145.A EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 243 EU-CA AA, 10.21 EU-Korea FTA. 
148 Art. 207.d). 
149 Arts. 213 EU-CP TA, 10.25 EU-Korea FTA, 145.A EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 274 EU-CA AA. 
150 The Subcommittee on IP in the EU-CP TA (art. 213) and the EU-CA AA (art. 274), and the 
CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA (art. 145.A). 
151 Arts. 210.3 and 211 EU-CP TA, 145.C and D EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 246.4, 248 EU-CA AA, 
10.21.2, 3, 5 EU-Korea FTA 
152 Arts. 244 EU-CA AA, 10.18 EU-Korea FTA. 
153 Arts. 246.2 EU-CA AA, 207 h) EU-CP TA. 
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differentiation with widely recognised products but also as a useful agricultural 
development strategy154. Despite the defects of the law155, up to now, there are 
28 protected GIs in Vietnam, most of them related to national products. In 
particular, it is worth mentioning that there are GIs on three of the most 
exported products in Vietnam: rice, coffee and tea. 
 
52. In Art. 20.2 PAC, EU and Vietnam agree to enhance cooperation 
on establishing the “appropriate means to facilitate protection and registration 
of the other party’s geographical indications in their respective territories, 
taking into account international rules, practices and developments in this area 
and their respective capacities”. 
Taking into account his agreement and the relevance granted to GIs by 
both parties, there should not be any problem for Vietnam and the EU to agree 
on a system of mutual recognition of GIs. This agreement should not be 
impeded by the fact that the GIs that the EU wants to include in the lists of 
protected GIs are much more numerous than does of its partners. For instance, 
in the EU-Korea FTA, the EU included more that 160 GIs.  
Another aspect to take into account in relation to the establishment of 
these lists is the fact that some of the GIs protected by Vietnam are of non-
agricultural products – e.g. Văn Yên, Huế. While Vietnam should be interested 
in including these products in the list, the EU does not protect this category of 
GIs yet, but it is studying the possibility of adopting legislation in the field156. 
 
53. Vietnam’s IPR system provides a higher level of protection of GIs 
than the one provided by TRIPS, but Art. 129.3 IPL does not seem to provide 
protection in one situation covered by the FTAs: use of GIs for products other 
than wine and spirits not originating from the area bearing such GIs, even 
where the true origin of goods is indicated or GIs are used in the form of 
translations or transcription, or accompanied by such words as “category”, 
“model”, “type”, “imitation” or the like. In these cases, it seems like it has to be 
proved that the alleged infringer is taking advantage of the reputation and 
popularity of the GI or that consumers are misled as to the origin of the product.  
 
54. Finally, it is worth mentioning that problems may appear to adopt 
provisions on exceptions to the protection by GIs. As mentioned before, these 
provisions are very different from one FTA to another. In the EU-CP TA and the 
EU-CA AA it is said that a GI protected under each of these agreements “cannot, 
in that Party, be deemed to have become generic, as long as it is protected as a 
GI in the Party of origin”. On the contrary, art. 80 IPL states that names and 
indications which have become generic names in Vietnam shall not be protected 
as GIs.  
                                               
154 T. B. Vu / D. H. Dao, Geographical Indications and Appellation of Origin in Vietnam: 
Reality, Policy, and Perspective, Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural 
Development - MISPA Project, 2006. Available at  http://www.foodquality-
origin.org/documents/GI%20and%20AO%20in%20Vietnam.pdf  
155 It is argued that the law was not clear, making it difficult to implement: in particular, 
requirements to apply of a GI (produced in a similar place, must be differentiated, compared 
with similar products) makes it difficult for producers to create an appropriate strategy to 
develop and protect their trademarks (Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 89.). 
156 In this sense, the Communication, p. 16. Apparently, one of the reasons for the adoption of 
this legislation is that some EU’s partners such as India have asked for protection of non-
agricultural GIs in exchange to the protection of EU’s agricultural GIs in their territories. 
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Exceptions to the protection are also established for GIs identical with or 
similar to protected marks, or which mislead consumers as to the true 
geographical origin of the products. Furthermore, arts. 125.2 g) and h) IPL 
states that GIs owners cannot prevent the use of trademarks identical with or 
similar to the GI where such marks have acquired the protection in an honest 
manner before the date of filing applications for registration of such GIs; 
furthermore GIs cannot prevent the use in an honest manner of people’s names, 
descriptive marks of type, quantity, quality, utility, value, geographical origin 
and other properties of goods or services (art. 125.2 g) and h) IPL).  
Finally, the ASEAN-AU-NZ FTA states that each party shall protect 
trademarks where they predate, in its jurisdiction, GIs in accordance with its 
domestic law and the TRIPS agreement. Each party recognises that GIs may be 
protected through a trademark system. 
The particularities of the Vietnamese GI system might make difficult an 
agreement on the content of provisions in this field. 
 
 
F. Genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore 
 
1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
55. Traditional knowledge (TK), genetic resources (GRs) and folklore (or 
traditional cultural expressions) are economic and cultural assets of indigenous 
and local communities and their countries. In the latter years, there has been a 
steep rise in the economic and commercial utility of such resources. In the 
meanwhile, several case of misappropriation of these assets have been reported 
– e. g. medicines, cosmetics and agricultural products originating from 
biodiversity resources in African countries and patented by multinational 
corporations, without there being evidence of benefits accruing to the countries 
of origin157. 
Protection of these assets is paramount for countries which are 
biodiversity-rich and are therefore exposed to a major risk of misappropriation. 
However, principles informing their protection and those informing IPR 
protection seem to be in conflict. While TRIPS conceives IPR as “private 
rights”158 generally owned by individuals or corporations, the United Nation 
Convention on the Biological Diversity (CBD) proclaims the sovereignty of 
States over the GRs in their territories and, at the same time, national 
legislations in several countries state that TK and folklore belong to the local 
communities where they originate159.  
Works aimed at the adoption of an international instrument in this field 
are taking place in the TRIPS Council in the framework of the Doha 
Development Round160 and WIPO161. In the meanwhile, the EU has included 
this issue in its FTA negotiations which diverging results. 
                                               
157 T. Worku Dagne, “The Application of Intellectual Property Rights to Biodiversity Resources: a 
Technique for the South Countries to Maintain Control over the Biodiversity Resources in their 
Territories?”, RACID, vol 17, 2009, pp. 150 ss. 
158 See Preamble. 
159 J. Gibson, “Community Resources: Intellectual Property Systems, Traditional Knowledge, 
and the Global Legal Authority of Local Community”, p. 1.  
160 Par 19 of the Doha Declaration. 
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56. In general, the treaties “recognise the importance of respecting, 
preserving and maintaining indigenous and local communities’ knowledge, 
innovations and practices related to the preservation and the sustainable use of 
biological diversity”162. 
 
57. Secondly, the treaties provide for the promoting and wide application of 
GRs, TK and folklore with the involvement and approval of the holders of such 
knowledge, innovation and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from its utilisation. It should be recalled, that the CBD provides 
for a “benefit-sharing” obligation163. However, explicit endorsement of the rights 
and obligations of the states under the CBD is only establishes in the EU-CP TA 
and the EU-CA AA164. 
 
58. Thirdly, all the treaties include a provision on the relation between 
the CBD and international obligations in the field of IPR.  
The EU-CP TA obliges the parties to ensure that IPR are supportive of 
and do not run counter to their rights and obligations under CBD.  
With the same aim, the EU-CA AA states that nothing in the treaty shall 
prevent the Parties from adopting or maintaining measures in conformity with 
the CBD. Its Art. 259.2 adds that “no contradiction exists between the 
protection of plant varieties and the capacity of a Party to protect and conserve 
its genetic resources”.  
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA asks for a mutually supportive interpretation 
of the CBD and the patent provisions of the treaty and calls for an exchange of 
view among the parties on issues related to the relationship between TRIPS and 
CBD.  
In the EU-Korea FTA, there is just a provision calling for this exchange of 
view. 
 
59. Finally, as with other sections in the IPR Chapters, the FTAs 
include other provisions on this issue but they do not show common characters. 
It is worth mentioning that the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-CP TA 
include provisions related to the disclosure of the origin of GRs in patent 
applications – a topic widely discussed in multilateral negotiations – but none 
                                                                                                                                         
161 In 2000, an Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) was established with the objective of reaching 
agreement on an international legal instrument (or instruments) which will ensure the effective 
protection of TK, GRs and folklore. 
162 Arts. 201 EU-CP TA, 150 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 229 EU-CA AA, 10.40 EU-Korea FTA. 
163 In the EU-CP TA, this obligation is stricter because instead of the “involvement and 
approval”, the “prior inform consent” of the holders is required.  Furthermore, in relation to the 
obligation of “benefit-sharing” the EU-CP TA makes reference to the obligation to take measures 
in accordance with art. 15.7 CBD. Such benefit-sharing obligation may also refer to IPR arising 
from the use of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. 
164 According to the CBD, “the authority to determine access to genetic resources rest with the 
national governments and is subject to national legislation”. Therefore, use of these GR without 
the informed consent of the country violates the CBD’s access and benefit-sharing obligations. It 
is doubtful whether the absence of a reference to the CBD in the EU-Korea FTA and the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA has any implication. 
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of them establish an obligation to do so165.  Nothing is said in the EU-Korea FTA 
and the EU-CA AA. 
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
60. Protection of GRs, TK and folklore are important for developing 
countries in so far as it is commonly the case that these countries are 
biodiversity-rich. This also the case of Vietnam, a tropical country which is 
understood to be among the ten richest in biodiversity worldwide.  
Examples of legislations in this field are provided by Latin American 
countries such as Peru, Panama or Costa Rica166. This explains why provisions 
in the FTAs with these countries are more numerous than in the EU-Korea FTA. 
The adoption of legislation in this field is not that common in South East 
Asia. It’s been only in the latest years that specific regulations have been 
adopted to protect the interests of indigenous communities167, although several 
countries have adopted specific provisions in certain IPR-related legislation168.  
 
61. In the case of Vietnam, besides the CBD – Vietnam is party since 1994, 
specific legislation – the Biodiversity Law (BDL) – is combined with specific 
provisions in the IPL.  
Broadly speaking, among other things, the BDL states the general 
principle that individuals that benefit from biodiversity exploitation shall share 
their benefits with concerned parties. Any company interested in accessing GRs 
must: a) register; b) enter into a benefit sharing agreement (ABS Contract) with 
the organisation appointed by the government to administer the territory where 
the GRs are located; c) apply for a license from a competent state management 
agency; d) periodically submit progress reports on the state of research, 
development and commercialisation of products derived from GRs.  
The law does not include an obligation to disclose the origin of genetic 
resources in patent and plant variety right applications. According to some 
authors this would have helped reducing concerns for biopiracy169. 
                                               
165 The first states that the Parties may require such a disclosure as part of the administrative 
requirements for a patent application. The second acknowledges the usefulness of requiring this 
disclosure because it contributes to the transparency about the uses of genetic resources. This 
latest treaty also include provisions aimed at facilitating access to information about patent and 
patent applications related to genetic resources – exchange of information, use of data bases or 
digital libraries – and the capacity building of patent examiners and law enforcement authorities 
in the field. 
166 Decision 391 of the Andean Community of Nations on a Common Regime on Access to 
Genetic Resources (1996), Provisional Measure No. 2186-16 of Brazil (2001), Biodiversity Law 
7788 of Costa Rica (1998) or Law No 20 of 26 June 2002 of Panama, Law 27811 of 2009 of Peru 
on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge of Indigenous People related to Biodiversity. See C. 
Correa, “TRIPS and TRIPS-plus Protection and Impacts in Latin America”, in D. Gervais (ed.), 
Intellectual Property Trade and Development, Oxford University Press, 2007., pp. 221 ff. 
167 That is the case of the Philippine Indigenous People Rights Act 1997. See C. Antons, 
“Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights in Australia and Southeast Asia”, in C. 
Heath / A. Kamperman Sanders, New Frontiers of Intellectual Property Law, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, p. 51. 
168 That is the case of the legislation on plant varieties in Thailandia, of copyright and plant 
varieties in Indonesia. See C. Antons, “Traditional Knowledge…”, p. 51. 
169 C. Chiarolla, Intellectual Property..., p. 239. 
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Besides the BDL, Art. 14 k) IPL lists folklore and folk art work of folk 
culture as works covered by copyright. According to Arts. 23 IPL and 20 D. 
100/2006 the users of this category of works are obliged to indicate its origin by 
citing the geographical location of the indigenous community where such 
folklore and folk art works were created170.  
Although the BDL encourages the registration of copyright on knowledge 
derived from GRs, it should be recalled that is not the only means of protection 
of GRs and TK. Other forms of IPR protection may be more appropriated. There 
are several examples of protection of TK of indigenous communities by general 
categories of IPR – e. g. after a dispute with Starbucks, Ethiopian coffee is 
distributed under a specific trademark. In certain cases, Vietnam may follow the 
same pattern – e.g. the protection of Coconut-leaf conical hat or Huế.  
Taking into account that Vietnam is biodiversity-rich, the competent 
authorities should study the possibility to include provisions on GRs, TK and 
folklore in a hypothetical FTA with the EU to guarantee an effective protection 
of its biodiversity internationally. 
 
 
G. Copyrights and related rights 
 
1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
62. Copyright and related rights are governed by arts. 9 to 14 TRIPS 
(Section 1, Part II). All the FTAs include important TRIPS-plus provisions in 
this field in relation with international agreements, the term of protection, the 
role of collecting societies, the recognition of a right to broadcast and 
communicate to the public to performers, producers of phonograms and 
broadcasters, and obligations in the field of technological protection measures 
(TPM) and electronic right management information (RMI).  
 
63. International treaties. All the FTAs include the obligation of 
the parties to “comply with”: a) the Berne Convention; b) the Rome Convention; 
c) the WIPO Copyright Treaty; d) the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty171. Taking into account the extensive protection provided in this treaties, 
this is an important TRIPS-plus provision. 
 
64. Term of protection. With the exception of the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA, it is generally agreed in the FTAs that copyright shall last at least 70 years 
from the death of the author, and related rights at least 50 years from the end of 
the year in which the performance was fixed, the fixation of the phonogram was 
made or the broadcast took place172. This is also an important TRIPS-plus 
                                               
170 WTO, Vietnam Review..., at. 80. 
171 Arts. 215 EU-CP TA, 10.5 EU-Korea FTA and 233 EU-CA AA. Surprisingly, the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA does not refer to the Berne Convention (although all the parties have ratified 
it) and, in the case of the Rome Convention, there is only an obligation to “endeavour to accede” 
(art. 143.A). 
172 Arts. 218-219 EU-CP TA, 234-235 EU-CA AA. In the EU-Korea FTA, the 50-year term is only 
established for broadcasting (art. 10.6-10.7). The EU-CP TA includes several rules to calculate 
the term of duration in case of co-authorship, anonymous or pseudonymous works, 
photographic works, works of applied art, cinematographic or audiovisual works. 
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provision in so far as the term of protection is increased in comparison with 
those provided in the Berne Convention and art. 12 and 14.5 TRIPS173.  
 
65. Collecting societies. Another common feature of all the FTAs is 
the inclusion of a provision obliging the Parties to “facilitate the establishment 
of arrangements between their respective collecting societies with the purpose 
of mutually ensuring easier access to and delivery of licenses for the use of 
content…”174. 
This is seen as a useful tool as many countries may be looking at better 
exploiting their cultural industries. For that reason it is also worth mentioning 
that, in similar terms, all the treaties but the EU-CARIFORUM EPA call for the 
effective management, equitable distribution, rationalisation and the 
improvement of transparency with respect to the execution of the task by the 
collecting societies. 
 
66. Broadcasting and communication to the public175. With 
the exception of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, the FTAs include some provision to 
supplement the rights provided in TRIPS to performers, producers of 
phonograms and broadcasting organisations. 
First, the FTAs supplement Art. 14.1 TRIPS by granting performers with 
the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the broadcasting and the 
communication to the public of their performances, except where the 
performance is itself already a broadcast performance or is made from a 
fixation.  
Second, performers and producers of phonograms shall enjoy the right to 
a single equitable remuneration for the direct or indirect use of phonograms 
published for commercial purposes, for broadcasting or for any communication 
to the public176. 
Third, as a supplement to art. 14.3 TRIPS Parties are obliged to provide 
broadcasting organisations with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the 
rebroadcasting of their broadcasts. The EU-Korea FTA and the EU-CA AA also 
grant exclusivity on the communication to the public of their television 
broadcasts if such communication is made in places accessible to the public 
against payment of an entrance fee. 
Finally, the treaties recall the possibility open to the parties by art. 13 
TRIPS to establish limitations or exceptions to these rights to certain special 
cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.  
 
67. Protection of technological measures and right management 
information. The EU-Korea FTA establishes very detailed obligations to 
                                               
173 Art. 7 Berne Convention and art. 12 TRIPS provides for 50-year minimum term of protection 
for copyright. Art. 14.5 TRIPS establishes a 50-year minimum term for performers and 
producers of phonograms, and 20-year for broadcasters’ rights. 
174 Arts. 217 EU-CP TA, 143.B EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 236 EU-CA AA, 10.8 EU-Korea FTA. 
175 Arts. 220 EU-CP TA, 237 EU-CA AA, 10.9 EU-Korea FTA. 
176 In similar terms, the treaties states that in the absence of agreement the Parties may enact 
legislation to set the terms according to which the revenues deriving from that remuneration are 
to be shared.  
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provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention of TPM and the 
removal or alteration of any RMI177.   
The EU-CP TA also includes a specific provision on this issue, but its 
purpose is just to recall that the parties shall comply with the provisions of Arts. 
11-12 WCT and 18-19 WPPT178. The provision is superfluous as far as that 
obligation derives from all EU partners from the general obligation to comply 
with the WCT and WPPT.  
The obligations in these treaties are not as strict as those in the EU-Korea 
FTA. In particular they oblige contracting parties to provide adequate legal 
protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of TPM, the 
removal of RMI or the dissemination of works in which the RMI has been 
altered. Contrary to the EU-Korea FTA, EU’s partners have plenty of room to 
implement this obligation in their national law.  
It is worth mentioning that this flexibility is lost in ACTA: art. 27.5 to 8 
detail the way in which the obligations related to the protection of TPM and 
RMI in the WCT and WPPT should be implemented. 
 
68. Other provisions. As it is the case with other categories of IPR, 
EU’s FTAs include other provisions in the field of copyright and related rights. 
However, further common provisions cannot be identified.  
In particular, it is worth mentioning that the EU-CP TA includes an 
extensive regulation on moral rights179, the unwaivable right of performers to 
obtain an equitable remuneration for the transfer of exploitation of certain 
rights180, and the artist’s resale right181. 
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
69. Copyright and related rights are governed by arts. 736 – 749 CC, 
arts. 13 – 57 IPL, D. 100/2006 and D. 105/2006. The Culture and Information 
Ministry is in charge of the management of this category of IPR. 
At present, Vietnam is facing several challenges to the protection of these 
rights deriving from the use of the information and communication technologies 
(ICT) to exploit and infringe copyright and related rights. While at first sight it 
seems like the existing regulation is adapted to the digital environment, it is 
sustained that to ameliorate the management and enforcement of copyright and 
related rights in the Internet, the following measures need to be taken: to issue 
legal documents prescribing responsibilities of Internet Service Providers (ISP) 
in this field; to issue specific regulation to forbid the uploading and 
downloading of protected contents in the absence of the right holder’s consent; 
to formulate regulations to balance the rights and legitimate benefits of right 
holders with those of users and the general public; to improve collective 
                                               
177 Arts. 10.12 and 10.13. Both provisions are copied from Arts. 6 and 7 D. 2001/29. 
178 Arts. 221-222. 
179 Art. 216. 
180 Art. 220 
181 Art. 223. This right is also mentioned in the EU-Korea FTA (art. 10.10) but there is just an 
obligation to exchange views and information and to enter into consultation within two years to 
study the feasibility of introducing such a right.  
48 
 
management organisations’ capacity for managing and enforcing effectively 
laws on copyright and related rights182.  
The adoption of some of the measures included in the EU’s FTAs would 
certainly help Vietnam to overcome these challenges. 
 
70. At present Vietnam is party to the Berne Convention and the Rome 
Convention183, but not to the WCT and the WPPT. According to the interviews 
carried out for the elaboration of this Report, Vietnam has the intention to ratify 
both treaties. Therefore, Vietnam should not have any problem to accept the 
obligations established in EU’s FTAs.  
In case of ratifying those conventions, Vietnam might need to adapt its 
legislation. For instance, the rental right provided in art. 20 IPL for software 
and cinematographic works should be extended to any work of art as stated in 
Art. 7 WCT. Another example is found in art. 29 IPL: it should be amended to 
clarify that performers also have the right to authorise the making available of 
their fixed performances (art. 10 WPPT).  
 
71. In relation with the term of protection in Vietnam, at present it is 50 year 
post mortem auctoris for copyright (art. 27 IPL)184 and the same term for 
performers from the fixation of their performances, for producers of 
phonograms from the year following publication, and for broadcasting 
organisations from the year following the making of the broadcast (art. 34 IPL).  
The adoption of the hypothetical FTA with the EU would require Vietnam 
to increase the copyright term of protection at least to 70 years.  
In relation with performers’ rights, while the term is the same that the 
one provided for in the FTAs, it should be recalled that recently the EU 
institutions reached an agreement to adopt a new Directive that will increase the 
term of protection to 70 years185. It is still unknown whether this will imply that 
the EU will ask their partners in future FTAs to provide a similar term of 
protection. 
 
72. Other provisions in the IPL which might need to be amended are those 
related with TPM and RMI186. As previously mentioned, all the FTAs but the 
EU-Korea FTA exclusively obliges the parties to implement the general 
obligation provided in the WCT and WPPT. Therefore, EU’s partners are not 
obliged to provide a very detailed regulation on this issue. Having this in mind, 
Vietnam would not really need to amend its legislation if a similar provision is 
included in a hypothetical FTA with the EU. However, there are two reasons 
why Vietnam should study the amendment of its regulation in the field.  
First, as previously mentioned, ACTA provides for a detailed regulation of 
TPM and RMI. It might be the case that in the near future the EU will require its 
partners to comply with the minimum standards established in that treaty. 
                                               
182 V. N. Hoan, “Copyright and Related Rights on the Internet in Vietnam”, available at 
http://www.cov.gov.vn/cbqen/ 
183 Vietnam is also party to the Phonograms Convention 1971 and the Satellites Convention 1974 
as a consequence of the obligation established in the US-Vietnam FTA. 
184 Exceptionally, it is 75 years from publication for cinematographic works, photographic works, 
works of applied art and anonymous works.  
185 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2006/116 on the term of protection of copyright 
and certain related rights. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/term/2011_directive_en.pdf  
186 Arts. 28.12 to 14, 35.6 to 8, 198 IPL, Art. 43 D. 100/2006, Arts. 7 and 21 D. 105/2006. 
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Second, Vietnam should be aware that the regulation of TPM plays at 
important role on promoting access to knowledge187. It is usually the case that 
national legislations sanctions acts of circumvention of TPM without having into 
account whether the information is protected by copyright or whether the use of 
that work is legitimate by an exception to copyright. Eurocham has denounced 
that Vietnam’s regulation of TPM is so broad that it covers public interest users 
who might wish to make fair use of copyrighted works. For that reason, they 
recommend the inclusion of a specific provision that allows circumvention of 
TPM for limited purposes under certain specifically defined circumstances188.  
As far as Vietnam does not negotiate a provision of TPM and RMI in a 
hypothetical FTA with the EU similar to that included in the EU-Korea FTA, it 
would be possible to adopt these measures189.  
 
73. In relation with the provisions on collecting societies, at present in 
Vietnam there are three: the Vietnam Literary Copyright Center, the Recording 
Industry Association of Vietnam and the Vietnam Center for Protection of Music 
Copyright. Their activities are governed by arts. 56-57 IPL and 41-42 D. 
100/2006. 
Scholars have underlined the important role that these bodies can play in 
developing countries to promote traditional music. This can be a source of 
revenues if the music meets consumer tastes both national and international. 
Authors of musical works have to rely on collecting societies that represent their 
interests, collectively administer their rights and collect the dues and transfer 
them to authors. However, while the system of collecting societies is well 
established in industrialized countries it is unknown or relatively new in 
developing countries. National collecting societies enter into bilateral 
agreements among them in order to represent the interests of their authors in 
their respective territories. Afterwards, they transfer the royalties to the 
collecting societies in the home country of the respective author or artist. 
However, they transfer those royalties only in part to collecting societies in 
certain developing countries due to the fact of their malfunctioning190.   
 Regardless on whether collecting societies in Vietnam are experiencing 
these problems, it is certainly the case that cooperation arrangements as those 
provided for in the EU’s FTAs may certainly help collecting societies to carry out 
their task more efficiently. In fact, Vietnam is already party to two FTAs that 
provides for the promotion of the activities of these bodies191.  
                                               
187 J. Kuanpoth, “TRIPS-plus Rules…”, p. 27. 
188 Eurocham, IPR Position Paper, p. 5. The following examples are provided: circumvention by 
libraries and education institutions for specific acquisition purposes or reverse engineering in 
order to develop interoperable computer programs. 
189 This is confirmed by Art. 27.8 ACTA: “In providing adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 7, a Party may adopt or maintain 
appropriate limitations or exceptions to measures implementing the provisions of paragraphs 5, 
6, and 7. The obligations set forth in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 are without prejudice to the rights, 
limitations, exceptions, or defences to copyright or related rights infringement under a Party’s 
law”. 
190 S. Schlatter, “Copyright Collecting Societies in Developing Countries: Possibilities and 
Dangers”, in C. Heath/A. Kamperman Sanders, New Frontiers of Intellectual Property Law, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005, p 55. 
191 The ASEAN-AU-NZ FTA states that the parties shall foster the establishment of appropriate 
bodies for the collective management of copyright and encourage such bodies to operate in a 
manner that is efficient, publicly transparent and accountable to their members” (art. 5). Art. 
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74. Arts. 29 – 31 IPL and 31, 35, 36 D. 100/2006 seems to be consistent with 
the obligations provided for in the EUs FTAs in relation with the recognition to 
performers of an exclusivity right to authorise the broadcasting and 
communication to the public of their unfixed performances. 
In fact, the ASEAN-AU-NZ FTA and the US-Vietnam FTA already 
establish obligations to increase the protection of certain related rights.  
 
 
IV. PROVISIONS ON IPR ENFORCEMENT 
 
75. Tackling piracy and counterfeiting is one of the priorities for the 
Commission both inside the EU and abroad.  
As mentioned in chapter I, Vietnam has been identified by the EU as a 
country “with high levels of production, transit and/or consumption of IPR 
infringing goods” and the US as a country having "serious intellectual property 
rights deficiencies"192.  
While the substantive efforts made by Vietnam to improve the 
enforcement of IPR are acknowledged by the US and the EU193, further actions 
are needed194. Although, the level of counterfeiting and piracy activities seems to 
have decreased in the latest years195, some experts understand that recent 
efforts have not kept in pace with the rising levels of IP-infringing activities196 . 
                                                                                                                                         
89.3 Japan-Vietnam EPA obliges the parties to promote the development of the collective 
management organisations in accordance with its laws and regulations. 
192 See chapter I, at 10 
193 Evaluation of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Strategy in Third Countries, 
Final Report, November 2010,  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_147053.pdf , p. 45: “Vietnam 
has made substantial efforts to reform its legal system. A major step was the introduction of the 
Intellectual Property Law and its implementing decrees in 2005; the most recent example being 
the issuance of a Criminal Circular offering guidelines on criminal prosecution against acts of 
piracy and counterfeiting on a commercial scale”. These improvements are also acknowledge by 
legal scholars: Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 92. 
194 “While Vietnam took steps to implement important amendments to its IP Law in 2010, the 
United States urges Vietnam to do more to ensure full implementation” (2011 Special 301 
Report, p. 41). The need to keep working on the establishment of an effective system of 
enforcement was acknowledge by the Vietnamese representative before the TRIPS Council in 
2008: : “Although the Government was determined to push forward the process of IP 
legislation, the current legal system still contained some shortcomings that needed to be settled, 
especially concerning issues related to IPR enforcement. There remained much work to do 
towards a "sufficient" and "efficient" IP legal system that met the TRIPS/WTO standards and 
was in line with the circumstances of Viet Nam” (WTO, Vietnam Review, p. 6.). 
195 “An important number of enforcement actions have been conducted. Furthermore, while 
pirated and counterfeited merchandise remains quite available indeed, it is not at the level 
hitherto seen in the country”, IPR Enforcement Report 2009, p. 14. According to the statistics 
provided by Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 92: Trademark infringement declined from 
over 300 cases to fewer than 100 after Vietnam’s accession to the WTO in 2007, and software 
piracy has experienced a 7% drop in the piracy rate over the past five years although Vietnam is 
still at the top of the software-pirating countries in the world (BSA, 2008). 
196 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 92. Eurocham considers that a broad range of 
counterfeiting products continue to be sold in the Vietnamese market. Counterfeiters are 
becoming more sophisticated in their methods and practices (Eurocham, IPR Position Paper, p. 
2). For the US some of the problems of IPR enforcement that remain in Vietnam are “the high 
levels of copyright piracy, increasing levels of piracy over the Internet, satellite and cable signal 
piracy, and the general availability of counterfeit goods in the marketplace” (US 2011 Special 301 
Report, p. 42). 
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76. As explained in chapter I, the negotiation of FTAs where EU’s partners 
assume an obligation to increase the efficiency in IPR enforcement in the 
territory of their countries is just one of the actions taken by the EU to fight 
against counterfeiting and piracy. For that purpose the adoption of legislative 
measures is necessary, but this is not enough.  
The following have been identified as additional problems in Vietnam 
that need to be tackled in order to attain an effective IPR enforcement system: 
a) shortage of human resources in terms of quantity and quality197; b) lack of 
coordination between administrative agencies198; c) the lack of awareness of the 
value of IPR protection among Vietnamese business and consumers199. As it will 
be explained in chapter IV, in order to tackle these problems the EU’s FTAs 
provide for cooperation mechanisms. 
Having said that, in the following pages the report will focus on the 
examination of the legislative measures which would need to be taken by 
Vietnam in case provisions on IPR enforcement similar to those in the existing 
EU’s FTAs are included in a hypothetical agreement with the EU. 
 
77. The provisions on enforcement in the FTAs show more common features 
than those concerning substantive protections. They mirror provisions in 
Directive 2004/48 on IPR enforcement (D. 2004/48) and Regulation 
1383/2003 on border measures (R. 1383/2003). In general, it can be affirmed 
that they build on Part III of TRIPS, but they go much further in three senses: a) 
while TRIPS provisions allow significant room for manoeuvre when 
implementing, provisions in FTAs list in minute detail not only the results to 
attain but also the necessary actions200; b) the option provided in footnote 4 to 
art. 23.1 TRIPS to protect GIs for wine and spirits only by administrative means 
is lost: GIs must enjoy the same protection than the rest of IPR; c) they extend 
the application of the enforcement mechanisms adopted in accordance with 
TRIPS to new categories of IPR provided in the FTAs.  
 
78. As it was the case with provisions on substantive protection, 
sections on enforcement in the FTAs share the same structure: general 
provisions, civil and administrative remedies, border measures, liability of 
internet service providers and criminal measures. Common provisions do not 
exist in relation with the last two sectors. 
 
 
A. General provisions. 
 
                                               
197 “Lack of trained IPR officials” is seen as a problem by the EU (IPR Enforcement Report 2009, 
p. 14). 
198 Eurocham denounces insufficient cooperation between authorities in charge of enforcement. 
They lack the financial resources, manpower, expertise knowledge and confidence to deal with 
unusual cases. This makes it impossible for them to keep up effective enforcement, (Eurocham, 
IPR Position Paper, p. 3). The US 2011 Special 301 Report also states that , “additional work is 
needed to streamline enforcement efforts and to improve coordination among enforcement 
authorities, including by making clear the respective areas of responsibility of the various 
enforcement agencies”. This problem was also mentioned at least by two persons who were 
interviewed in the framework of the elaboration of this Report. 
199 Eurocham, IPR Position Paper, p. 1. 
200 X. Seuba Hernandez, “Health Protection...”, p. 36. 
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1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
79. General obligations. In order to recall the mandate in Art. 41.1 and 2 
TRIPS, the FTAs reiterate the general obligation of the parties to provide for 
measures, procedures and remedies which are necessary to ensure the 
enforcement of IPR covered by each treaty. It is also mentioned, that such 
measures should be expeditious, effective, proportionate and constitute a 
deterrent to further infringement. They shall be fair and equitable and shall not 
be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or 
unwarranted delays. Finally, they state that such measures should not be 
applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade 
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse201. 
Art. 234.4 EU-CP TA states that the Parties are not obliged to put in place 
a judicial system for the enforcement of IPR distinct from that for the 
enforcement of law in general in order to comply with the obligations in the 
FTAs. Furthermore, the Parties do not assume any obligation with respect to the 
distribution of resources for enforcement of IPR and the enforcement of law in 
general. While none of the other treaties establish a similar provision, it should 
be recalled it is copied from Art. 41.5 TRIPS, therefore the EU partners can 
invoke it regardless of not having been expressly included in their respective 
FTAs202. 
 
80. Entitled applicants. Art. 42 TRIPS establishes that members 
shall make available to right holders – including “federations and associations 
having legal standing to assert such rights”203 – civil judicial procedures 
concerning the enforcement of their IPR. The FTAs oblige EU’s partners to 
include in the list of entitled applicants: a) persons authorised to use those 
rights, in particular exclusive licensees and other licensees; b) IP collective 
management bodies; c) and professional defense bodies204. In all cases, the 
entitlement to seek application of these procedures of these categories shall be 
“in accordance with the provisions of the applicable law” or “in so far as 
permitted by the applicable law”205. 
Furthermore, while Art. 42 TRIPS does not make clear whether the 
entitlement refers exclusively to civil and administrative actions (Section 2, Part 
III, where the provision is located) or to any action in the framework of Part III 
TRIPS, the provisions in the FTAs explicitly refer to Part III of TRIPS in general. 
Therefore, entitled applicants may also initiate criminal procedures and request 
the adoption of border measures. 
                                               
201 Arts. 234 EU-CP TA, 151 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 260 EU-CA AA, 10.41 EU-Korea FTA. The 
content of these provisions is a reproduction of Art. 3 D. 2004/48. Art. 3 ACTA reproduces art. 
41.1 TRIPS, but art. 6.2 actually contains stronger language obliging the parties to adopt 
measures to ensure that the rights of all participants are appropriately protected. 
202 X. Seuba, “Checks and balances in the intellectual property enforcement field: reconstructing 
EU trade agreements”, forthcoming (handed by the author), p. 10. 
203 See footnote 11 to art. 42. 
204 The list is copied from Art. 4 D. 2004/48. 
205 Arts. 236 EU-CP TA, 152 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.42 EU-Korea FTA. As an exception, Art. 
261 EU-CA AA does not refer to IPR collective right management bodies, although it can be 
interpreted that as far as they have been granted the management of their rights by IPR holders, 
they can be considered “holders of IPR” or “federations or association” in the sense of Art. 42 
TRIPS. That would be the case of collective management societies in many countries of Central 
America. 
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2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
81. The IPR Enforcement system in Vietnam is governed by several 
regulations: arts. 198 – 219 IPL, D. 105/2006, D. 97/2010, Customs Law, the 
Criminal Code, the Civil Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. 
 
82. According to art. 199 IPL and 4 D. 105/2006, depending on their 
nature and seriousness, infringements are handled by civil, administrative or 
criminal measures. The elements to determine such nature and seriousness are 
specified in art. 14 D. 105/2006.  
While criminal and civil remedies are handled by courts, administrative 
remedies are handled by inspectorates, police offices, market management 
offices, custom offices and People’s committees of all levels.  
Cases are more likely to be settled via administrative procedure due to 
the fact that they are more time-and-cost effective206. However, administrative 
authorities cannot impose damages.  
At present there are not specialized IP courts, although the government 
has plans to introduce them207. 
Competent authorities handling IPR infringements have the right to ask 
for IPR assessment by a competent organisation (VIPRI, NOIP….)208. This is the 
general rule in all complaints. 
 
83. According to several sources, enforcement actions and penalties 
have virtually no deterrent effect on infringers209. One of the reasons might be 
that right holders prefer to ask for administrative remedies to save time and 
money and renounce to ask for damages in civil procedures. Since the 
infringement does not cost much money to infringers they do not feel persuaded 
to carry out infringement activities in the future. As the respondents to the EU 
Survey on IPR Enforcement stated, other reason for this is that civil procedures, 
provisional measures, criminal procedures and particularly customs procedures 
seem to be deficient or not implemented” 210. Finally, it is the opinion of the US 
that Vietnam’s enforcement agencies should initiate more criminal 
prosecutions, and impose deterrent-level sentences in appropriate cases211. 
Being so, at present Vietnam is not in a position to comply with the 
obligation in the EU’s FTA – and in TRIPS as well – to adopt measures that 
“constitute a deterrent to further infringement”212.  
 
84. It is certainly the case that the implementation of these obligations 
is not easy for developing countries. Generally speaking, enforcement sections 
                                               
206 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 92. 
207 F. Mattei, “Patent Strategy in Asia”, Managing IP – Life Sciences, 2011, pp. 9 ff. 
208 Art. 201 IPL. 
209 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 93. According to Eurocham “Sanctions for selling 
counterfeit products must be increased and rigidly enforced in practice as a deterrent to 
counterfeiting activity” (IPR Position Paper, p. 1). 
210 IPR Enforcement Report 2009, p. 14. 
211 2011 US Special 301 Report, p. 42. 
212 In fact, Vietnam has adopted obligations to improve its enforcement system in US-Vietnam 
FTA (art. 11) and Japan-Vietnam EPA (art. 94.3). 
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are expensive to implement: new judges, administrative buildings and 
personnel, among other investments may be necessary to comply with them.  
However, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the FTAs and art. 
45.1 TRIPS, EU’s partners are oblige neither to put in place a judicial system for 
the enforcement of IPR distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, 
nor to modify the distribution of resources as between enforcement of IPR and 
the enforcement of law in general.  
To fulfil the obligation of adopting measures that “constitute a deterrent 
to further infringement”, and at the same time make use of the right to not 
modify the distribution of resources seems difficult to harmonise213. 
Furthermore, the FTAs provide for cooperation mechanisms according to 
which the EU may provide technical assistance to their partners to comply with 
their enforcement obligations214. 
 
85. Finally, in relation with the entitled applicants to initiate 
procedures to protect IPR, it seems like licensees of industrial property rights 
only have legal standing in administrative procedures and under the condition 
that “the right to request handling of violations is not restricted by holders”215. 
In the case of copyright and related rights, licensees are not mentioned among 
the entitled applicants216. Finally, in relation to plant variety rights, “licensee 
has the right to take necessary measures to prevent a third party’s infringement 
if within a time limit of 3 months from the date of receipt of a request by the 
licensor, the latter fails to act as requested”217. 
This does not seem to be consisted with the provisions in the existing 
EU’s FTAs. 
 
 
B. Civil and administrative measures 
 
1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
86. Provisions on civil and administrative measure are the most 
numerous in the EU’s FTAs. They deal with the following issues: evidence, right 
of information, provisional and precautionary measures, corrective measures, 
injunctions, publication of decisions and damages and legal costs. 
 
87. Evidence. Rules of evidence can be found in Arts. 43 and 50.1. b) 
TRIPS. However, the FTAs provide for stricter obligations in this field218. First, 
art. 43 TRIPS states that “the judicial authorities shall have the authority… to 
order that [an] evidence be produced by the opposing party”. The obligation of 
the states is to empower their judicial authorities to order the measures, 
however they have discretion to order the measure or not in each particular 
case. However, the treaties state that states “shall take such measures as are 
necessary… to enable the competent judicial authority to order the 
communication [of the information required]”. It is sustain that in the FTAs it is 
                                               
213 X. Seuba, “Checks and balances…”, p. 10. 
214 See chapter IV. 
215 Art. 24 D. 97/2010. 
216 Art. 44 D. 100/2006. 
217 Art. 193 IPL 
218 Arts. 237 EU-CP TA, 153 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 262 EU-CA AA, 10.43 EU-Korea FTA. 
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an obligation for the States to provide those measures. Judicial authorities have 
no discretion to decide on their adoption. If right holders apply for them they 
are obliged to grant them. 
Second, all the treaties but the EU-CA AA precise that the evidence that 
might be asked for are “banking, financial or commercial documents”219. 
Third, the obligation to adopt these measures is exclusively for IPR 
infringements “committed on a commercial scale”. 
Fourth, all the treaties but the EU-CA AA provide for the adoption of 
“provisional measures for preserving evidence” even when the proceedings have 
not been initiated220. 
Fifth, while Art. 50.1 only talks about “relevant evidence”, the FTAs 
coincide in the catalogue of measures that can be the object of these provisional 
measures for preserving evidence: “the detailed description, with or without the 
taking of samples, or the physical seizure of the infringing goods, and, in 
appropriate cases, the materials and implements used in the production and/or 
distribution of these goods”.   
Finally, while all the FTAs state that the party who request the adoption 
of the measure shall present “reasonably available evidence to support its claims 
that its IPR has been infringed or is about to be infringed”, they do not include 
other safeguards which are included in TRIPS with the aim of counterbalance 
the rights of the alleged infringer221. Taking into account the supplementary 
character of the FTAs, it is understood that EU partners are obliged to 
implement those safeguards in their domestic legislations. 
 
88. Right of information. All the treaties contain provisions 
allowing judicial authorities to order the infringer to provide information about 
his accomplices, upstream or downstream in the channels of production and 
distribution222. These provisions are based on Art. 47 TRIPS but with the 
exception of the EU-CA AA223 they go much further in detailing the obligations 
of the parties. 
 First, while Art. 47 TRIPS states that “Members may provide…”, the 
treaties states that the parties “shall ensure…”. So it is not optional anymore for 
EU’s partners to adopt these measures.  
                                               
219 The provision is copied from Art. 6.2 D. 2004/48. EU-CA AA refers to “evidence” in general. 
220 Arts 238 EU-CP TA, 154 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.44 EU-Korea FTA. In the EU-CP TA (art. 
236) these measures cannot be adopted before the commencement of proceedings.  
221 For example, an obligation for the requester to submit reasonable evidence to support his 
claim and the specification of the evidence relevant to the substantiation of its claim is only 
established in EU-CA AA. Furthermore, no reference is made in the FTAs to: a) the possibility of 
the courts to order the applicant to provide a security sufficient to protect the defendant and to 
prevent abuse (art. 50.3 TRIPS); b) to the obligation of give notice to the parties affected by 
provisional measures adopted in audita altera parte and the right to a review, include a right to 
be heard (art. 50.4 TRIPS); c) to the possible revocation of the measures upon the request of the 
defendant if a complaint on the merit is not filed within a reasonable period (art. 50.6); d) to the 
right to be appropriately compensated for any injury caused by the measures if it is found that 
there was no infringement (art. 50.7). These safeguards are also present in Art. 7 D. 2004/48. 
222 Arts. 239 EU-CP TA, 155 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.45 EU-Korea FTA. These provisions are 
modelled in accordance with art. 8 D. 2004/48. In EU-CP TA measures concerning the right of 
information shall only be implemented in proceedings concerning infringement committed at a 
commercial scale (art. 235). 
223 Art. 264 EU-CA AA is identical to art. 47 TRIPS. 
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Second, while in Art. 47 the order to provide information can only be 
directed toward the infringer, the FTAs allow the order to be directed to other 
persons involved somehow in the infringement224.  
Third, the provisions lack the exception in Art. 47 TRIPS that allows 
infringing parties not to inform on third parties or distribution channels if this 
“would be out of proportion to the seriousness of the infringement”. 
 Fourth, while Art. 47 TRIPS exclusively talks about “the identity of third 
persons involved in the production and distribution of the infringing goods or 
services and of their channels of distribution”, the provisions in the FTAs 
include a detailed list of the information to be provided. First it does not talk 
about the identity but of the names and addresses of the members of the 
channel of production and distribution. Second it states that such information 
can also be related to the quantities produced, manufactured, delivered, 
received or ordered, as well as the price obtained for the goods or services in 
question. 
Finally, it is established that the application of these measures is made 
“without prejudice to other statutory provisions”225. 
  
89. Provisional and precautionary measures. Art. 50.1 TRIPS 
states that “judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and 
effective provisional measures: a) to prevent an infringement of any IPR from 
occurring, and in particular to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce 
in their jurisdictions of goods, including imported goods immediately after 
customs clearance”. Par. 2 allows these measures to be taken inaudita altera 
parte where appropriate, in particular where any delay is likely to cause 
irreparable harm to the right holder, or where the is a demonstrable risk of 
evidence being destroyed”. The following paragraphs establish certain 
safeguards which have already been mentioned to make sure that provisional 
measures are not abused by right holders. 
All the treaties include provisions226 that expand the types of provisional 
measures which can be adopted. They all establish that judicial authorities may, 
at the request of the applicant, issue an interlocutory injunction intended to 
prevent an imminent infringement of an IPR, to stop the continuation of the 
alleged infringement, or to subject the continuation of the infringement to the 
lodging of guarantees227.  
                                               
224 In the case of EU-Korea FTA, to “any other person which is party to a litigation or a witness 
therein”. In the case of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-CP TA: “any other person who: a) 
was found in possession of the infringing good on a commercial scale; b) was found to be using 
the infringing services on a commercial scale; c) was found to be providing on a commercial 
scale services used in infringing activities; d) was indicated by [any of these persons] as being 
involved in the production, manufacture or distribution of the goods or the provision of the 
services”. 
225 The aim of these statutory provisions can be to: a) grant the right holder rights to receive 
fuller information; b) govern the use in civil or criminal proceedings of the information 
communicated pursuant to the measure; c) govern responsibility for misuse of the right of 
information; d) afford an opportunity for refusing to provide information which would force the 
person to admit his own participation or that of his close relatives in an infringement of an 
intellectual property right; or (e) govern the protection of confidentiality of information sources 
or the processing of personal data”. 
226 Arts. 240 EU-CP TA, 156 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 263 EU-CA AA, 10.46 EU-Korea FTA. They 
are based on Art. 9.1 a) D. 2004/48. 
227 There are some distinctions from one treaty to another. First, the EU-CP TA states that such 
measures shall be adopted “in accordance with domestic legislation”. Second, in the EU-CA AA, 
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 With the exception of the EU-CA AA, the other treaties also provide for 
the establishment of “interlocutory injunctions to order the seizure of goods 
suspected of infringing an IPR to prevent their entry into or movement within 
the channels of commerce”. 
 As it was the case with the measures related to the right of information, 
the FTAs do not include any safeguard aimed at ensuring that provisional 
measures are not abused. As mentioned before, this does not mean that EU 
partners are not obliged to implement the safeguards provided for in art. 50 
TRIPS. 
 To conclude it is worth mentioning two important aspects where there 
are not common provisions. On the one half, seizure of property of the alleged 
infringer to secure the payment of damages is envisaged in the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-Korea FTA228 but not in the EU-CP TA or the 
EU-CA AA. On the other half, these two FTAs also establish that interlocutory 
injunctions may be issued against infringers and intermediaries229. This 
possibility is not mentioned in the EU-CP TA or the EU-CA AA, but it should be 
mentioned that ACTA also oblige contracting parties to provide the possibility to 
adopt provisional measures against “third parties”230. 
 
90. Corrective measures. As a complement to Art. 46 TRIPS, all 
the FTAs but the EU-CA AA provide for three possible actions with regards to 
goods found to be infringing IPR: the recall, definitive removal from the 
channels of commerce or their destruction231. The EU-CP TA and the EU-Korea 
FTA state that such measures can also be taken, in appropriate cases, also with 
regards to materials used to produce those goods. It should be recalled that Art. 
46 TRIPS also includes this possibility.  
 
91. Injunctions. TRIPS talks about injunctions in art. 44. Leaving aside the 
EU-CA AA, which is silent on this matter, the other agreements establish a 
provision similar to that article232: in case of infringement, judicial authorities 
                                                                                                                                         
there is no mention to the possibility to subject the continuation of the infringement to the 
lodging of guarantees, or to the possibility to grant interlocutory injunctions to forbid the 
continuation of the alleged infringement. Moreover, there is no mention of the possibility to 
request a recurring penalty payment. 
228 As a guarantee for the opposing party, both treaties state that the applicant of these measures 
must prove circumstances likely to endanger the recovery of damages. The object of the seizure 
can be movable and immovable property, including the blocking of bank accounts and other 
assets. In the EU-CARIFORUM EPA it is further provided that for the purpose of adopting these 
measures, “the competent authorities may order the communication of bank, financial or 
commercial documents, or appropriate access to the relevant information. 
229 The EU-CARIFORUM EPA establishes that these interlocutory injunctions may be issued 
against infringers and intermediaries and in respect of any IPR category. The EU-Korea FTA 
establishes a similar provision but exclusively for copyright, related right, trademarks or 
geographical indications. For the purpose of the provision, the EU-Korea FTA states that 
“intermediary” is to be defined according to each party’s legislation, “but shall include those who 
deliver or distribute infringing goods, and also where appropriate, include online service 
providers”. 
230 Art. 12.1. 
231 Arts. 241 EU-CP TA, 157 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.47 EU-Korea FTA. These provisions are 
modelled in accordance with art. 10 D. 2004/48. Contrary to the EU-Korea FTA, Art. 46 TRIPS 
and Art. 10.3 D. 2004/48, no reference is made in the EU-CP TA and the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
to the need of proportionality in the adoption of these measures. 
232 Arts. 242 EU-CP TA, 158 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.48 EU-Korea FTA. These provisions are 
based on Art. 11 D. 2004/48. 
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may issue an injunction against the infringer to prohibit the continuation of the 
infringement. In all cases, it is established that “non-compliance with an 
injunction shall, where appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty payment”. 
This is something that is not mentioned in art. 44 TRIPS. 
Since the provisions do not make any distinction, it can be assumed that 
injunctions can be adopted against persons who did not know or did not have 
reasonable grounds to know that carrying out a certain activity would entail an 
IPR infringement. In this sense, these provisions go beyond what is established 
in art. 44 TRIPS. 
Finally, the treaties also state that “each party shall ensure that right 
holders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose 
services are being used by a third party to infringe IPR”233. The provision is 
TRIPS-plus because art. 44.1 refers exclusively to infringers234.  
 
92. Damages. Art. 45.1 TRIPS simply states that the compensation 
that a right holder can get for the infringement of his IPR must be “adequate to 
compensate” for the injury caused by a wilful or negligent infringer. With the 
exception of the EU-CA AA, the FTAs provide for detailed provisions on 
calculation of damages235. Two situations are distinguished: 
a) person who knowingly infringed or had reasonable grounds to 
know that he was infringing an IPR (conscious infringer). In these cases, the 
treaties state two alternatives to calculate damages. First, judicial authorities 
may set damages taking into account “all appropriate aspects” which at 
minimum includes profits made by the infringer and lost profits236. Second, as 
an alternative, the treaties permit a lump sum payment for damages caused 
which are to be calculated on the basis of elements such as the amount of 
royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested 
authorisation to use the IPR in question. 
b) person that did not know or had no reasonable grounds to know 
that he was committing an IPR infringement (“innocent” infringer). In this case, 
the treaties state that judicial authorities may order the recovery of profits or the 
payment of damages which may be pre-established. 
Art. 9 ACTA includes a new way in which damages are to be calculated. 
Courts “shall have to authority to consider, inter alia, any legitimate measure of 
value the right holder submits, which may include lost profits, the value of the 
infringed goods or services measured by the market price, or the suggested 
retail price”. These novel approaches differ from the one in the EU’s FTAs and 
D. 2004/48 and its application might be problematic. 
 
                                               
233 EU-Korea FTA limits the scope of that obligation to “copyright, related rights, trademarks or 
geographical indications”. 
234 This expansion can also be found in ACTA: its Art. 8.1 is similar to art. 44 TRIPS but with a 
small but important difference, it expands the application of injunctions beyond alleged 
infringers to include third parties. 
235 Arts. 244 EU-CP TA, 160 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.50 EU-Korea FTA. They are a 
reproduction of Art. 13 D. 2004/48. 
236 In the case of the EU-CP TA and the EU-Korea FTA – not the EU-CARIFORUM EPA – the 
moral prejudice caused to the right holder by the infringement shall also be taken into account. 
The standard of protection is higher than in TRIPS: while Art. 45.1 the obligation of the judicial 
authorities is to grant damages “adequate to compensate”, in the treaties states judicial 
authorities are obliged to take into account “all appropriate aspects”.  
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93. Legal costs. Art. 45.2 TRIPS establishes that “judicial authorities 
shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder expenses, 
which may include appropriate attorney’s fees”. In the FTAs, the parties must 
ensure that costs and other expenses are borne, as a general rule, by the 
unsuccessful party237. With the exception of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, it is said 
that such legal costs must be reasonable and proportionate. An exception to the 
general rule can be made if “equity requires that cost be allocated otherwise”238. 
 
94. Publication of decisions. While TRIPS does not provide for 
this measure, all the FTAs do239. Following an ex parte petition, judicial 
authorities may order the dissemination of the decision, including displaying 
and publishing. The costs of these measures will fall on the infringer240.  
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
95. Civil remedies are provided in Arts. 202 – 209 IPL and 
administrative remedies in arts. 211, 214 and 215 IPL and D. 97/2010. 
 
96. At first sight, it seems like arts. 203.5 IPL and 94 CPC are 
consistent with the obligations in EU’s FTAs related to the collection of 
evidence. 
 
97. In relation to the right of information, as the Vietnamese representative 
recognised in the WTO Review, there is no provision in Vietnamese IPR Law 
empowering authorities to order infringers to inform on the identity of third 
persons involved in the production and distribution of the infringing goods or 
services and of their channels of commerce241. 
 
98. Art. 206 IPL states that “upon or after the initiation of a lawsuit, 
the IPR holder shall have the right to request provisional measures if certain 
conditions are met. The court shall decide to apply provisional measures before 
listening to the party subject to such measures”. Arts. 99 and following CPC 
govern the procedure to request those measures.  
Art. 207 IPL lists the following measures for civil procedures: seizure; 
distraint; sealing, ban from alteration of original state, ban from movement; ban 
from ownership transfer. At first sight, the IPL does not seem to include all 
provisional measures listed in the FTAs such as: interlocutory injunctions or 
stop the continuation of the alleged infringement. However, these provisional 
measures can be interpreted to be included in art. 102.12 CPC.  
                                               
237 Arts. 245 EU-CP TA, 268 EU-CA AA, 161 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 10.51 EU-Korea FTA. In the 
EU-CP TA reference is made to “legal costs, procedural expenses, including attorney’s fees”.  
238 It should be mentioned that the latter sentence is taken from art. 161 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 
whose wordings show some differences which those of art. 268 EU-CA AA – “unless equity does 
not allow this, in accordance with domestic legislation” –, art. 245 EU-CP TA – “unless equity or 
other reasons, in accordance with domestic legislation” – and art. 10.51 EU-Korea FTA – “unless 
equity does not allow as such” –. 
239 Arts. 246 EU-CP TA, 162 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 269 EU-CA AA, 10.52 EU-Korea FTA. They 
take as a model Art. 15 D. 2004/48. 
240 The only difference among the texts can be found in EU-Korea FTA which establishes that 
judicial authorities will order the publication “where appropriate”. 
241 WTO, Vietnam Review, at. 38. 
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The measures to be adopted are more numerous in administrative 
procedures242. In particular, art. 33 D. 97/2010 states that when detecting a 
violation, the competent authority shall immediately order its termination 
(interlocutory injunctions)243. 
An important pitfall of the regulation of provisional measures is that the 
possibility to adopt them before the commencement of the proceedings is not 
contemplated. This is not consistent neither with the EU’s FTAs nor with Art. 50 
TRIPS. 
 
99. The corrective measures that competent authorities may adopt in 
IPR infringement cases depend on whether they are to be adopted in civil 
procedures or in administrative procedures. 
In the first case, competent authorities may order the destruction, 
distribution or use for non-commercial purposes of the infringing goods or the 
materials used for the IPR infringement, provided that the adoption of these 
measures do not affect the exploitation of IPR by the right holder244.  
In administrative procedures, in addition to those measures, art. 214.3 
IPL and D. 97/2010 provides for cautions and fines; the confiscation of the 
infringing goods are materials used to commit the infringement; suspension of 
business activities of the infringer; compelled transportation out of the Vietnam 
territory of transit goods infringing upon IPR or compelled re-export of 
counterfeit goods, as well as imported materials used for the production of the 
goods, after infringing elements are removed from such goods. 
As previously mentioned, the EU-CA AA is the only FTA that provides for 
the charitable donation of the infringing goods. It is doubtful whether the use of 
the infringing goods for non-commercial purposes can be considered as a 
“definitive removal of the goods from the channels of commerce” in the sense of 
the other FTAs. 
Furthermore, certain of these measures only apply to counterfeit marks 
and GIs and pirated goods (copyright and related rights). 
 
100. Injunctions are provided for in civil procedures (art. 202.1 IPL) 
and administrative procedures (art. 214.1 IPL). In the latter case, the injunction 
can be subject to caution or monetary fine. 
 
101. As previously mentioned, damages can only be requested in civil 
procedures (art. 202.4 IPL). According to art. 204, damages include material 
and spiritual damages.  
Once a plaintiff has proven material damages, he can request the court to 
be compensated on the following bases: a) the amount of money plus profit 
gained by the defendant as a result of the act of infringement where the reduced 
profit amount of the plaintiff has not yet been calculated into such total material 
damage; b) price of the license, under the presumption that the defendant has 
been licensed by the plaintiff; c) where it is impossible to calculate 
                                               
242 Art. 215: preventive measures to secure the administrative sanctioning include termporary 
custody of persons; termporary custody of infringing goods, material evidence and means; body 
search; search of means of transport and objects; search of places where infringing goods, 
material evidence and means are hidden. Similar measures are established in Art. 32 D. 
97/2010. 
243 A caution can be imposed when there are sufficient grounds and clear evidence. 
244 Art. 202.5 IPL, arts. 29-32 D. 105/2006. 
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compensation on the basis of a) and b), such compensation level shall be set by 
the court, depending on the damage extent, but must not exceed VND 500 
millions245. 
 In relation to spiritual damage, they need to be calculated separately: the 
court shall decide on the compensation level ranging from VND 5 millions to 
VND 50 millions, depending on the damage extent. 
 It seems like these calculation criteria should be fine-tuned in the case 
Vietnam aims to celebrate an FTA with the EU. 
 
102. Art. 205.3 IPL states that the plaintiff can request the court to 
compel infringers to “pay reasonable costs of hiring attorneys”. The provision 
should be amended because it does not seem to fit the requirements in the FTAs 
which also include procedural expenses and other expenses. 
 
103. Finally, Vietnamese IPL does not provide for the publication of the 
judgement, but it include a similar measure consisting on “public apology and 
rectification” (art. 202.1 IPL). 
 
 
C. Border measures 
 
1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
104. TRIPS devotes Arts. 51 – 60 to border measures. Broadly 
speaking, Art. 51 states that a procedure must be made available before a 
judicial or administrative authority to a right holder to lodge an application for 
suspension of the release of goods suspect of being counterfeit or pirated. The 
following provisions provide further details and requirements concerning such 
procedure. 
The provisions on border measures in the EU’s FTAs246 increase the 
standards in TRIPS in four different ways. First, while art. 51 only imposes an 
obligation to sanction the “importation” of counterfeited or pirated goods (and 
the control of exports is optional), the treaties extent that obligation to 
“importation, exportation and transit” at least247.  
Second, Art. 51 exclusively refers to counterfeit and pirate goods. The 
adoption of border measures for other categories of IPR is optional for the states 
(art. 51.2). The obligation to establish border measures extents in all the Treaty 
but the EU-CA AA at least to goods infringing related rights and design rights. 
In addition, the EU-Korea FTA includes GIs, patents and plant variety rights248. 
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA also includes geographical indications. For this 
category of IPR, the EU-CP TA only states that “the parties will evaluate the 
                                               
245 Art. 205 and Arts. 16-20 D. 105/2006. 
246 Arts. 249 EU-CP TA, 163 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 273 EU-CA AA, 10.67 EU-Korea FTA. These 
provisions mirror Art. 9 Regulation 1383/2003. 
247 The EU-CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-CA AA to “importation, exportation, re-exportation, 
entry or exit of the customs territory, placement under a suspensive procedure or placement 
under a custom free zone or a customs free warehouse”; and in EU-Korea FTA to “importation, 
exportation, re-exportation, customs transit, transhipment, placement under a free zone, 
placement under a suspensive procedure or a bonded warehouse of goods”. 
248 According to art. 10.67.4 Korea has two years from the date of entering into force of the 
agreement to implement border measures concerning patents and registered designs. 
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application of these measures for goods suspected of infringing geographical 
indications”.  
Third, art. 58 TRIPS enable (but do not oblige) WTO members to provide 
their custom authorities the power to suspend ex officio the release of 
suspecting goods, and it provides several requirement that such procedures 
must met. In EU-CP TA and the EU-Korea FTA, this faculty is an obligation for 
the parties: they shall provide that their authorities may suspend ex officio the 
release of suspecting goods or detain them if they have sufficient grounds, in 
order to enable the right holder to submit, subject to domestic law of each Party, 
a judicial or administrative action. A similar provision is also found in the EU-
CA AA, but not in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. 
Fourth, all the treaties state that “any right or obligation established in 
Part III, Section 4 TRIPS concerning the importer shall be also applicable [not 
exclusively to the importer, but also] to the exporter or to the holder/consignee 
of the goods”. 
 
105. To conclude this section, it is worth mentioning that the area of 
border measures is one of the most affected by ACTA. For instance, its 
provisions expand the application of border measures in two ways: first, to all 
categories of IPR but patents and undisclosed information249; second, at least to 
acts of importation and exportation250. ACTA also obliges the parties to 
empower their competent authorities to act on their own initiative. 
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
106.  In Vietnam legislation, border measures are governed by arts. 216 
– 219 IPL, arts. 34-38 D. 105/2006, 10-12 D. 97/2010 and different provisions 
of the Customs Law (CL). 
At first sight, according to arts. 219 IPL and 57 CL, it seems like the scope 
of application of these measures include all categories of IPR. However, 
different measures can be established depending on each IPR. For instance, art. 
12 D. 97/2010 establishes special sanctions to the import of goods bearing 
counterfeit marks or GIs. 
These measures are provided for acts of import and export of IPR-
infringing goods. But, again, D. 97/2010 establishes that infringing transit 
goods shall be brought out of the Vietnamese territory. Other special sanctions 
are established as well depending on the IPR infringed. 
At first sight, the measures can only be taken at the request of the right 
holder. However, art. 37 D. 105/2006 seems to empower customs offices to 
exercise their power to impose administrative sanctions on their own motion. 
The interpretation is not shared by the Vietnamese representative before the 
TRIPS Council who explained that the “IP Law only provides for the authority of 
customs offices to ex officio apply administrative remedies in respect of 
imported goods regarded as pirated goods or trademark/geographical 
indication counterfeiting goods”251. 
 
                                               
249 Art. 13 and footnote 9. 
250 Art. 16.1. The adoption of procedures against goods in transit is optional. 
251 WTO, Vietnam Review, at 50. 
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107. Despite the fact that Vietnamese legislation in this field is very 
close to the obligations established in EU’s FTAs, European authorities have 
raised concerns about its application in practice. “seizures carried out by 
customs authorities are insufficient, they have been notoriously corrupt, and for 
many years no actions have been pursued. It is hoped that the new Customs Law 
will improve the situation, but there is a lack of efficient IT devices or of a single 
database on goods infringing IPRs”252. 
 
 
D. Areas where common provisions do not exist: liability of 
Internet service providers and criminal measures 
 
1. Provisions in the FTAs 
 
108. Liability of Internet service providers. The EU-Korea FTA 
and the EU-CP TA contain provisions concerning liability of Internet services 
providers (ISPs)253. In these provisions, the Parties recognise that the services 
provided by ISPs may be used by third parties to infringe IPR and they oblige to 
adopt provisions that exempt IPS from liability as far as certain conditions are 
met.  
These provisions concern the following IPS activities: transmission of or 
provision of access to information provided by a recipient of the service (mere 
conduit); automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of information 
provided by a recipient of the service (caching); or the storage of information 
provided by the recipient (hosting).  
At the same time, Parties are obliged not to impose a general obligation 
on ISP to monitor the information they transmit. They can only be compelled to 
promptly inform about any alleged illegal activities undertaken or information 
provided by recipients of their services.  
Neither TRIPS nor the EU-CARIFORUM EPA or the EU-CA AA include 
provisions in this regard. Thus it can be affirmed that there are not common 
provisions on this issue. However, ACTA establishes provisions in this field 
which might be incorporated to future FTAs concluded by the EU. Compared to 
the previous versions, the final version of ACTA has reduced the obligations 
assumed by the contracting parties in this field. 
Art. 27.1 states the obligation of the parties to ensure that all the 
procedures and standards for civil and criminal enforcement shall be applicable 
in the digital environment. In particular, such procedures shall be available 
against the “unlawful use of means of widespread distribution for infringing 
purposes”. Contracting parties have the option of providing measures aimed at 
requiring ISPs and other intermediaries to provide information about 
subscribers to right holders on request. In any case, on the adoption of these 
measures, contracting parties are allowed to preserve their system for ISP 
liability limitation and any laws that are aimed at preserving free expression, 
fair process and privacy. 
 
                                               
252 Evaluation of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Strategy in Third Countries, 
Final Report, November 2010,  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_147053.pdf 
253 Arts. 10.62 to 10.66 EU-Korea FTA and Arts. 250-254 are but a copy of Arts. 12-15 D. 
2000/31 on E-Commerce. 
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109. Criminal measures. While provisions on criminal measures 
were negotiated in preliminary drafts of some FTAs254, up to now the only 
agreement that include provisions in this field is the EU-Korea FTA255. 
The provisions in this treaty go further beyond the obligations 
established in Art. 61 TRIPS. First, “acts of piracy” also includes acts in 
infringement of related rights. Furthermore, Parties may expand criminal 
measures to acts of counterfeiting GIs and industrial designs. Second, the 
Parties shall adopt measures to ensure, consistently with the legal principles of 
their respective legal systems, the liability of legal persons for criminal acts 
against IPR and to punish the aiding and abetting of such acts. Third, besides 
the confiscation and/or destruction of all infringing goods and materials used 
for the commission of the infringement, the Parties shall ensure that their 
competent authorities have the power to order confiscation of the assets derived 
from, or obtained directly or indirectly through, the infringing activity. 
For the rest of EU partners, the standard of protection is the one 
established in TRIPS. However, the current status quo in international criminal 
IP enforcement is likely to undergo significant changes once ACTA enters into 
force. One can expect that the EU will put pressure on their trading partners to 
adopt this new standard on IPR enforcement either by signing ACTA or by 
incorporation its substantive standards in future FTAs256. 
Broadly speaking, the content of arts. 23 – 26 ACTA provide for similar 
obligations to those in the EU-Korea FTA. However, two important differences 
shall be mentioned.  
First, a definition of “acts on a commercial scale” is provided in Art. 23.1: 
such acts “include at least those carried out as commercial activities for direct or 
indirect economic or commercial advantage”257. The obligation thus is much 
broader that the one in Art. 61 TRIPS. Any country bound by ACTA would not 
be able to rely on the significant flexibility of art. 61 TRIPS – and recently 
confirmed by the WTO Panel Report in the China-IPRs dispute – concerning the 
interpretation of “commercial scale”258. 
 Second, art. 26 shall provide that, in appropriate cases, its competent 
authorities may act upon their own initiative to initiate investigation or legal 
action with respect to the criminal offences. 
 It is worth mentioning that while the EU is negotiating these provisions 
in international agreements, at present there is no internal legislation on 
criminal measures259. 
 
                                               
254 That was the case at least of the EU-CP TA. 
255 Arts. 10.54 – 10.61. 
256 H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, “From TRIPS to ACTA: Towards a New Gold Standard in Criminal IP 
Enforcement?, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research 
Paper, No 10-06., p. 17. 
257 The notion of “indirect economic or commercial advantage” might cover internet users 
downloading copyright files without rightholder authorisation and so receiving an (indirect) 
economic advantage of not having to pay the retail price”. H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, “From TRIPS 
to ACTA…”, p. 16. 
258 H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, “From TRIPS to ACTA…”, p. 11. 
259 This is one of the reasons raised by a Group of European Academics to question the 
compatibility of ACTA with the EU acquis. See Opinion of European Academics on ACTA, 
available at http://www.iri.uni-hannover.de/tl_files/pdf/ACTA_opinion_200111_2.pdf . The 
Commission published a response to this declaration, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/april/tradoc_147853.pdf  
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2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
110. Liability of ISPs in Vietnam is governed by arts. 16 – 20 of the Law 
on Information Technology. These provisions are modelled in accordance to 
Arts. 13 – 15 D. 2000/31 on electronic commerce and the US Digital Millenium 
Copyright Act 1998.  
Having this in mind, it can be affirmed that the regulation comply with 
the requirements established in CAN and the EU-Korea FTA. 
However, although the legislation exists, it does not seem to be 
implemented in practice. The US 2011 Special Report has identified as one of 
the remaining problems for Vietnam the “increasing levels of piracy over the 
Internet”. In fact, practitioners interviewed during the elaboration of this 
Report stated that infringement of copyright and related rights are committed 
by the ISPs themselves. For this reason, a future regulation to define the 
responsibilities of the providers of Internet shall be welcome260.  
 
111. In relation with criminal measures, Vietnam is bound by two FTAs 
that also include provisions in the field: US-Vietnam FTA and ASEAN-AU-NZ 
FTA.  
Vietnam amended its provisions on criminal measures in the Criminal 
Code in 2009 with the purpose of fighting more efficiently against 
counterfeiting and piracy. At present criminal measures extent to copyright and 
related rights piracy, counterfeit of trademarks and GIs on a commercial scale. 
According to the representative of Vietnam before the TRIPS Council, “all 
penalties in general and fines in particular with regard to the copyright 
infringement crimes and IPR infringement crimes provided for in Articles 131 
and 171 of the Criminal Code are designed in equivalence with other penalties 
for other crimes with the same seriousness throughout the whole Code, 
therefore, they have the similar deterrent effect like those applicable to other 
crimes”. Therefore, it is affirmed that the provisions on penalties are consistent 
with Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement”261. 
Unfortunately the studies carried out by other countries do not permit to 
reach this conclusion. In the opinion of the US Trade Representative, Vietnam’s 
enforcement agencies do not initiate enough criminal prosecutions and do not 
impose deterrent-level sentences in appropriate cases”.  
Finally, in relation to the terms “acts on a commercial scale”, a definition 
is not provided in Vietnam IP Law, but as the Vietnam representative before the 
TRIPS Council said: “it is a fact that there is no official definition of this concept 
in the statutory provisions of other countries in the world”262. However, at 
present, a definition has been provided by a WTO panel263. It is certainly a very 
flexible definition, at least much broader that the one established in ACTA. 
                                               
260 V. N. Hoan, “Copyright…”, p. 11. 
261 WTO, Vietnam…, at. 66. 
262 WTO, Vietnam…, at. 62. 
263 “[…] a “commercial scale” is the magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial activity. 
Therefore, counterfeiting or piracy “on a commercial scale” refers to counterfeiting or piracy 
carried on at the magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial activity with respect to a 
given product in a given market. The magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial activity 
with respect to a given product in a given market forms a benchmark by which to assess the 
obligation in the first sentence of Article 61. It follows that what constitutes a commercial scale 
for counterfeiting or piracy of a particular product in a particular market will depend on the 
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V. PROVISIONS ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
1. Common Provisions in EU’s FTAs 
 
112. Provisions on technology transfer in TRIPS and FTAs have a 
double aim: first, to oblige the Parties to promote international technology 
transfer among states; second, to enable the Parties to adopt measures to fight 
abusive practices in technology transfer contracts between companies. In the 
present section the second category of provisions will be explained. The first one 
will be analysed in Chapter IV, since one of the aims of cooperation mechanisms 
in to promote international technology transfer. 
 
113. TRIPS reaffirms the power of WTO members states to adopt 
measures to prevent companies to make use of licensing practices or conditions 
in their contracts “that may constitute and abuse of IPR having an adverse effect 
on competition” (art. 40.2) or which may “unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology” (art. 8.2)264. 
 It is common to all the FTAs to include a provision recalling the power 
granted to each WTO member in art. 40 TRIPS265. In the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
it is also established that such measures may also be adopted to prevent the 
“abuse of obvious information asymmetries in the negotiation of licenses”266. 
Apart from the EU-Korea FTA, the other treaties also make reference to the 
power granted in Art. 8.2 TRIPS267. However, there are important distinctions 
between TRIPS provisions and those in the FTAs: a) while TRIPS do not create 
an obligation for the states to adopt such measures, the FTAs (except for the 
EU-CP TA) do – “the parties shall take measures as appropriate”; b) these 
provisions could be interpreted as requiring European authorities to monitor 
the technology transfer impact in the EU’s partners of IP licensing practices and 
other IP strategies of EC companies; c) while in TRIPS, the adoption of those 
measures must be consistent the other provisions in the Agreement, this 
requirement is absent in the FTAs so more flexibility for its adoption exists. 
Scholars understands these provisions as the most effective tool with regard to 
countering the inhibiting effects of extensive IP protection for technology 
transfer268. 
 
 
2. Implications for Vietnam’s IPR System 
 
                                                                                                                                         
magnitude or extent that is typical or usual with respect to such a product in such a market, 
which may be small or large.” (WTO, 2009, at 7.577) 
264 Another provision in TRIPS related to technology transfer is art. 28.2: “patent owners shall 
also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing 
contracts”. 
265 Arts. 231 EU-CA AA, 10.3 EU-Korea FTA. 
266 Art. 142 EU-CARIFORUM EPA. 
267 Art. 197 EU-CP TA. 
268 A. Kur / H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, “Enough is enough – the notion of binding ceilings in 
international intellectual property protection”, MPI Research Paper Series, No. 09-01, pp. 52-
53. 
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114. Although Vietnam has promulgated an special law on technology 
transfer contracts, the Technology Transfer Law (TTL), the regulation of these 
agreements is also affected by other bodies of law: a) the CC includes some 
provision in the field269 and it is applicable in all those aspects of the contracts 
which are not explicitly governed by the TTL270; b) provisions on the “transfer of 
industrial property rights” in the IPL also have an impact on the regulation of 
these contracts271; c) finally, these agreements shall comply with the provisions 
on the Competition Law.  
Vietnam shall make use of these regulations to attain the objectives 
established in TRIPS and the EU’s FTAs. An assessment on whether these 
regulations prevent right holders from abusing of their IPR with and effect on 
competition or from making use of licensing practices which unreasonably 
affect the international transfer of technology would require a detailed analysis 
that cannot be carried out in this Report. However, at first sight it can be 
ascertained that Vietnam has established certain limitations in IPR licenses for 
the sake of fair competition and the promotion of technology transfer. In 
particular, art. 144.2 IPL prohibits “grant-back” clauses, tying clauses or clauses 
forbidding the licensee to challenge the validity of the IPR in court. All these 
clauses shall be declared ex officio null and void. 
  
 
                                               
269 Arts. 754 – 757 CC. 
270 Art. 4.1. The provision also states that “when specific technology transfer activities are 
provided for in another law, the provisions of that law prevail”. 
271 Arts. 138 – 150.  
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CHAPTER III 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS AND 
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR VIETNAM OF AN IPR 
CHAPTER IN A HYPOTHETICAL FTA WITH THE EU 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Having explained the hypothetical content of an IPR Chapter in a future 
FTA between Vietnam and the EU and the implications that it would have for 
the Vietnamese IPR system, it is now time to briefly explain the effects that such 
a Chapter may have on Vietnam’s economy.  
It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide an in-deep analysis of 
those effects. The reasons are that there is not much literature on the issue272 
and that this is not the right place to carry on such analysis. Such work – which 
is certainly necessary, should be undertaken by economists.  
The present Chapter will just explain how the strengthening of IPR 
protection affects on the socio-economic welfare of developing countries. From 
the existing literature, it can be explained how Vietnam socio-economic 
development could be affected by the adoption of an IPR Chapter in a 
hypothetical EU-Vietnam FTA with provisions similar to those of the existing 
EU’s FTAs. 
While the second section of this chapter will argue on the benefits that 
such an increase of protection which may entail for developing countries, the 
third will deal with the costs that may derive. Finally, the fourth section will 
analyse the different mechanisms that Vietnam can make use of to reduce those 
costs. As it will be explained, Vietnam should make use of the flexibilities 
provided in TRIPS and hypothetical FTA with the EU to accommodate the 
required amendments of the IPR system to its particular socio-economic 
circumstances. Furthermore, those amendments should be accompanied with 
measures to increase the R&D capacity of Vietnam in order to take full profit of 
them.  
 
 
II. BENEFITS OF THE INCREASING OF IPR PROTECTION FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND VIETNAM 
 
2. Broadly speaking, authors agree that the increasing of IPR protection 
have benefits for developing countries. However, there is also agreement that 
how much these countries can benefit depends on its particular circumstances. 
Furthermore, it is a common opinion that the strengthening of IPR by itself is 
not enough for the development of a country. 
                                               
272 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p…; M. P. Nguyen, “Impact …”, p. 116; N. P. Mai / N. V. 
Hung / T. N. Ca, “Impact of the Intellectual Property System on Economic Growth. Country 
Report – Vietnam”, WIPO – UNU Joint Research Project. 
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1. The case of developing countries in general 
 
3. Studies have identified three reasons why the increasing of IPR 
protection benefits developing countries: FDI attraction; technology transfer; 
promotion of local innovation and R&D. 
 
a) FDI attraction. As multinational companies begin to feel that their 
IPR are secure in a developing country, an increase in FDI will result either 
because they feel comfortable to import their product, to provide their services 
or to locate their production and/or other activities overseas. At the same time, 
it is argued that IPR owners have weak incentives to market their technologies 
in developing countries with poor IPR regimes due to risks of infringement273. 
Import of IPR-related products by foreign firms may lead to new jobs in 
distributorship and retail sector in developing countries. Furthermore, a 
country that enhances its IPR regime may attract additional knowledge 
intensive products, which will otherwise be unavailable on the local market274. 
There may also be significant gains in terms of product quality and reliability, 
especially in the area of pharmaceuticals. Trademark protection will also allow 
consumers from benefiting of genuine goods, goods that come with the 
assurance of quality associated with the mark through domestic or international 
advertising and reputation. Finally, music, films and books are unlikely to be 
distributed in a developing country in the absence of sufficient IPR protection. 
The location of subsidiaries in developing countries also implies creation 
of jobs requiring a higher level of skills. In the best scenario, some R&D jobs are 
created, which may have spill-over effects in higher education, local 
laboratories, etc…275. 
 
b) Technology transfer. Levels of technology transfer or licensing are 
more likely to occur against a secure legal framework and will ultimately lead to 
the transfer of know-how and expertise that will contribute to local economic 
growth276. Such technology transfer can consist of tangible good (such as 
technological machinery) made available through merchandise trade, intangible 
goods (such as technological know-how) made available through service 
trade277. 
While access to new technologies is good on its own for a developing 
country – consumers can benefit from them, this also helps local companies to 
improve their capacity to innovate. In the long run, these industries will be able 
to benefit from that technology to carry out their own research activities and, if 
needed, to adapt that technology to the specific needs of the country. 
                                               
273 D. Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights, Routledge, London/New York, 2002, 
p. 108 ff; S. Adams, “Intellectual property rights, Investment Climate and FDI in Developing 
countries”, International Business Research, vol 3, No 3, July 2010. 
274 S. Adams, “Intellectual property rights …”, 2010. 
275 D. Gervais, “The Changing Landscape of International Intellectual Property”, in: C. Heath / 
A. Kamperman Sanders, Intellectual Property and Free Trade Agreements, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2007, p. 71. 
276 D. Matthews, Globalising …, p. 110.  
277 W. Park / D. Lippoldt, Technology transfer and the economic implications of the 
strengthening of intellectual property rights in developing countries, OECD Trade Policy 
Working Paper No 62, 2008, p. 12. 
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c) Promotion of local innovation and R&D. Improvements in IPR in 
developing countries may create the incentives for foreign businesses to invest 
in new product research or in innovative activities. High technology sector 
would benefit the most.  
For example, publication of patents of foreign companies may provide 
the background information needed to stimulate new inventions in developing 
countries. 
Thanks to the distribution of foreign music, films and books due to a 
stronger IPR protection, national cultural industries may develop. At the same 
time, businesses that rely on copying will disappear, displacing mostly unskilled 
workers. Hopefully some of them will be able to find job in the new, creative 
industry. These new jobs are likely to pay higher wages and stimulate creativity, 
while reducing the need of local creators to live in higher protection countries. 
Trademark protection will also lead to the closure of businesses 
producing counterfeiting goods, but that economic activity could be replaced by 
jobs in distribution, retail and franchises278. 
 
4.  As previously mentioned, while authors agree on the benefits of 
increasing the level of IPR protection, there is also agreement that the level of 
influence of these benefits in each developing country depends on its particular 
circumstances. 
First, it is argued that the positive effects of a stronger system of IPR 
protection depend on the economic development of each country. IPR are 
unlikely to generate positive effects below a certain minimum threshold of 
economic development. Poorer developing countries (but probably not least-
developed ones) are poised to benefit from IPR protection due to inward FDI 
and new imports, as a new source of technology transfer. High income countries 
also benefit, but IPR protection has only a small positive impact on growth in 
middle income countries279.  
Second, the increase of IPR protection is not enough to attract FDI. An 
IPR reform must be accompanied by proactive policies that encourage 
improvements in physical and institutional or governance infrastructure, and 
business climate to improve the chances of attracting more FDI. In fact, 
countries such as Brazil, China or Russia have experienced a great increase in 
FDI with low levels of IPR protection280. This has led some authors to raise 
doubts about the prospects for significant flows of FDI thanks to higher level of 
IPR281. 
Third, it is also argued that adequate IPR protection is only one factor 
that influences technology transfer. There are other factors that also play a role: 
availability of skilled workforce, tax incentives, local transportation 
infrastructure, currency, political stability, the size of domestic markets, market 
                                               
278 D. Gervais, “The Changing Landscape…”, p. 73. 
279 D. Gervais, “The Changing Landscape…”, p. 63; L. Kilgour, “Building Intellectual Property 
Management Capacity in Public Research Institutions in Vietnam: Current needs and Future 
Directions”, Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology, vol 9, 2008, p. 322. 
280 S. Adams, “Intellectual property rights …”, 2010. In fact, several countries listed in the 
Priority Watch List of the USTR Special Report are some that have received the most significant 
inflows of US FDI over the years.  
281 C. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPs 
Agreement and Policy Options, London, Zed Books/Third World Network, 2000. 
71 
 
liberalisation and deregulation, technology development policies and 
competition regimes282.  
Fourth, although it might be that IPR protection will stimulate local 
innovation in developing countries, this innovation might have been achieved 
through other policies. For instance, access to low-cost and skilled workforce 
has played a more significant role than the increase of IPR protection in India to 
attract foreign multinationals in high technology sectors. According to D. 
Gervais, “stronger IPRs alone are not sufficient to establish effective conditions 
for technology development and growth. Rather they must be embedded in a 
broader set of complementary initiatives that maximize the potential of IPRs to 
be dynamically pro-competitive”283. The possibilities of local companies to 
innovate do not only depend on the stronger IPR protection. It also depends on 
the scientific and technological capabilities of the country.  
Finally, it is also argued that time is important. In the short-term the 
increase of IPR protection in developing countries produce net benefits for 
multinational companies based in developed countries. In the longer term the 
potential benefits of innovation, joint ventures and investment through greater 
transfer of technology and inflows of FDI should redress the balance in favour of 
developing countries. 
 
 
2. The particular case of Vietnam 
 
5. In relation with Vietnam, an increase in the registration of IPR has been 
experience in the latest years284. However, this does not imply that IPR has 
some impact on economic growth. In fact, most of those IPR have been 
registered by foreign firms. 
According to the existing literature this assessment is not an easy one 
since development and growth depends on several policies and strategies. It is 
difficult to evaluate the impact of IP laws and policies only285. In any case, it 
seems clear that if any, the increase of the level of IPR protection has shown a 
very small impact on the development of the economy and society in general.  
There are three reasons why the impact of the increase of IPR protection 
is not so strong and effective286.  
First, the enforcement of IPR is still weak in Vietnam for a number of 
reasons explained in chapter II. 
Second, public awareness about IPR is not appropriate.  
Third, IPR creation capacity is weak. Vietnam is short of scientists and 
engineers and the current R&D level – 0.5% of the country’s GDP – is generally 
low as compared with that of other countries in the region. Furthermore, 
Vietnam’s R&D sector is characterised by the fact that instead of research 
collaboration with universities, firms often do research by themselves. R&D 
activity in Vietnam is dominated by state-owned inefficient R&D organisations, 
which make up 60% of all the R&D organisations. Additionally, over 95% of 
                                               
282 S. Adams, “Intellectual property rights …”, 2010. 
283 D. Gervais, “The Changing Landscape…”, p. 66. 
284 Statistics on IPR registration and technology transfer can be consulted in Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, 
“Vietnam’s…”. 
285 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 80; M. P. Nguyen, “Impact …”, p. 116; N. P. Mai / N. V. 
Hung / T. N. Ca, “Impact …”, p. 15. 
286 N. P. Mai / N. V. Hung / T. N. Ca, “Impact …”, p. 15. 
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enterprises in Vietnam are SMEs, which do not have R&D sections. As a 
consequence of this the number of patents, utility solutions and industrial 
designs registered by local entities is very small. This is also due to the lack of a 
consolidated IP management strategy at SMEs and of business awareness. At 
present, enterprises pay more attention on creating and registering for 
trademark protection rather than creating other IP assets like patents or 
designs287. 
 
6. Despite the lack of impact of the increase of the level of IPR protection in 
Vietnam’s economy so far, there are elements that require the authorities to 
keep the same attitude towards IPR protection.  
First, Vietnam’s authorities have acknowledged in the Master Plan that 
“the business and investment environment in Vietnam has not really attracted 
European companies”288. As previously mentioned, the increase of IPR may 
help to attain this objective. Even more when one of the aims of the Master Plan 
is to “create the favourable environment to attract foreign direct investment 
from enterprises in very IPR-sensitive sectors such as “IT, telecom and bio-
tech”289.  
Second, the attraction of technology transfer would allow Vietnam to 
climb up the innovation chain. 
 Third, the attainment of other objectives mentioned in the Master Plan 
will also require an adequate IPR protection by Vietnam: increasing high-tech 
products including through joint venture or outsourcing for European 
enterprises and gradually build up Vietnam trademarks for exports to EU; 
import from EU the advance technologies together with tech transfer, know 
how, especially the IT and bio-technology290. In addition, the Master Plan states 
that cooperation should be established or followed to promote tech transfer; 
develop Vietnamese trade marks for high quality, nice and cheap products 
including products that Vietnam has already exported such as garments, 
footwear, timber products, handicrafts; boost the production of Vietnam’s 
leading products such as tea or coffee; developing Vietnam geographical 
guidelines; and boosting the cooperation with the EU in transfer of bio-tech. 
 Fourth, as mentioned in chapter I, the Development Strategy demands 
for the strong development of a scientific and technological market. The 
creation of such a market needs to be accompanied with the effective protection 
of IPR. 
 
7. The attainment of these objectives requires a positive attitude towards 
IPR. However, as it will be explained in the following sections, the increase of 
the level of protection needs to be accommodated to the particular 
circumstances of Vietnam and accompanied with other measures in order to 
create a viable technological base.  
 
 
                                               
287 Science and Technology Development Strategy by 2010 (Decision 272/2003-QD-TTg, 31 December 
2003).Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 92. L. Kilgour, “Building Intellectual Property…”, p. 345 
ff. 
288 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 98 add the following reasons to the lack of spillover 
effects of FDI: corruption, weak enforcement of IPR, and the absence of market forces. 
289 Master Plan, p. 9 and 11. 
290 Master Plan, p. 11. 
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III. COSTS OF THE INCREASE OF IPR PROTECTION FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
8. Despite the benefits that the strengthening of the IPR system may have 
on the economy of developing countries, some authors have identified some 
costs that may arise from such strengthening.  
 
9. First, there are the costs that derive from the implementation of the 
obligations established in the IPR treaties. For instance, there might be costs 
associated with the purchase of the required equipment for the processing of the 
registration of IPR, hiring new personnel, creation of new judicial courts, 
building of new facilities, and training of all the personnel in charge of 
administration and enforcement of IPR. In relation to border measures, the 
resources needed to secure borders against unlawful importation of infringing 
goods in difficult terrain such as long coastlines, deserts or jungles might be 
extremely high. Furthermore, fight against corruption within the IPR 
administration entail further costs in time and money291. 
 
10. A second problem identified by experts is that of access to medicines. 
When TRIPS was negotiated, developing countries expressed concerns that the 
requirement to grant patent to pharmaceutical products may lead to 
substantially higher drug prices, with adverse effects on healthcare services.  
These concerns were reflected in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. The Declaration stipulates that TRIPS “can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all. The right of the WTO members to take advantage of TRIPS 
compulsory licensing provision (art. 31) and to adopt the principle of 
international exhaustion of rights so as to facilitate parallel imports is recalled 
as well. Furthermore, a Decision was adopted to deal with the particular 
problem of developing countries that do not have a national industry capable of 
supplying the market with medicines in case of emergency292.  
The problem is that despite the Doha Declaration, certain FTAs provide 
for an increase of the IPR protection of pharmaceutical products by different 
means: the limitation of the situations where compulsory licenses can be 
applied for, the obligation to adopt the principle of national exhaustion of 
rights; the extension of the patent term of protection to compensate for 
unreasonable delays in issuing the patents or in the process of approval by the 
market regulatory authorities; or the protection of test data submitted to 
competent authorities for the approval of the marketing of pharmaceutical 
products.  
As a consequence of this, measures that are likely to restrict access to 
medicines at affordable prices by the population of developing countries still 
exist. 
In Vietnam, 21.45% of the population lives with less than 1.25 $ per 
day293. As a consequence, an increase on the prices of essential medicines may 
certainly create problems. As explained in chapter II, Vietnam was obliged to 
                                               
291 D. Matthews, Globalising …, p. 110. 
292 Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration and the Protocol 
amending the TRIPS Agreement. 
293 Human Development Index, 2011. 
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protect test data under the FTAs with the US and Japan. However, such 
protection is provided under unfair competition law, something that the US 
keeps complaining about294. Furthermore, Vietnam has adopted the principle of 
international exhaustion of right in order to allow parallel imports even in those 
cases where medicines where commercialised in foreign countries under 
compulsory licenses. 
 
11. A third problem relates to the influence that the strong IPR protection 
may have on the agricultural sector of developing countries. Certain FTAs 
require the patentability of all categories of life-forms, including plants, animal, 
biological processes, genes and gene sequences. In addition, there are some of 
these treaties that impose the ratification of the UPOV 1991 to ensure an 
effective protection of plant varieties rights.  
It is sustained that adopting these rules may have a considerable socio-
economic impact on developing countries that rely on agriculture to sustain its 
economy. Thanks to the monopoly rights granted large biotechnology 
companies may disrupt the access to essential products such as seeds or 
foodstuff in the same way as patents may restrict access to vital medicines for 
people in developing countries.  
In particular, UPOV 1991 provides for the extension of protection to all 
plant varieties and impose a full-scale monopoly right that might adversely 
affect the interests of poor farmers, in particular when their right to save seeds 
is removed. 
Vietnam’s economy is still predominantly based on agriculture. While 
dependence on this sector is decreasing, it contributes a 38’7 % to Vietnam GDP 
and 15% to exports (including rice, wood, rubber, coffee or shrimp)295. At the 
same time 41% of the work force is employed in this sector and 75% of the 
population still lives in rural areas.  
Despite that, Vietnam adopted the UPOV 1991 due to the commitments 
assumed in its FTAs. In a specific study on plants protection in Vietnam, C. 
Chiarolla sustains that the existing regime helps multinational corporations to 
consolidate their presence in the Vietnamese seed market. Whether Vietnamese 
companies will also benefit from such levels of IP protection with wealth-
maximising effects for all is an open question. The option for the UPOV 1991 
instead of other existing alternatives and the suboptimal use of TRIPS 
flexibilities in this field are all “examples of a trend towards an unbalanced 
model of commodification of resources and knowledge with far reaching 
implications for wealth redistribution, agricultural innovation, sustainability 
and development. Under these conditions, innovation spill-overs from 
agricultural research investments are more likely to be captured by the 
empowered groups, rather than promoting technology development and 
diffusion within distributed systems of innovation, such as those which 
characterise the agricultural sector in most developing countries”296.   
 
12. A fourth problem is that of misappropriation of indigenous knowledge 
and genetic resources. As previously mentioned, developing countries usually 
are biodiversity-rich. Since rights to indigenous knowledge are not explicitly 
                                               
294 US Special 301 Report 2011. 
295 European Commission statistics on Vietnam, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113463.pdf  
296 C. Chiarolla, Intellectual Property…, 2009. 
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protected in TRIPS, the complaint has been that IPR allow global acts to 
appropriate medicinal treatments used widely in developing countries297. 
This should not be a problem for Vietnam since the Biodiversity Law 
seems to provide an adequate protection of GRs and TK and ensures that local 
communities can share the benefits for the exploitation of those resources. 
However, none Vietnam’s partner has assumed an obligation to protect these 
assets in an FTAs so far. 
 
13. The last problem relates to access to knowledge. While the Berne 
Convention provides for a minimum term of protection of 50 year post mortem 
auctoris, FTAs increase that term to 70 years. It is argued that this has an 
adverse economic impact on libraries, universities, cultural institutions and the 
public at large. They will have to pay royalties for a longer time. The “copyright 
balance” is altered very much in favour of copyright owners at the expenses of 
users. 
Furthermore, while the WCT and WPPT oblige to provide sanctions to 
the acts of circumvention of TPM or alteration of RMI, Contracting states have a 
lot of flexibility to implement these obligations in their national laws. However, 
certain FTAs include very detailed provisions on how such obligations have to 
be implemented. For instance, TPM provisions in US FTAs, the EU-Korea FTA 
or ACTA prevent the circumvention for non-infringing usage, and interfere with 
the rights of consumers to deal with the goods they have legitimately purchased. 
The application of the exceptions to the exclusivity right is narrowed down as 
the owners can require payment for any use regardless of the user’s purpose. 
The use of the internet and digital works for educational or private non-
commercial purposes, or the use by educational and library organisations will be 
increasingly hindered because of this prohibition298. 
At present, the regulation of TPM and RMI in Vietnam does not seem to 
entail these problems. 
 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE EU’S FTAS: MEANS TO AVOID THE 
COSTS OF THE INCREASE OF IPR PROTECTION  
 
14. The general advantages that an FTA with the EU would provide Vietnam 
seems to overcome the possible costs that an IPR Chapter in that FTA may 
entail. Therefore, the question for Vietnam is not whether such FTA should 
include such a Chapter but how the competent authorities should implemented 
it in national law to reduce the possible cost of an increase of the level of IPR 
protection.  
The “one-size fits all” system does not fit at all. Vietnam should not just 
simply “copy-paste” the provisions in TRIPS or in the hypothetical FTA with the 
EU in its domestic legislation. Vietnamese authorities should adapt the IPR 
system provided in these treaties to its particular circumstances, including their 
industrial, cultural, legal and economic parameters299. As a representative from 
                                               
297 J. Kuanpoth, “TRIPS-plus Rules…”, p. 43. 
298 J. Kuanpoth, “TRIPS-plus Rules…”, p. 43. 
299 Developing countries make use of the elasticity of international IPR instruments to reconcile 
their rules to the extent possible with their industrial, cultural, legal and economic parameters, 
based on their determination of priorities (Gervais, p. 80). Adoption by less developed countries 
the IP protection level of countries that have already reached an advanced stage of development 
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NOIP said in an interview carried out for the elaboration of this Report, 
Vietnam needs to adopt a “sustainable IP system”. In addition to this, the IPR 
reform must be accompanied by measures aiming to create a viable 
technological base. For doing so, the following aspects should be taken into 
account. 
 
15. First of all, the sections on “General Principles” in the IPR Chapters of 
the EU’s FTAs provide more ambitious principles and objectives than those in 
arts. 7 and 8 TRIPS. Vietnam should negotiate for the inclusion of principles 
which are important for its socio-economic circumstances. The authorities 
would be able to rely on them when implementing those Chapters in domestic 
legislation. 
 
16. Second, the analysis of the provisions on substantive protection in the 
FTAs confirms that: a) the level of IPR protection is not heavily increase in 
relation to the existing level in Vietnam legislation; b) none of the flexibilities in 
TRIPS is removed.  
In relation to the problem of access to medicines, it is true that the EU’s 
FTAs provide for an extension of the term of protection. However, Vietnam 
would be able to keep its system of test data protection and to make use of 
compulsory licenses or exceptions to patent protection. Furthermore, Vietnam 
would be able to keep the principle of international exhaustion of rights. 
In relation to the problem for the agricultural sector, the EU’s FTAs do 
not provide for anything that does not already exist in Vietnamese regulation in 
relation to the protection of plant varieties rights and patents of life forms. 
In relation to the problem of the protection of GRs, TK and folklore, the 
EU’s FTAs include provisions to ensure their protection at an international 
level.  
In relation to the problem of access to knowledge, the EU’s FTAs increase 
the term of protection of copyright, but EU’s partners have plenty of flexibility 
to implement the obligations on TPM and RMI in the Internet Treaties. 
Furthermore, Vietnam would be able to make use of exceptions to the 
exclusivity rights as far as the three-step test is respected. 
 
17. Third, provisions on enforcement in the EU’s FTAs do certainly suppose a 
problem for Vietnam. They are very demanding and their implementation is 
costly.  
Art. 41.5 TRIPS needs to be recalled: the putting into practice of the 
necessary measures cannot create obligations “with respect to the distribution 
of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the 
enforcement of law in general”. According to this, Vietnam should be obliged to 
implement the provisions on enforcement in the FTAs up to the limit of its 
capacity. 
In the same sense, point 45 of the WIPO Development Agenda 
recommends “to approach IPR enforcement in the context of broader societal 
interests and specially development-oriented concerns, with a view that the 
protection and the enforcement of IPR should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to 
                                                                                                                                         
many hamstring the ability of the former to take advantage of the same path to development” (L. 
Kilgour, “Building…”, p. 322). 
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the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in 
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations” in accordance with Art. 7 TRIPS. 
 
18. Fourth, the determination of the most appropriate way to implement the 
obligation in the IPR Chapters must take into account corresponding policies in 
relevant sectors such as agriculture, S&T and education300.  
In particular, it is sustained that IPR reforms must be accompanied with 
measures to improve the R&D system of a country. As previously mentioned, 
the possibilities of local companies to innovate do not only depend on the 
stronger IPR protection. It also depends on the scientific and technological 
capabilities of the country. Developing countries are far from homogenous. A 
country must be able to make good use of imported technology and eventually 
to compete with its own R&D efforts301.  
This has not passed unnoticed to Vietnam authorities. While the present 
state of S&T in the country is very poor, the government made clear in the 
Science and Technology Development Strategy by 2010302 that S&T together 
with education and training development are the first national policies. 
Furthermore, bringing Vietnam’s science and technological capacity to the level 
of regional leaders is one of the major goals of the country’s current five-year 
plan on science and technology303. Other goals of the Plan include the 
improvement of the quality and efficiency of scientific research, building a 
strong scientific work force and increasing international research 
collaborations. This should allow Vietnam not only to reduce the cost of the IPR 
provisions in the hypothetical FTA but to make profit out of them. 
 
19. Fifth, in order to comply with its obligations in the EU’s FTA, Vietnam 
should benefit from cooperation mechanisms provided for in their IPR 
Chapters.  
As it will be explained in the following chapter, technical assistance is 
needed to implement the FTA in a manner that best accommodates to the 
particular circumstances of each country. It is sustained that developing 
countries often lack the expertise and resources to draft legislation that 
addresses their specific needs304. It also plays an important role to train the 
personnel that is in charge of the administration and enforcement of IPR.  
But not only that: technical assistance programs can also help a country 
to create the structures needed to take full profits of the technology that arrives 
to the country and for the establishment of a R&D structures capable of taking 
all the profit from IPR protection. In fact, in the EU-CA AA the promotion of 
technical and financial cooperation in the area of IPR is an objective on its own 
that Central American countries can benefit from. 
                                               
300 P. Roffe, “Intellectual Property, Bilateral Agreements and Sustainable Development: the 
Challenges of Implementation”, CIEL, January 2007. 
301 Examples of measures that can be adopted in order to improve the R&D system of a country 
include: granting merit-based research subsidies or grants to local creators, an incentive to local 
innovators and creators; scholarships to the best students and researchers to go to the top 
foreign universities especially in fields of S&T of great relevance for the country. Gervais, p. 66. 
302 Available at http://www.most.gov.vn/Desktop.aspx/Details-Article/ST-
stratergy/The_translation_is_for_reference/  
303 Decision 67/2006/QD-TTg of 21 March 2006. 
304 L. Kilgour, “Building…”, p. 323 
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CHAPTER IV 
COOPERATION MECHANISMS IN THE IPR CHAPTER IN 
A HYPOTHETICAL FTA BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE 
EU 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. As it has been previously mentioned, the adoption of legislative measures 
in the field of IPR protection and enforcement by developing countries are not 
enough by themselves neither to ensure an effective protection and enforcement 
of the IPR of both national and foreign companies, nor to promote the 
international transfer of technology, nor to favour the growth of national 
industries based on research and innovative activities. 
Among other things – political dialogue, sanctions… - such measures 
need to be accompanied of cooperation mechanisms to help EU’s partners to 
attain these objectives. It should be recalled that developed countries undertook 
in Art. 67 TRIPS the obligation to provide technical and financial cooperation to 
developing and least-developed countries in order to facilitate the 
implementation of the Agreement305. Such obligation is reconfirmed in the 
Doha Declaration306, and the TRIPS Council has implemented a mechanism to 
monitor the efforts of each developed WTO members on the compliance of this 
obligation307. It is for their own benefit – increase the level of IPR-related 
exports and investment – that developing countries experiment an economic 
growth. 
In order to comply with this obligation the EU has adopted cooperation 
mechanisms in development programs adopted unilaterally or in bilateral 
agreements. 
 
2. Bilateral EU cooperation has targeted Vietnam among many other 
countries. The cooperation began in 1989. At present, Vietnam receives aid from 
the EU in the framework of the EU-Vietnam Country Strategy Paper (2007-
2013)308. Several projects have been funded under this project, including 
MUTRAP. Many of them include actions in the field of IPR.  
In addition to this, Vietnam benefits from cooperation schemes 
established in the framework of the ASEAN-EU Cooperation Agreement such as 
                                               
305 “In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed country Members 
shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial 
cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation 
shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the prevention of their abuse, and shall 
include support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies 
relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel”. 
306 Par. 11.2. 
307 Decision of 19 February 2003 (WTO document IP/C/28). 
308 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/vietnam/csp/07_13_en.pdf  
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the ECAP project whose aim is to facilitate “ASEAN regional integration by 
building capacity in ASEAN Member States to manage and benefit from a 
reinforced IPR system”309.  
A new period on the bilateral cooperation between Vietnam and the EU 
will open when the new PAC enters into force. Art. 20.2 states that “[t]he Parties 
agree to enhance cooperation on intellectual property protection and 
enforcement”, and paragraph 3 clarifies that such “cooperation shall be 
implemented in the forms agreed by the Parties, including to exchange 
information and experiences” on all IPR-related aspects310. In addition to this, 
“[t]he Parties agree to strengthen scientific and technological cooperation in 
areas of mutual interest […] taking account of their respective policies and 
cooperation programmes”311.  
 
3. Taking these precedents into account, the purpose of this Chapter is 
triple: a) to identify and explain common cooperation schemes provided in the 
EU’s FTAs; b) to assess whether the inclusion of similar cooperation measures 
in a hypothetical FTA with Vietnam will add something to the bilateral 
cooperation schemes that already exist; c) to provide some recommendations on 
how these cooperation mechanisms should be modelled to avoid problems that 
have been identified in the existing technical assistance programs.  
It is important to note that EU projects in Vietnam will not last forever as 
far as they depend on EU’s strategic needs in Southeast Asia and on the 
perception that the EU has on Vietnam’s economic development. Therefore, it is 
possible that, in the near future, Vietnam would only be able to rely on the 
cooperation structures mutually agreement in international agreements.  
 
4. When analysing the “cooperation” provisions included in the EU’s FTAs, 
it is interesting to note that they are very detailed in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
– different from the other FTAs, IPR provisions are included in a chapter 
entitled “Innovation and intellectual property” – and the EU-CP TA, but they 
are much more programmatic in the EU-CA AA and the EU-Korea FTA. In this 
latter case, this can be explained on the fact that the Republic of Korea is not a 
developing country that needs help from the EU to implement its obligations in 
the FTA. 
Having in mind that cooperation schemes in the FTAs relate to enhance 
IPR protection and enforcement, technology transfer and research, 
development and innovation (R&D+I), this chapter will be divided into three 
sections. 
 
 
II. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF IPR PROTECTION AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
                                               
309 http://www.ecap-project.org/  
310 “[…] such as the practice, promotion, dissemination, streamlining, management, 
harmonisation, protection, enforcement and effective application of intellectual property rights, 
the prevention of abuses of such rights, the fight against counterfeiting and piracy, including, 
inter alia, the establishment and strengthening of organisations for the control and protection of 
such rights”. 
311 Art. 39. 
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5. Two of the difficulties which have been identified regarding IPR 
protection and enforcement in Vietnam are: a) the shortage of human resources 
in terms of quantity and quality; b) the low public awareness of the importance 
of IPR protection312. 
 
6. In order to face the first problem, the only cooperation mechanism 
explicitly mentioned in the PAC is the “exchange of information and 
experiences”. The cooperation mechanisms provided for in EU’s FTAs go 
further beyond: a) exchange of information and experiences on the legal 
framework concerning IPR and relevant rules of protection and enforcement313; 
b) capacity building or training of personnel; c) enhancement of institutional 
cooperation between IP offices. 
The need of these cooperation mechanisms starts with the process of 
implementation of the FTA in the drafting of all the legislation needed and 
continues, inter alia, with trainings to the competent authorities – including 
judges and personnel of IPR administration – in charge of the application of 
that legislation314.  
 
7. In relation to the second problem, while the PAC does not say anything, 
the EU’s FTAs call the Parties to adopt mechanisms to increase public 
awareness (on business circles and civil society as well as public awareness of 
consumers and right holders)315. 
Vietnamese scholars consider this the most important measures to 
improve IPR protection and reduce IPR infringement along with raising 
awareness on IPR-related issues316.  
Public awareness seminar and campaigns should target persons ranging 
from police officers, customs officers and local governments officials to 
students, teachers, enterprises focusing on the scientific identification and 
effective eradications of counterfeit and pirated goods.  
A different aspect of the problem of lack of public awareness is the “lack 
of legal habit” among Vietnam businesses: even the most prominent domestic 
businesses tend not to seek legal advice prior to entering into contracts, instead 
seeking law firm counsel only after conflict has arisen317. 
 
8. While the adoption of an FTA with the EU would provide Vietnam the 
legal framework to ask for technical assistance to fight both problems, there 
appears to exist a general view that this cooperation mechanism needs to be 
better focused. 
From the opinions of several IP experts and of the persons interviewed in 
the framework of this report, the following problems need to be tackled:  
 
                                               
312 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 95. 
313 Arts. 10.69.1.a) EU-Korea FTA, 164.2.b EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 55.1.A EU-CA AA, 256.1 a) 
EU-CP TA. 
314 In the case of the FTAs concluded by the US, the agreement does not enter into force until the 
partner has adopted the necessary implementation legislation that meets the expectations of the 
US. This is not the case of EU’s FTAs.  
315 Arts. 256.2.d) EU-CP TA, 55.1.b) EU-CA AA, 10.69.1.e) EU-Korea FTA. 
316 Y. Heo / T. N. Kien, “Vietnam’s…”, p. 95. 
317 L. Kilgour, “Building …”, pp. 317 ff. 
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a) Technical assistance programs follow a “one size fits all” vision of 
IPR in their approach. They focus on the strengthening and enforcement of IPR 
in accordance with the highest standards provided in TRIPS or any other 
multilateral treaties. Developing countries often lack the expertise and resources 
to draft implementing legislation. Since the technical assistance they received 
follows this approach of IPR, it is not surprise that their legislation end up being 
a copy of TRIPS or of a legislation of a developed country following this 
approach318. Unfortunately the technical assistance they receive does not help 
them to make use of the flexibilities provided for in international agreement to 
adapt the implementing legislation to the specific needs of the country.  
Among the things which are not adequately explained, M. Leesti / T. 
Pengelly list the following: how to utilize the flexibilities, safeguards and 
technical assistance provisions in TRIPS; how to ensure that the national IPR 
system can best promote innovation, creativity, access to knowledge and 
transfer of technology; or how to better implement the Doha Declaration319. 
The cause of this problem usually is that speakers follow the “one size fits 
all” model previously mentioned or that they are not well-prepared. However, it 
is suspected that another cause of the problem is that the significant interests 
that developed countries have as importers of products in a particular 
developing country can play a determinant role on the shaping of a technical 
assistance program320.  
 
b) Technical assistance programs are not usually appropriately 
tailored to the circumstances of each developing country. The reason might be 
that foreign speakers usually lack knowledge of the local IPR issues and the 
socio-economic circumstances of the country321, however it might also be the 
case that there is a lack in the developing country of a person with enough 
expertise to provide a need assessment regarding IPR.  
In Vietnam, interviewees consider that trainings by foreign experts are 
important, but they are mostly hold in English and not every competent 
authority understands English. Therefore, it was recommended that such 
trainings should be provided by local experts in Vietnamese at least to lower 
level authorities. Furthermore, it is said that those training should be targeted at 
different groups depending on their competences and the geographical area 
where they are located.   
 
c)  The beneficiaries of IP-related technical assistance are usually 
national IP offices, but seldom other national agencies with competences in IP 
or business organisations. In the opinion of some persons interviewed for this 
Report, trainings need to be provided not only to member of NOIP but also of 
other agencies such as the scientific inspectorates or the custom authorities. It is 
worth mentioning that art. 55.2 EU-CA AA pays special attention to cooperation 
on custom matters, focusing in particular on the increasing of the information 
exchange and coordination between the relevant customs administrations. 
Nothing similar is mentioned in the other treaties. 
                                               
318 K. Maskus / J. Reichman, “The Globalisation of Private Knowledge Goods and the 
Privatisation of Global Public Goods”, Journal of International Economy Law, 2004, pp. 279 ff. 
319 M. Leesti / T. Pengelly, “Assessing Technical Assistance Needs for Implementing the TRIPS 
Agreement in LDCs”, ICTSD, August 2007. 
320 C. Chiarolla, Intellectual Property..., p. 239. 
321 L. Kilgour, “Building Intellectual Property…”, p. 345 ff. 
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d)  These trainings seldom target business associations and 
companies as the intended end users of IP policies322. The following example 
illustrates the problem that these actors suffer due to the lack of IP awareness: 
“[Vietnam] has increased its seafood export to the US drastically, but exporters 
complain that their good quality products suffer due to the difficulties to register 
trade marks. As result, their price is lower than it would be justified otherwise”. 
The reason is that Vietnamese businesses have not been trained to register 
trademarks and are not in a position to catch the attention of consumers323.  
 
e) Something that is requested by Vietnamese authorities is access to 
IT devices or of databases managed by other countries or international 
organisations, in particular in relation to counterfeiting goods. This lack has 
also being identified by enterprises doing business in Vietnam324.  
Unfortunately, the only FTA that explicitly refers to this kind of cooperation is 
the EU-CA AA: “cooperation on the development and enhancement of electronic 
systems of the IP offices in the Republics of Central America”. While the other 
treaties do not include a similar provision, it might be the case that the sharing 
of data is included within the institutional cooperation between IP offices. 
 
9. Despite these problems, it should be recalled that some technical 
assistance programs have been very successful. For instance, thanks to the 
“Modernisation of the Industrial Property Administration Project” sponsored by 
the Japanese Government, the number of applications processed in 2005 
increased by 25% over 2004. Also there was a program to support enterprises 
and creators with regard to information, legal understanding, and developing, 
exploiting and managing methodology. One of the positive advances made is 
that the number of IP assets in Vietnam increased, as well as the number of 
Vietnamese inventions and utility solutions: applications increased in 2005 by 
nearly 80% over 2004325. 
Vietnam has already received a great deal of IP-related technical 
assistance. It might be appropriate to confirm whether such technical assistance 
has matched the needs of the country and to identify those aspects where 
further assistance is required. Someone within Vietnam’s IP administration 
should make that need assessment. 
 
 
III. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
10. As it has been mentioned in chapter II, EU’s FTAs and TRIPS contain 
provisions on technology transfer with two different but closely linked 
objectives: first, to oblige States to promote international technology transfer; 
                                               
322 M. Kostecki, “Intellectual Property and Economic Development: What Technical Assistance 
to Redress the Balance in Favour of Developing Nations?”, ICTSD, Issue Paper, No. 14; P. 
Roffe/D. Vivas/G. Vea, “Maintaining Policy Space for Development”, ICTSD, Issue Paper, No. 
19. 
323 M. Kostecki, “Intellectual Property…”, p. 22. 
324 Evaluation of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Strategy in Third Countries, 
Final Report, November 2010,  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_147053.pdf 
325 M. P. Nguyen, “Impact…”, p. 116. 
83 
 
second, to enable the States to adopt measures to fight abusive practices in 
technology transfer contracts between companies. Cooperation mechanisms in 
EU’s FTAs relate to the first of these objectives.  
 
11. According to one of the basic provisions of TRIPS, IPR protection is not 
an aim on itself but a means to “contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.” (art. 7). 
As it has been explained in the previous chapter, a strong IPR protection 
system is one of the elements that help developing countries to attract foreign 
direct investment. Thanks to this, local industries may have access to foreign 
technology. In the long run, these industries will be able to benefit from that 
technology to carry out their own research activities. However, the more 
technology-advanced is a country, the more they can benefit from an IPR 
system and the more they can compete in the global markets. That’s why any 
IPR reform must be accompanied by measures to reinforce the R&D system of a 
country. 
As a means to accelerate this process, art. 66.2 TRIPS states that 
“developed countries are called to provide incentives to enterprises and 
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to Least Developed Countries in order to enable them to 
create a sound and viable technological base”. 
 
12. The provisions in the EU’s FTAs build on these two provisions. The 
regulation is more abundant in the EU-CP TA, the EU-CA AA and the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA than in the EU-Korea FTA, something which can be easily 
explained by the more advanced level of development of the latter. 
 To start with, it should be recalled that, in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and 
the EU-CA AA, the transfer and dissemination of technology and know-how is 
an objective on its own326. In the EU-CP TA, the need to maintain a balance 
between the rights of IPR holders and technology transfer is a guiding principle 
of the IPR Chapter327.  
The cooperation mechanisms that the FTAs provide for to achieve this 
objective are:  
 
a) Exchange of views and information on their practices and policies 
affecting transfer of technology both domestically and internationally. Particular 
attention shall be paid to the conditions necessary to create an adequate 
enabling environment for technology transfer, including issues such as 
development of human capital and legal framework328. The EU-CP TA connects 
technology transfer with R&D when stating that particular attention in this 
exchange of information shall be paid to the creation of an “adequate enabling 
environment for the promotion of lasting relations between the scientific 
communities of the Parties, the intensification of activities to promote linkage, 
innovation and technology transfer between the Parties”329.  
                                               
326 Arts. 132 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 228 EU-CA AA. 
327 Art. 196. 
328 Arts. 142 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 231 EU-CA AA, 10.3 EU-Korea FTA. 
329 Art. 255. 
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b) In all the treaties but the EU-Korea FTA, the EU undertake the 
obligation established in art. 66.2 TRIPS to offer its institutions and enterprises 
incentives destined to promote and to favour the transfer of technology to the 
other Party, in such a way that allows the establishment of a viable technological 
platform330. 
 
 c) Academic, professional and/or business exchange programs 
directed to the transmission of knowledge from the EU to the other Parties331. 
  
d) The EU-CP TA provides also for the promotion of capacity 
building and training of personnel in this area to the extent of each Party’s 
possibilities.  
 
13. In relation with Vietnam, taking into account that the PAC does not 
include a provision in this field, the inclusion of provisions such as those in a 
hypothetical FTA with the EU would be very beneficial for the country’s access 
to foreign technology. 
 
 
IV. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
14. It is sustained that higher standards of IPR protection may increase the 
level of innovation in high technology sectors in developing countries. This can 
be further stimulated if international technology transfer is efficiently 
promoted. 
As scholars state, “the way forward for most developing countries is not 
only to intensify their move toward a more efficient IPR regime, but also to 
intensify their technological R&D to maximize their growth potential”332.  
However, public and private research and innovative institutions cannot 
take all the profits from the IPR systems unless well-established R&D systems 
exist in their respective countries. Furthermore, an important component of any 
program to attract high-quality FDI and promote technology transfer is the 
development of a competent indigenous technological capacity333. 
 
15. Art. 66.2 TRIPS oblige developed countries to help least developed 
countries to create a sound and viable technological base. For that purpose they 
are called to provide incentives to their economic actors for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer.  
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA and the EU-CP TA go further beyond TRIPS 
since they include specific cooperation mechanisms conceived for helping their 
partners to improve their R&D systems. Unfortunately, the Parties are only 
obliged “to encourage”334 or “to foster in compliance with their internal rules”335 
these mechanisms.  
                                               
330 Arts. 142.3 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 255.5 EU-CP TA, 55.3.b) EU-CA AA. 
331 Arts. 255.2 EU-CP TA, 55.3.a) EU-CA AA. 
332 S. Adams, “Intellectual property rights …”, 2010. 
333 S. Adams, “Intellectual property rights …”, 2010. 
334 Arts. 255.2 and 3 EU-CP TA,  
335 Art. 136 EU-CARIFORUM EPA. 
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a) Participation of entities and experts on their respective systems of 
science and technology (S&T) in projects and joint R&D+I networks with the 
purpose of strengthening their capacities in S&T. Such participation can be 
implemented by means of: joint R&D+I activities and educational projects; 
visits and exchange of researchers and experts; joint organisation of scientific 
meetings to foster exchanges of information and interaction; joint R&D+I 
networks; exchange and sharing of equipment and materials. The EU-
CARIFORUM EPA includes many other initiatives such as the participation of 
non-EU entities in the Knowledge and Innovation Communities of the 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology336. 
 
b) Exchange of information about R&D+I projects funded from 
public purposes. In particular, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA talks about joint 
initiatives to raise awareness of the S&T capacity building programs of the EU, 
including the international dimension of the Framework Programmes for 
Research and Technological Development337. 
 
c) Capacity building and trainings of personnel in this area to the 
extent of their possibilities. In the EU-CARIFORUM EPA it is further explained 
that these actions should be implemented with the purpose of creating long-
lasting sustainable links between the S&T communities of each Parties. 
 
In the EU-CA AA the scope of the provisions related to R&D is more 
modest but, contrary to the previous FTAs, it creates an obligation for the EU to 
facilitate and promote programs aimed to the creation of activities of R&D in 
Central America, “to attend the region's needs, such as access to medicines, 
infrastructure and technology development necessary for the development of 
their people, among others”338. 
 
16. When comparing the provisions in the FTAs with that in art. 39 PAC, it 
can be observed that they do not add much to the cooperation mechanisms in 
S&T that Vietnam will benefit from once the PAC enters into force.  
In any case, it is a common opinion that the country is in urgent need 
from external cooperation in this field.  
According to the Science and Technology Development Strategy by 2010, 
S&T together with education and training development are the first national 
policies. S&T must contribute an important role in promoting the country socio-
economic development. However, the Strategy and some scholars have 
identified several defects that place the R&D system in Vietnam well below 
international standards. Besides the facts explained in chapter III, there is a lack 
of cooperation among R&D organisations, universities and enterprises. 
Vietnam’s R&D sector is characterised by the fact that instead of research 
collaboration with universities, firms often do research by themselves. 
Furthermore, the level of IP awareness among researchers and institutions 
remains low. It is not common that research institutions have an office 
dedicated to IP management. Technical assistance has not satisfied the need to 
                                               
336 http://eit.europa.eu/ 
337 http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm  
338 Art. 55.3. c). 
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develop adequate IP management policies and procedures for national 
universities and research institutes so far. 
These might be some of the reasons why, despite the fact that the IP 
system is sufficiently reliable to enable research institutions to benefit from 
registering their innovation, very few of them have registered patents or 
copyrights. Furthermore, these also explain why the number of foreign patent 
applicants is much higher than domestic.  
  Taking this overall assessment into account, it is not surprising that 
raising Vietnam’s science and technological capacity to the level of regional 
leaders is one of the major goals of the country’s current five-year plan on 
science and technology339. Other goals of the Plan include improving the quality 
and efficiency of scientific research, building a strong scientific work force and 
increasing international research collaborations.  
In relation with this latest aspect, the Strategy states that “international 
cooperation on S&T should be promoted in order to exploit opportunities 
brought in by the globalisation”. Cooperation mechanisms provided for in the 
EU’s FTAs would certainly help Vietnam to attain its objective in this field.  
  
                                               
339 Decision 67/2006/QD-TTg of 21 March 2006. 
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ANNEX 
PROBABLE CONTENT OF AN IPR CHAPTER IN A 
HYPOTHETICAL FTA BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE EU 
 
Content of the hypothetical 
provisions of the Chapter 
Provisions in Vietnam IPR 
Legislation probably affected by 
the Chapter 
Objectives, general obligations and principles 
Objectives 
Adequate and effective IPR protection 
and enforcement 
Promotion of technology transfer 
Promotion of technical and financial 
cooperation 
 
General obligations 
Implement the provisions of the 
chapter and the int’l treaties to attain 
the abovementioned objectives 
National conformity clause 
 
General principles 
Doha Declaration on Public Health 
Decision on implementation of 
Paragraph 6. 
Protocol Amending TRIPS 
References to Arts. 7 and 8 TRIPS 
 
Exhaustion of rights 
Parties are free to establish their own 
regime 
 
Vietnam´s FTAs only mention the first 
objective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam has not ratified the Protocol 
yet. 
 
 
Vietnam has adopted the principle of 
international exhaustion 
Substantive provisions on IPR protection 
Patents 
 
International treaties 
Obligation to comply with Budapest 
Treaty and PCT 
“make all reasonable efforts to accede 
to” PLT 
 
Patent term extension 
No general obligation 
 
Protection of test data 
Any system of protection is admitted. 
 
 
 
Obligation to accede to this treaty is 
already established in Agreement with 
Switzerland. 
Vietnam is party to the PCT 
 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam protects test data as business 
secrets. 
Plant Varieties  
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International treaties 
No general obligation to accede to 
UPOV 91 
 
Farmers’ privilege 
In different terms depending on the 
FTA 
 
 
Vietnam is already a party to UPOV 91 
 
 
 
Vietnam applies Art. 15.2 UPOV. 
Trademarks 
 
International agreements 
References (but no general obligation 
to accede) to: Madrid Protocol, TLT 
1994 and 2006. 
 
Registration procedures 
Obligation to adopt opposition 
procedures 
Decision duly reasoned and 
communicated in writing 
Opportunity to contest the refusal 
Public available data base of 
applications and registrations 
 
Well-known trademarks 
Different content in each of the FTAs 
 
Exceptions 
Fair use of descriptive terms by third 
parties 
In certain FTAs provision on relation 
between GIs and previous trademarks. 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam is party to Madrid system 
Obligation to make all reasonable 
efforts to adhere to TLT exists in 
Agreement with Switzerland 
 
At first sight, Vietnam’s legislation is 
consistent with these provisions, but 
practitioners have identified many 
problems in practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Art. 125.2 g) IPL seems to be 
consistent with these provisions. 
Industrial Designs 
 
International Agreements 
“all reasonable efforts” to accede to 
the Geneva Act 
 
Requirements for protection 
Individual character 
Exclusion from protection of designs 
dictated essentially by technical or 
functional consideration, or that is 
contrary to public policy 
 
Scope of protection 
Making, selling, importing, offering, 
stocking or using 
Acts for commercial purpose or that 
unduly prejudice the normal 
 
 
 
Obligation to make all reasonable 
efforts to adhere to Hague Agreement 
exists in Agreement with Switzerland 
 
Arts. 66-67 IPL establish slightly 
different requirements 
Similar exclusion exists in art. 64  
 
 
 
 
All these acts seem to be covered by 
art. 124.2 IPL 
IPL does not refers to the last two 
categories of acts. 
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exploitation or that is not compatible 
with fair trade practice. 
 
Term of protection 
No common provision 
 
Exceptions 
FTAs reproduce art. 26.1 TRIPS 
 
Relation to copyright 
The subject matter of protection can 
also be protected under copyright law 
 
 
 
 
5 years, renewable for two consecutive 
5-year terms. 
Geographical indications 
 
Mutual Recognition 
Obligation for the parties to mutually 
recognise and protect the GIs of the 
other party included in an Annex. 
 
Enhanced protection 
The protection granted to GIs in 
general is at least equivalent to that of 
wine and spirits in TRIPS. 
Protection is subject to the protection 
of the GI in the country of origin. 
In some FTAs, extension of protection 
to non-agricultural products 
 
 
 
Cooperation mechanisms 
Enhanced cooperation in GIs is 
explicitly mentioned in the PAC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam level of protection is similar 
but some exceptions exist. 
 
 
 
Vietnam protects GIs of non-
agricultural products. 
Problems may appear with relation 
between GIs and previous trademarks 
and generic terms. 
Genetic resources, traditional 
knowledge and folklore 
 
Endorsement of the CBD in some of 
the FTAs 
 
Mutually supportive interpretation of 
CBD and TRIPS 
 
Recognition of the importance of 
respecting, preserving and 
maintaining GRs, TK and folklore 
 
Promotion of the application of these 
resources with the approval of its 
holders and encouraging the equitable 
sharing of benefits. 
 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam is party to the CBD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Biodiversity Law ensures the 
attainment of these objectives. 
Protection of folklore is also 
recognised in IPL  
Copyright and related rights.  
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International treaties 
Obligation to comply with Berne 
Conv., Rome Conv, WCT and WPPT. 
 
Term of protection 
At least 70 year for copyright; at least 
50 for related rights 
 
Collecting societies 
Facilitate the establishment of 
arrangements to ensure access to and 
delivery of licenses for the use of 
content 
 
Broadcasting and communication to 
the public  
in relation to performers, producers of 
phonograms and broadcasters 
 
Protection of TPM and RMI 
Except for EU-Korea FTA, the 
protection shall be granted in 
accordance with WCT and WPPT. 
 
 
Vietnam is not a party to WCT and 
WPPT. Its ratification might imply 
some amendments to the IPL. 
 
At present 50 years (art. 27 IPL) 
 
 
 
Other FTAs ratified by Vietnam also 
provide for cooperation in this field. 
 
 
 
 
Similar obligations are established in 
other FTAs ratified by Vietnam 
 
 
 
Vietnam already protects TPM and 
RMI but some amendments might be 
needed 
IPR Enforcement 
General provisions 
 
General obligation 
Obligation to provide the means to 
ensure an effective IPR enforcement.  
Reference to art. 41 TRIPS.  
No obligation to put in place a special 
IPR enforcement system (art. 41.5 
TRIPS) 
 
Entitled applicants 
Right holders, persons authorised to 
use the rights; collective management 
bodies, professional defense bodies. 
 
 
 
Some doubts about the deterrent 
effects of penalties: preference for 
administrative remedies, lack of 
enough criminal procedures 
initiated…. 
 
 
 
It does not seem like licensee can be 
considered entitled applicants in 
accordance with IPL. 
Civil and administrative 
measures 
 
Evidence 
Competent authorities are empowered 
to order that evidence be produced by 
the opposing party, before or after the 
proceedings have started. 
 
Right of information 
Competent authorities can order the 
infringer or any other person involved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No provision in Vietnamese law 
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in the litigation to provide information 
about his accomplices, upstream or 
downstream in the channels of 
production and distribution 
 
Provisional and precautionary 
measures 
FTAs allow the adoption of measures 
that go beyond those established in 
art. 50 TRIPS 
 
 
 
 
Corrective measures 
Recall, definitive removal from the 
channels of commerce or destruction 
of infringing goods or materials used 
in their production. 
 
 
Injunctions 
Competent authorities may order the 
prohibition of the continuation of the 
infringement and impose a penalty 
payment in case of non-compliance. 
These measures can be adopted 
against intermediaries 
 
Damages and legal costs 
Two alternatives to calculate damages 
are established in case of conscious 
infringer 
In case of innocent infringer, pre-
established damages can be adopted. 
The infringer shall pay the right 
holder expenses as a general rule 
 
 
 
Publication of decisions 
Following a ex parte petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The IPL does not seem to include for 
civil procedures all the provisional 
measures established in the FTAs 
No possibility to adopt those measure 
before the commencement of the 
proceedings 
 
 
 
It is doubtful that the “charitable 
donation” of the infringing goods is 
consistent with the obligations in the 
FTA. 
Certain of these measures do not 
apply to all categories of IPR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Damages can only be requested in civil 
procedures.  
Some amendment might be needed to 
adapt the principles of calculation of 
damages in the IPL to the FTAS’ 
requirements. 
IPL should make sure that procedural 
expenses is included in the concept of 
“legal costs”. 
 
 
IPL provides for “public apology and 
rectification”. 
Border Measures 
 
Obligation to sanction the 
importation, exportation and transit 
of counterfeited or pirated goods. 
 
Pirated good include goods on 
infringement of related rights. Other 
While the legislation seems to be 
consistent with the obligations in the 
FTAs, there are great concerns about 
the problems that exist to implement 
this legislation in practice. 
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treaties extent the definition of 
counterfeit goods to include 
infringement of designs, GIs, patents 
and plant variety rights. 
 
Border measures can be taken against 
the importer, the exporter or the 
holder of the goods. 
Provisions on Technology Transfer 
Power of the parties to adopt 
measures to prevent practices that 
may constitute and abuse of IPR 
having an adverse effect on 
competition (art. 40 TRIPS)  
or which may unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology 
(art. 8.2) 
The power of Vietnam authorities to 
fight these practices is governed by the 
IPL, the Technology Transfer Law and 
the Competition Law. 
Cooperation 
Cooperation in the field of IPR 
protection and enforcement 
Exchange of information and 
experiences 
Capacity building 
Institutional cooperation between IP 
offices 
 
Cooperation in the field of technology 
transfer 
Exchange of views and information on 
their practices and policies affecting 
technology transfer both domestically 
and internationally 
Incentives to institutions and 
enterprises to promote and favour 
technology tranfer 
Academic, professional and/or 
business exchange programs 
Capacity building 
 
Cooperation in the field of research 
and development: 
Participation of entities and experts 
on their respective system of science 
and technology 
Exchange of information abut R&D 
projects funded from public sources 
Capacity building 
 
 
PAC exclusively talks about “exchange 
of information and experiences” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar provisions are established in 
the PAC (art. 39). 
 
